VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 4, OCTOBER, 1958

Educational Theory....

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEORY OF LEARNING

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND JOHN DEWEY'S EXPERIMENTALISM

EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY IN FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND

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Published by THE JOHN DEWEY SOCIETY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY, and THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

A Medium of Expression for the John Dewey Society and the Philosophy of Education Society

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Subscriptions: REGULAR RATE	$4.00
FOR MEMBERS OF THE JOHN DEWEY SOCIETY	$3.00
Membership Dues in the John Dewey Society	$5.00
Membership Dues in the Philosophy of Education Society	$8.00
Foreign Subscriptions	$5.00

All regular subscriptions should be sent directly to the Editorial Office, 105 Gregory Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. Members of the societies should send their subscriptions through their respective society. Statements concerning admission to membership in these societies are on the inside back cover.

Manuscripts and general correspondence should be sent to the Editorial Office, 105 Gregory Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

Entered as second class matter under Act of Congress, March 3, 1879, at the post office in Columbus, Ohio.

SPAHR & GLENN CO., 50 EAST BROAD STREET, COLUMBUS, OHIO

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Educational Theory

Volume VIII October, 1958 Number 4

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEORY OF LEARNING

BY R. J. HENLE, S. J.

IF WE WERE TO POLL PHILOSOPHERS AND EDUCATORS, NOT ONLY AMONG THE LIVING BUT AMONG THOSE ALSO WHOM CHESTERTON HAS CALLED THE GREAT DEMOCRACY OF THE DEAD, I think we could pose one question which would reveal fairly wide agreement. If we asked, "Are intelligence and reason important in life and in education?" Aristotle, for example, might comment, "The animals other than man live by appearances and memories and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings."[1] Aquinas might amplify his "yes" by two remarks, "Intelligence is a form of life, and of living things, it is the most perfect"[2] and ". . . man is the master of his own acts through reason and will."[3] On another questionnaire we might read, "To expatiate upon the importance of thought would be absurd. The traditional definition of man as 'the thinking animal' fixes thought as the essential difference between men and the brutes—surely an important matter,"[4] John Dewey thus repeating a remark from "How We Think." And we can be sure that, in the answers collected from the authors of *Modern Philosophies and Education*,[5] intelligence and reason would receive a vote of confidence. Indeed in recent years, many have felt constrained to express this confidence as an article of an explicit and loudly-stated creed. The word "anti-intellectualism" can now be filed with sin, communism, discrimination, and the torturing of small children. We are against it; we are shocked by it.

Now it might be said that even at this level the alleged agreement is illusory, since the words "knowledge," "reason" and "intelligence" simply mask a profound diversity of positions. Yet, before granting this, I think we should note a fact that is equally striking, namely, that there is, among philosophers of all types, a certain implicit agreement as to what is "intelligent" and what is validly "knowledge." Isn't it a fact that when we put away our explicit theories of knowledge

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[1] *Meta.*, A, 1 (980b25–27).
[2] *In 12 Meta*, 1, 8.
[3] *S. T.*, 1–2, 1, 1, *C.*
[4] John Dewey, *How We Think* (Boston: Heath, 1910), p. 14.
[5] Nelson B. Henry, Editor (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

and intelligence, we find we are able, largely, to agree that such-and-such a book is intelligently written, that such-and-such an author has presented a good or bad case for his thesis. Do we not find that in discussing individual instances of intelligence and knowledge, we *can* discuss, we *can* communicate, we *can* understand each other. Moreover, in many specific areas we find ourselves in agreement as to the sort of evidence we would demand for conviction.

This factual sort of agreement seems to me to point to a certain community of understanding at the experiential level which, somehow, disappears or is, at least, masked at the level of explicit and formal theory.

It is, however, all too true that when we pass over to our explicit theories of intelligence, we display almost incredible differences in our accounts of its nature, its purpose, its operations, its limits and value.

This situation in which our profoundest common convictions of the importance of intelligence and rationality loses force and direction within the fogs of our ideas about intelligence—this situation ought, I think, be a matter of concern for us both as philosophers and as educators. For the doctrine of the intelligence and the intelligible is central in any philosophical system; it is correlative to and, in part, determinative of the highest reaches of metaphysics as well as of the understanding of human nature. And since intellectual development is at least an important part of growth in the educational process, educational philosophers surely ought to be able to contribute to the educational enterprise some understanding of understanding and some knowledge of knowledge.

It is then this situation and its implications which I would like to consider with you.

A Consideration of Learning Theories

Now there is a sort of border-line discipline within which educationists, psychologists, and even philosophers have been actively investigating the nature of intelligence and of learning—this is the discipline called learning theory. I presume there is no need to offer proof that this discipline—if indeed it be a discipline—embraces a vast amount of experimentation and empirical data and an equally vast confusion of explanation and interpretation. In fact, learning theory appears to be in a stage of development very much like that of astro-physics in the 60 years preceding the publication of Newton's *Principia Mathematica.*

Now, for purposes of my discussion I find it necessary to present several analytic evaluations of types of learning theories, evaluations which, through brevity, will be somewhat less than elegantly nuanced.

There is a type of investigation in which intelligence and learning are approached in what is considered to be a wholly external and objective manner. Problems of learning are translated into problems of external behavior; this experimental method is used to develop paradigms of behavior and behavioral change and to establish for them systems of quantification and correlation. In this type of system, definitions or statements of the nature—of the subject-matter taken for study (intelligence, insight, learning) as well as of the factors to be used in explanation—emerge from the methodology itself: the process here is, as Eddington says of its analog in physics, a "self-defining" process. Through this

methodology, there arise, at the very first systematic level, definitions for intelligence of the following sort:

> Intelligence is the capacity of an individual to adapt himself to a new situation.[6]

for learning:

> An increase in the strength of a response that comes about through repetitions of that response or repetitions of stimulus situations appropriate to the emission of that response.[7]

These are indeed operational definitions but ones in which the operations are methodologically determined to disclose correlations for and not the nature of the subject matter. Let me illustrate from a slightly different subject-matter. In a symposium on *Anxiety* an experimental design of the type just described yielded this definition of anxiety:

> Anxiety is the relationship between the presentation of S_1, after the $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ operation has been sufficiently performed, and certain measurable behavior changes.[8]

Now a paradigm of behavioral change, organized by correlation and measurement does not convey, express or illumine the nature of anxiety itself, as it is initially and in itself discovered in human experience.

No doubt definitions and experimental systems of this sort can and often have given empirical principles of great practical importance, but, in the very nature of the case, they remain philosophically neutral. To put the matter in a somewhat blunt and common sense way, these methods cannot illumine the basic philosophical problem because they formally deal with their subject matters in terms of things which are not those subject matters. For this reason I have elsewhere called these methods a constructural or surrogate methodology.

It is, however, extremely difficult and perhaps not sufficiently fruitful to maintain a pure constructural methodology, self-contained and self-defining. The physicist finds it comparatively easy to do so, for example, in gross mechanics, since he has no intuitive or direct access to the natural causes or events concerned. He is "outside" the moving object; for him, it is indeed "thing," "object," in the sense in which Bergson speaks of "object," The physicist cannot place himself consciously at the real center of the operations which he is clocking and correlating.

In human knowing and in human learning, however, we are, in a sense, "inside" the events; we have direct intuitive access to some, at least, of the operations involved.

Instead, therefore, of the wholly "objective" or "constructural" methodology, the investigator may be using, explicitly or surreptitiously, knowledge gained by insight and/or intuition. Thus, it seems that "insight" as discussed in Gestalt theory cannot be given a purely operational definition. A grasp of Gestalt theory itself depends upon an insight into learning experiences which is a reflective grasp of the essential structure or nature of the conscious operations as knowledge operations. In contrast to this is the purely operational use of the term "insight" by Köhler.[9]

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[6]H. C. Hines, *Measuring Intelligence* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1923), p. 11.
[7]James Deese, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 342.
[8]Hoch and Zubin, (Ed.), *Anxiety* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1950), pp. 74–75.
[9]Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), pp. 238-240.

Now, in this mixed type of method and system there may be evidence of philosophical relevance introduced, but essentially the learning theorists themselves intertwine this with constructural theories. Hence the philosophical value of these mixed theories demands in turn the institution of an independent philosophical critique.

And this brings us to a third general consideration. It is true that many, if not all, learning theorists recognize that they are not engaged in a philosophical task. This recognition is not always flattering to philosophy. Thus, says one, "No matter how much we may desire it, we cannot consider the subtle intangibles of the philosopher's *mind* to be the subject matter of a science."[10] Yet, there are many ways in which learning theory is actually influenced and determined by philosophy.

The matrix, so to speak, out of which the experimental design and even the materials of experiment and theory emerge may itself be already formed by a philosophical orientation. The introduction to *A Study of Thinking* frankly adopts a nominalistic interpretation of categorizing;[11] it should not surprise us if the experimental examination of categorizing seems thereafter to support a nominalistic interpretation. This general problem of inter-relationship is recognized by Rapaport and stated thus:

> I shall avoid here the philosophical question of whether psychology—itself based on fundamental assumptions of the sort epistemology studies—can claim competence to answer epistemological problems.[12]

In such cases, the experimental investigation cannot, of itself, be determinative of a philosophical position; rather, a prior philosophical decision determines, if not the experimental design itself, most certainly the interpretation of the experimental data.

The ambiguities, the indecisiveness, the inadequacies of present learning theory are due, partially, to a failure to recognize the ambiguities of data, methodology and interpretation to which I have briefly pointed. Surely, a pure constructural type of theory devised according to a selected uniform methodology can be developed and can be useful, as long as the limitations of the self-imposed methodology are strictly and consciously maintained. Nor can one object to mixed systems, provided the relation to philosophy is recognized and set forth. Indeed, there is no intrinsic reason why we cannot use a variety of constructural systems of learning theory, just as in physics we have been able, despite the contradiction in hypothetical images, to use both a wave and a particle theory of light. The situation may be less elegant, less economical and less manageable than if we had a single all-embracing system, but, meanwhile, there is no deadly self-destructive contradiction involved.

But I would suggest—and, given time, I would argue for and maintain—this general and more relevant observation. No matter how you develop an experimental learning theory, it will presuppose philosophical decisions. One cannot determine the bearing of a selected methodology, such as a behavioristic one,

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[10]Deese, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[11]Bruner, Goodnow, Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: Wiley, 1956), pp. 1–24.

[12]Rapaport, *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 722.

except within a total epistemology;[13] one cannot evaluate the philosophical directions and data within the mixed systems without a previous philosophical critique. Moreover, in the very nature of these systems, resultant data and theories will be either philosophically neutral or philosophically predetermined; in neither case can a philosophy of knowledge be built upon them.

We are therefore driven back upon other resources and to a general philosophy of knowledge.

A GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

Every system of philosophy and every mode of philosophising implies some conception of intelligence, some definition or delineation of rationality and of intellectual knowledge. Even in systems which tend to blur, if not eliminate, the distinction between sensibility and intellection, some analogous effort to delimit and describe knowledge yet fulfills much the same function.

The long philosophic episode which stretches from Descartes to the present day is a succession of efforts to define intellectual knowledge or at least sound knowledge by some rather clear-cut univocal criterion and method and to proclaim, at long last, the disclosure of the right method, the true rules. Prototype in this was Descartes himself with his clear and distinct idea—the very definition of intellectual knowledge—; with his universal method—a mathematical deductive manipulation of univocal concepts and, too, with his disarming assurance that, through his method, all knowledge would in a few years be rectified and brought to completion. After all, geometrical problems never before even formulated had, in a few months, been brought to definitive solution through his method. In similar fashion, the discovery of the true method has been announced over and over again.—Locke's "plain historical method," Spinoza's emendation of the human intellect through a system articulated *more geometrico;* Leibnitz' *Ars Combinatoria* and universal science.

Hume, by an epistemological criterion, consigned to flames once and for all all metaphysical tomes—just before the century which saw some of the most extensive and elaborate metaphysical writings of all time. Kant, again, once and for all, established the rights and limits of reason on a sound juridical basis: "But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents."[14] And so Kant's categories of the understanding, a formalizing ordering machine devoid of content and without intuition are in fact his definition of intelligence—and a limiting reduction that rendered metaphysics impossible as well as a wide range of other knowledges which we indubitably possess. In Comte, the strictly positivistic conception of science has brought the final age of reason and the perfection of knowledge. And again the dialectic of philosophy culminates and comes to perfect

[13]For example: There is no doubt that the Physics of Galileo and Newton exclude, methodologically, all explanatory use of finality, but, whether one accepts this as consequently excluding finality from the physical world, depends upon one's philosophical decision concerning the relation of this methodology to reality. Likewise: a strictly behavioristic definition of intelligence permits the arrangement of "learners" in a scale from, say, the paramecium to man according to *degrees* (Deese, *op. cit.*, p. 278–292); it is a philosophical decision to conclude that man does or does not differ from the brutes only in *degree* of learning ability and not in kind.

[14]Corus, (Ed.), *Kant's Prolegomena* (La Salle: Open Court, 1945), p. 8.

fulfillment in the Absolute Idea which defines both reason in general and, in particular, the reason of Hegel. And on and on—till we are tempted to say to all of them, paraphrasing St. Peter: "Behold the feet of them that buried your predecessor are at the door."

And if we look about today, we find a series of exclusive definitions of intelligence, a reduction of reason to some method or other. The naturalists and the experimentalists have set up an interpretation of the "scientific method" as a definition of "reflective intelligence;" the logical positivists, by a sharp epistemological limitation, check out as nonsense more than half of what we say. Philosophy is living in a sectarian pluralism; intelligence and reason which ought, I should think, to bring men together in the community of their own nature are themselves divided and reduced by philosophical fiat.

Simply as a matter of history, the grand pronunciamentos have never been prelude to sweeping philosophical victories and, simply as a matter of fact, the effort to identify intelligence with a single method or a single mode of thinking, of asserting or of validating has never succeeded. Moreover, it seems to me that by reflecting upon these historical experiments we can discover not only the fact of the failure but its very reasons.

The identification of intelligence with one mode means, logically, that this mode alone must be the channel as it were, or the container of intellectual consciousness. In fact, however, intellectual consciousness has always been able not only to make a particularized object of any given mode of intelligence; it has gone around and beyond that mode, at least in examining and rejecting others. In other words, intelligence is, for a fact, more than any or all of its modalities, forms, directions, operations or phases and, consequently, the effort to reduce it to one such has always been self-defeating.

Secondly, the effort to narrow intelligence and its modes of activity as well as its sources of evidence has always run up against some massive, unyielding brute fact. We have always been asked, in the name of clarity and distinctness, of positivistic knowledge, of scientific method, to deny some knowledge or some intellectual resource which we indubitably possess. For example, no matter how much the idealist may impugn or experience, scorn the five senses and reject the unknown somewhat that is matter, he cannot succeed; the brute encounter with a material world cannot be ignored, and the evidence of our total concrete experience imperiously reasserts itself. Hume may argue away the rationality of principles, but his successors accept him not as a conclusion but only as a problem. The neat Cartesian mind identifies clarity and distinctness with intellectuality, but Bergson and Whitehead will point out that some at least of our most penetrating intellectual insights remain ever obscured and darkened.

If this is a correct insight into the series of philosophical experiments since Descartes, then we can say that these philosophies failed not so much because of what they positively conceived of intelligence or knowledge but rather because of what they denied; they died of their own limitations.

For there *is* a sense in which all our intellectual knowledge rests upon an empirical base, but when this is isolated and solely considered, intelligibility tends to disappear altogether and philosophy passes into a sectarian Empiricism hardly distinguishable from irrationality. There *is* a sense in which all our intellectual

knowledge contains intelligible connections, derived from and, at times, discoverable in experience both of being and of thought, without which intelligible and intelligent human experience would be impossible, but when this alone is considered, philosophy freezes into a formal rationalism, sterile and static. There are relativistic elements in our knowledge; there are areas in which only positivistic propositions can be produced; there are matters in which we gain order and intellectual control only through mental constructs and the imposition of formal categories; there is insight and there is rigorous deduction; there are matters in which consequences alone are decisive. And through a wide range of theoretical and practical matters, probability and opinion, suspicion, guess, hunch or hope is the best we can have.

A COMMON ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

Now from the considerations which I have merely outlined here I think the following conclusion emerges:

A theoretical understanding of intelligence and of intellectual knowledge is important for both philosophical and educational purposes. We cannot, however, achieve this understanding by substituting an experimental scientific discipline for an experiential philosophy of knowledge. But, on the other hand, we do not possess an adequate philosophy of knowledge, largely because modern philosophy is suffering, in this matter, from a malignant sectarianism.

What we need is a philosophy of knowledge that will be broadly hospitable to all the forms and varieties of intellectual experience; one that will be open, not dogmatically enclosed in one method or one definition of reflective intelligence, of intuition or of validated assertion. Human intelligence cannot be so cabined, cribbed and confined.

The task of developing such a philosophy, I believe, should be our common concern. Let the logical positivists contribute their excellent analyses of certain formal relations, let the experimentalists contribute their excellent analyses of some problematic situations, let the semanticists contribute their excellent analyses of certain linguistic traps and temptations; let the Thomists contribute their excellent analyses of analogous knowledge—and so on.

I am not proposing, however, to accept a mere political conjunction of minds or systems; I am well aware too, that there are here oppositions which cannot be reconciled, in which a philosophical determination must be made. We cannot simply "add up" the positive assertions of different schools; a hard effort to rethink a rather complete philosophy of knowledge, from all the data, is called for.

But despite all difficulties, only good can come of an effort to soften our denials, to broaden our examination of intellectual experience and to work towards a larger and commoner philosophy of knowledge. It would be but another fatuous pronunciamento, were I to declare—in trumpet tones—that the hour is at hand when this could be fully or literally accomplished. However, to the extent that we move towards it, we will be restoring philosophy as a common and cooperative enterprise of intelligent men and women, and we shall be incorporating in philosophical activity that universality, that objectivity, that common understanding which the possession of intelligence makes possible, at least in some measure, for human beings.

A RESPONSE TO "PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEORY OF LEARNING"

BY ERNEST E. BAYLES

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY, WE HAVE THROUGH FELICITOUS EXPERIENCE COME TO EXPECT from each of our outgoing presidents an address which is significant, thoughtful, and scholarly. In these regards our expectations have this evening been fully, even copiously, realized. And what is more, we have been presented an offering aesthetically rewarding; one of artistic beauty. To us who know Father Henle this comes as no surprise. We knew what to expect. To comment further would be to gild the lily, so I proceed to show my greatest respect, as well as regard, by going at once to serious, critical analysis.

If I could have had the manuscript before I left home, I might have been able to quote Emerson exactly, but I am reminded of the opening sentence of one of his essays, "A narrow (or is it foolish?) consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." We are tonight advised to eschew such narrowness; to entertian a multiplicity of ways to get at that which we greatly value—knowledge or truth. We must get away from sectarianism in the philosophical pursuit—or get nowhere. Hence, although we cannot achieve consensus, we must get down to work—each in his own bailiwick perhaps—, quit bickering among ourselves, and unite to promote philosophical ends.

With this I seem to be in essential and enthusiastic agreement. Of course, like Mr. Dulles, I do not want to go into this business naively; seriously and honestly giving and taking and assuming that the Russians will do likewise, but suddenly sooner or later discovering that the giving has been all mine and the taking all theirs and, too late, being swallowed by the bear who never did have any thought of an outcome other than as he originally conceived it.

What bothers me, however, is what each fellow is going to be doing in his own bailiwick. There is the Lockean way of doing this: each man sticks to his last and does not interfere with the other fellow—my rights end where your nose begins. But the world has become tremendously more interdependent, interwoven, and closely knit today than it was for Locke. Long since have we given up isolationism as national policy. This is a cooperative, an interactive, world and, even though we may not like it (as many of us do not), we simply cannot avoid rubbing some skin off of other fellows' noses and, in turn, having some rubbed off of ours.

When our speaker says, in effect, that no experimental design is possible without a clear-cut hypothesis, theory, or philosophy, he is saying what the discerning scientific minds of the 20th century have come to realize and accept. Would that more of them were sharers in this discernment. And, if philosophers

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would seriously seek to join hands in the philosophical pursuit of formulating a program for building a better world in which to live, they too must work toward a hypothetical synthesis, broadly conceived and achieved through progressive modification and re-modification of present hypotheses, which will then in part and in whole be progressively subjected to broadly experimental investigation, leading to heightened or to lessened confidence as the case develops.

I wonder, however, whether this is what is in our speaker's mind when he refers to the physicists' use of both wave and corpuscular theories. First, when wave theory is used, it is by itself and to deal with a certain set of factual data; likewise with corpuscular. They are not both used simultaneously. Physicists have found when to use which; and that they seemingly have to do it that way. Second, they are using only one set of criteria for determination of truth; they are not using both experimentation and revelation.

Thus, we return to Emerson and his narrow or foolish consistency. Many have lifted the sentence from context and used it to give moral support to plain electicism. However, when the whole paragraph is taken, it is clear that Emerson had no such thing in mind. He was not speaking against what might be called a transverse consistency—seeking to have all aspects of a thought-pattern of a given time fit together in mutual accord. He spoke against the fear of little-minded men of having a later thought be out of keeping with an earlier one. When you speak, he says, "speak with words as hard as cannon balls,"and, if later you find it advisable to change your mind, speak with equal clarity on the altered basis. This is a long cry from working all sides or all ways at the same time; in fact just the reverse.

Actually, if we really believe that, when all work together with none seeking to influence (or, perish the thought, to override) the other we shall gradually effect an evolvement of the ultimately right synthesis, are we not employing the truth-getting method of realism—getting truth by induction? Are we really getting completely outside of idealism, realism, or pragmatism and being truly objective?

On the other hand, is not the truth-getting process of 20th-century, scientific relativism already what might be taken (if one wishes to become dialectical) as a synthesis of the thesis of pre-Rennaissance idealism and the anti-thesis of Baconian-Newtonian realism? Both the intuition (or revelation) and the logical deduction of that idealism have a highly functional place, and the observation-based induction of that realism is equally essential. Both, it is true, have been divested of their absolutistic qualities; they are not used for the presumed divination of absolutes. Would that I could pursue this further.

If this be true, then the modern scientific way of knowing is not merely a third way, on presumably equal terms with the other two. It transcends both, employing their advantages and rejecting their disadvantages. Need I remind this group of the tremendous strides which it has achieved during the first half of the 20-century in terms of knowledge and truth? And might I not repeat Dewey's oft-repeated suggestion that it might prove equally successful in realms other than the mechanical?

But let us look at a matter which does not seem to be wholly clear. I have in mind *knowledge* on the one hand and *belief* on the other. Our speaker's reference

to various ways of obtaining truth leads me to wonder whether he is not at times using the word "knowledge" when he should use the word "belief." When it comes to common understanding, and he spoke of such at the beginning of his paper, do not English-speaking persons rather commonly feel that when I say, "I believe," I am expressing something quite personal; something for which I hold them in no way responsible and which, even though it be outlandish, I may have that way if I want it. Yet when I say, "I know," do I not commonly throw out a challenge which is often met with the question (maybe said, maybe not said), "How do you know?" Do I not imply much greater dependability when I say, "I know," than when I say, "I believe"?

To get quickly to the point (since I know you well enough to know that you want to talk), there seem to be about as many ways of arriving at beliefs as there are cases of such arrival; it's never twice the same. Herein does pluralism seem justified. But can we justify pluralism in the matter of truth-getting and take the implied next step of treating all proposed ways as equally dependable?

When we are deeply concerned with a given truth-matter, when it really pinches or doesn't pinch, aren't we pretty choosy about the way it is obtained? When the pocketbook is strongly affected, are we willing to trust intuition or revelation? Or if and when we might be accused of crime and hailed before a court of law?

And one final question. Have we not been taken precariously close to the point of justifying the practice of treating assumptions as if *they* are absolutes? If each set of assumptions carries with it an entire epistemology, axiology, and ontology—that seems to be one point in the paper and with that I agree—, then need we not be dissatisfied with any philosophical enterprise which would make our original commitments fix with finality any and all which follows?

A philosophical absolute is something which is unchangingly unchanging; once we are convinced we have it, we have every incentive for staying with it and resisting all further change; it becomes sacrosanct. Moreover, there is then no point of working with others for further enlightenment; it would only be done to help the other fellow get the light which I already possess.

But if we adopt the relativistic commitment of refusal to entertain *any* commitment as final (leaving the way open even to change this one), then indeed we are morally and ethically bound to work cooperatively for the progressive making and remaking of commitments. This is what our speaker seems to want, but is he willing to pay the price?

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: A WORD FROM AN ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHER

BY CHARLES F. SAWHILL VIRTUE

I

The Inseparability of General Philosophy and the Philosophy of Education

THE THESIS OF THIS PAPER IS THAT GENERAL PHILOSOPHY IS THE MATRIX OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, and that responsible evaluation of philosophies of education requires at least a modest exposure to metaphysics, epistemology and axiology. One would not expect to make sense of the educational theories of Plato or of Rousseau, to cite two historical examples, without some acquaintance with Plato's theory of ideas as ontological forms, or of Rousseau's romantic naturalism in ethics; so one can hardly deal intelligently with John Dewey's educational instrumentalism without coming to terms with his larger concept of experience." Why should a widely read Thomistically grounded educational journal some years ago denounce Dewey as "Public Enemy Number One"? Not primarily because of his "progressive" methods, considered as teaching techniques, for there is nothing in Thomism which inhibits psychologically "advanced" techniques of learning as such. What the Thomists object to is Dewey's naturalistic concept of experience, with its ethical correlates and its final indifference to theism.

The major philosophers of education have always known that their educational theories were special applications of their basic ontological, epistemological and axiological theories. Conversely, the great philosophers have always recognized the teaching-learning process as integral in experience and hence a source of basic concepts. When Socrates wanted to illustrate the relation of formal structure to mind he picked an intelligent but untaught slave boy and led him through what was really a class room exercise in plane geometry. John Locke's theory of mind as a "*tabula rasa*," a blank tablet, whereon experience writes, is obviously a figure taken from academic learning situations; Descartes' notion of "innate ideas" —e.g., the ideas of number, of logical truth and falsity—reflects his experience as an exceptionally rational school boy, largely teaching himself and finding these necessary rational forms emerging in his own understanding.

There are levels of analysis in all developed philosophies which are of concern only to specialists. The teacher of social studies need not be an expert in the bewildering fields of historical and contemporary ethical theory; nor need the school administrator be an expert in all the involutions of political philosophy. Yet it can hardly be denied that social issues are ultimately ethical issues—questions of right and wrong; and it is equally true that educational administration is part of the socio-political process and that its final concepts of personal relations within institutional forms are "political" in the Aristotelian sense of politics as an extension of ethics.

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Sometimes it is argued that the only field of general philosophy relevant to educational philosophy is ethics as the normative discipline considering the aims of all self-directed life, and hence the aims of education. Surely the selection and criticism of the ends of life is presupposed in any comprehensive educational theory. But ethics is not independent of epistemology and metaphysics. An ethic of duty, for example, must have some notion of what it is that establishes duty and how duty can be known. Equally, an ethic of welfare, or of success, or of self-realization, must define the nature of the self as agent and recipient of action, as responsible director of its conduct; and here we approach metaphysics. While duty, considered phenomenologically, is not a metaphysical or ontological form, it is inseparable from some notion of mind or self or spirit. If these concepts are illusory, then the concept of duty loses in depth and reality.

The illustration just given—the idea of duty as a component in the moral presuppositions of a philosophy of education—may stand for the whole range of intellectual, aesthetic, ethico-socio-political and religious values at which the practice of education aims, and which it is the business of the philosophy of education to examine. Too often these aims seem to the educational theorist so obviously sound as to need no examination. There are admirably written books which demonstrate the vitality of current ways of living and show how these life-patterns, with their blend of attitudes and skills, may be made part of an effective school program. Such books are valuable insofar as they help us appreciate our culture and live more freely in it. But intellectually they are superficial. They have the same relation to serious educational theory as the psychological self-help books do to scientific psychology. The readiness with which educational theorists have accepted these how-to-do-it accounts of educational adventures speaks more highly for our adaptability than for our sense for basic values. The fashion in these books right now runs to an emotional glorification of certain items of traditional subject matter and a denunciation of what the authors deem the obvious errors of John Dewey and the progressives. A sober examination of this popular neo-conservatism reveals its bias as at least as stultifying as the "errors" it denounces.

The inseparability of general philosophy and the philosophy of education may be shown directly by a summary exposition of the philosophies of two major philosophers of the Twentieth Century, John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead, and two contemporary philosophers of education, Theodore Brameld and Harry S. Broudy. Both Dewey and Whitehead wrote on education. Brameld is in the general Dewey instrumentalist tradition, but develops his theory in his own distinctive way; Broudy, while not a Whiteheadian, yet has a feeling for objective value and ontological being, which, like Whitehead's realism, grows out of the realistic metaphysical tradition of Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas.

II

JOHN DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM

John Dewey is known to educational theorists primarily for his *Democracy and Education* and the never-ending stream of articles and editorials and speeches with which he enriched and remolded American education. He is the fountainhead of Instrumentalist, Experimentalist, Progressive and Reconstructionist educational theory. To Conservatives, Essentialists, Thomists and other Realists, Dewey is

the summation and the symbol of all that is wrong with contemporary American education.

Professional philosophers sometimes dispute as to what is most basic (or what actually came first chronologically) in Dewey's thought—his educational ideas or his general instrumentalist principles. The truth seems to be that they were inseparable in his thought. Dewey once commented that the academic philosophers seemed to have largely disregarded his *Democracy and Education*, though he himself thought it the best expression of his basic ideas.

The opening sentences of the Preface of *Democracy and Education* set the tone for the entire book:

> The following pages embody an endeavor to detect and state the ideas implied in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the enterprise of education. The discussion includes an indication of the constructive aims and methods of public education as seen from this point of view, and a critical estimate of the theories of knowing and moral development which were formulated in earlier conditions, but which still operate in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal. As will appear from the book itself, the philosophy stated in this book connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization, and is concerned to point out the changes in subject matter and method indicated by these developments.[1]

Dewey thus announces the aim and the method of his educational philosophy; its validity is located in its theory of the nature and origin of democracy; its success is to be measured by the extent to which it contributes to a realization of the democratic ideal.

Academic philosophers have been more concerned with Dewey's derivation of his ideas from the experimental method in the sciences and the concept of evolution in the biological sciences. For this reason they have paid more attention to Dewey's books like *The Quest for Certainty*, *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience* than to his essays on education. In these books Dewey elaborates his basic theories of the nature of experience—that it is primarily practical, the functioning of active organisms interacting with an environment that both makes possible their careers and frustrates the complete fulfillment of their innate potentialities. Only a person who has soaked himself in these critical, epistemological and methodological studies can appreciate the profundity of Dewey's educational theories. With Dewey, general philosophy and the philosophy of education are obverse and reverse of the same coin. In 1897, more than a quarter of a century before Dewey wrote *Experience and Nature*, he asserted in his *Pedagogic Creed:*

> I believe that consciousness is essentially motor or impulsive . . . Ideas (intellectual and rational processes) also result from action . . . What we term reason is primarily the law of order or effective action.[2]

The total life work of John Dewey thus illustrates the thesis that general philosophy is basic to the philosophy of education. Concepts originating in

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[1]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), page v.

[2]John Dewey, *My Pegagogical Creed*, Personal Growth Leaflet Number Nineteen, The National Education Association, Washington, pp. 22–23.

analysis of the learning situation are adequately defined, illuminated and criticized only in the more general disciplines of epistemology, ethics and metaphysics. The philosophy of education may be the actual starting point for a general philosophy and may contribute distinctive ideas to that general philosophy, but these ideas are validated by their ability to be co-ordinated with more general aesthetic, ethical, epistemological and metaphysical principles.

III

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM

Alfred North Whitehead is better known as a general philosopher than as a philosopher of education, though among college and univeristy teachers Whitehead's essays on education have had a great deal of influence. If Dewey's thought is basically sociological and psychological and centered largely upon the processes of education, Whitehead's is basically mathematical and metaphysical, centering on the problems of rational implication in logic and mathematics and the interrelation of events that constitute actual process. Whitehead's great book, *Process and Reality*, is one of the major works in the history of Western philosophy. It might be described as a Twentieth Century version of Plato's *Timaeus*, Whitehead having the advantage of modern quantum and relativity physics. Whitehead calls his philosophy, 'the philosophy of organism,' though, curiously enough, he makes scarcely any reference to the biological sciences. One of the central ideas in the philosophy of organism is the idea of sociality, though again, Whitehead is not directly concerned with social and political theory. Whitehead, speaking metaphysically, calls any actuality, such as a rock, a society. This is by no means an affectation, but a serious and profound usage of the term. The primary humanistic source of Whitehead's thought, corresponding to Dewey's reliance on democratic social experience, is religion. Religious experience is for him our deepest sense of the tragically harmonious quality of universal process. It is an experience in which subjectivity and objectivity are merged in contemplation of creative beauty. Here is Whitehead's description of religion, taken from the chapter on Religion and Science in *Science And The Modern World:*

> Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.[3]

and then he adds:

> The fact of religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments, lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagetelle of transient experience.[4]

Now, what of Whitehead's philosophy of education? Whitehead was not a professional educationist. He wrote no book on the theory and practice of education. He was, however, profoundly concerned with education. First of all, as a mathematician, he wrote on the principles of mathematics in relation to

[3]Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and The Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), page 275.
[4]*Ibid.*

elementary and secondary education. In a more general vein he addressed meetings of school principals and teachers in Great Britain; he considered technical education and the relations of science and literature. His most directly psychological and sociological thought is perhaps an essay on "The Rhythmic Claims of Freedom and Discipline," and a closely related essay on "The Rhythm of Education." Whitehead wrote on education as a mathematician, a teacher, a philosopher concerned with the meaning and value of life. He was profoundly concerned that education be creative; that it enlist the deepest drives of life; that it promote personal growth and social sensitivity; that it enlarge both our sense of order and our feeling for adventure, our loyalty to achieved goods and our creative freedom. These ideas can all be read in the small volume of collected essays, *Aims of Education and Other Essays*. The quality of his thought can be apprehended in the closing words of Chapter I of this book, which was Whitehead's Presidential Address to the Mathematical Association of England, forty years ago when Great Britain was engaged in its first desperate struggle of this century, World War I:

> When one considers in its length and in its breadth the importance of this question of the education of a nation's young, the broken lives, the defeated hopes, the national failures, which result from the frivolous inertia with which it is treated, it is difficult to restrain within oneself a savage rage. In the conditions of modern life the rule is absolute, the race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed. Not all your heroism, not all your social charm, not all your victories on land or at sea, can move back the finger of fate. Today we maintain ourselves. Tomorrow science will have moved forward yet one more step, and there will be no appeal from the judgment which will then be pronounced on the uneducated.
>
> We can be content with no less than the old summary of educational ideals which has been current at any time from the dawn of our civilization. The essence of education is that it be religious.
>
> Pray, what is religious education?
>
> A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events.
>
> Where attainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity.[5]

Is not the relation between general philosophy and the philosophy of education beginning to be clear? In Dewey we have a philosopher primarily impressed by the nature of social experience. When Dewey was in China he was hailed by the Chinese because of the sociological basis of his philosophy, as "the American Confucius." Whitehead, on the other hand, is, in Chinese terms, the Taoist, the philosopher of infinite creativity. The educational philosophy of neither of these major thinkers can be grasped in its wholeness apart from their general philosophic commitments; and neither of them can be adequately evaluated without recourse to that basic analysis and total vision which is the true concern of general philosophy.

IV.

THE RECONSTRUCTIONISM OF THEODORE BRAMELD.

The two philosophers of education to be presented here enjoy nothing like

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[5]Alfred North Whitehead, *Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 22–23.

the prestige and wide influence of Dewey and Whitehead; but in the schools of education their textbooks are widely used and their ideas are typical of kinds of theories future teachers are asked to organize their thinking about. They are thus of great importance to the future of American education. Their impact on elementary and secondary education is immense.

Professor Brameld's admirable textbook, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, first reviews what he terms the major educational philosophies in America today, Progressivism, Essentialism and Perennialism; it then presents his own system, Reconstructionism. Progressivism is sufficiently well known to need no explanation here: it is Dewey's Instrumentalism, the doctrine that all ideas as well as all skills are simply instruments for fuller living. Essentialism is the doctrine that there are certain items of knowledge, certain skills (e.g., spelling) and certain attitudes (e.g., industriousness) that are essential both to the success of the individual and the security of the race. Perennialism is the doctrine that there is a set of beliefs—e.g., belief in God, belief in moral standards, such as the Golden Rule—which is the constantly recurring framework of good living. It is these "perennial" beliefs which should be the main concern of education. Essentialism and Perennialism are variants of what the layman usually calls "old-line" or conservative theory of education. Brameld, then, really presents the familiar Conservative-Progressive split in educational theory, with two examples of each.

A major excellence of Brameld's educational thinking is that he recognizes educational philosophy as a special perspective within three of the major fields of general philosophy, viz., ontology (theory of the nature of things, e.g., material or spiritual), epistemology (theory of the kinds and the validity of knowledge), and axiology (theory of various sorts of value, e.g., the aesthetic and ethical or moral). Brameld then points out another truism, that philosophy on all its levels is the identification and critical elaboration of the beliefs of a culture. Modern culture, especially American culture, he describes as a "crisis culture," and says that there are cultural ways of dealing with crises; these ways are sufficiently designated by the terms Conservative, Liberal, Reactionary and Reconstructionist. The crucial cultural problem, and *a fortiori*, the central problem of the philosophy of education, is then the problem of choice among these (and possibly other) ways of dealing with our crisis-culture. How shall these alternatives be appraised? Brameld's answer is that the choice must be made by an appraisal of the assumptions these attitudes toward culture make in their final ontology, epistemology and axiology.

> "Both education and philosophy", he writes, "are themselves intrinsic with culture, primitive or civilized. On the one hand, philosophy can be regarded now as the effort of a culture to become conscious of and articulate to itself. On the other hand, education is the effort of a culture to reinforce and carry out the beliefs expressed through philosophy.[6]

Reconstructionism is identified by Brameld as "a philosophy of vision[7],"

> A self-conscious and critical Utopianism, a radical perspective oriented toward the potentialities of an emerging cultural Renaissance, a philosophy of magnetic foresight.[8]

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[6]Theodore Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* (World-Book Company, 1950), p. 86.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 409.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 82.

> The common denominator of its beliefs is a passionate concern for the *future* of civilization.[9]

As for onotology, Reconstructionism is frankly instrumentalist.

> Thus it agrees that experience and nature (recall the title of one of Dewey's greatest books) constitute both the form and content of the entire universe. By *experience* is meant the pulsating, vibrant stuff of life—"things and ideals", feeling and thought, the whole ebb and flow of personality, society, earth, sky. By *nature* is meant the world within reach of scientific experimentation and understanding, a world of disorder and order, of flux and stability, of strife and harmony.
>
> It follows that the reconstructionist, too, is hostile toward other-worldy philosophies, certainly toward any metaphysics that tries to establish the primacy of any supposed realm of *super*-nature over that of nature. Equally he is hostile to objective systems of pre-established order, whether these be of a realist or an idealist variety. From his point of view, "nature", always an elusive term, suggests primarily an evolving reality in which humanity, while the most important manifestation of nature, is but one segment of the dynamic infinitude of soil, water, mountain, plants, animals.
>
> Reconstructionism's area of sharper concentration begins to be delineated when it analyzes and interprets *social* reality—particularly group experience.[10]
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> The reconstructionist accepts the naturalistic, this-worldly ontology of progressivism but stresses more heavily that aspect he regards as most important to reconstructing our culture. . . . Two mutual features peculiarly relevant to his concern are, first, the cultural determinants of human experience, and second, history. The former is considered in terms of group conflicts, group allegiances, and group conditioners; the latter in terms of a philosophy of history as social struggle, as expansion and contraction of freedom, as organisms, and as future.[11]

If the purpose of this essay were to recommend a philosophy of education, this would be the place to analyze and evaluate Brameld's Reconstructionist theory—its naturalistic ontological assumptions, its culture-determined values, its theory of history as social struggle, its special emphasis upon the emerging future. Brameld's revision of Instrumentalism makes Reconstructionism the cutting-edge of left-wing educational theory in the United States. Our purpose, however, is not to choose among competing theories, but to see their relation to general philosophy.

The dilemma of philosophy is this: thought must always begin *somewhere*; but any one *where* must be defined in terms of other *where*: as the mathematicians and logicians say, any term must be integral to a set of terms. Brameld makes his ontological terms relative to his cultural—i.e., his socio-historical terms. There is no reason why he should not do this. A philosopher may select whatever sort of data seem to him most important for his base line, measuring the relative importance of other data relative to them. Any academic philosopher would say that it is the consideration of which data to begin with that is the crucial problem of philosophy. Brameld's own reiterated pleas for objectivity in teacher-training, his warnings against indoctrination and smug narrowness, demonstrate that he wants critical, not acquiescent, thought by the students who are to be the future teachers. Assuming this critical awareness, he makes a

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 435–6 (Dr. Brameld's most recent book, *Toward a Reconstructionist Philosophy of Education*, Dryden, 1956, did not come into my hands till after I had written this essay. Cursory reading of the new book does not indicate any substantial change in Dr. Brameld's position.)

plea for "defensible partiality." But can anyone expect competent critical judgment from students who have not had training in basic general philosophy?

V.

HARRY S. BROUDY'S REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

Harry S. Broudy's Realistic philosophy of education, elaborated in his useful recent book, *Building a Philosophy of Education*, illustrates the interconnectedness of general and specialized philosophy by its very antithesis to Brameld's Reconstructionism. Through Broudy's whole book there runs a sort of wonder at the marvelous experience of being a self-conscious creative personality in this extraordinary universe. To use a phrase of one of the major American axiologists, Broudy's world is "a value-charged universe." The great business of life, says Broudy, is to become creatively aware of the potentialities of life and to realize these potentialities in creative act. Broudy's realism is thus in the Platonic-Aristotelian-Thomistic-Leibnitzian-Whiteheadian tradition of ontological realism as contrasted with the Protagorean-Cartesian-Humeian-Jamesian-Deweyan empirical tradition of Brameld's Reconstructionism.

Seeing the human situation in this light, Broudy views education as the rational guidance of the learning of the nature of the real to the end that the individual may share in the real values of being; and his theory of the philosophy of education is that it is the clarification and deepening of the way the guided learning process takes account of these values. Broudy's Realism is thus an axiologically oriented variant of the general position of Essentialism. He is careful to explain that this general position does not inhibit him from profiting from the psychological, sociological and methodoligical insights of the Instrumentalists.

Broudy begins by distinguishing two general methods in the philosophy of education: (1) the adoption of a general philosophical point of view and an exploration of the ways in which this point of view can be made effective in education—which is Brameld's method; and (2) the use of the methods of philosophy itself in the discussion of educational problems. This second approach entails the analysis of educational problems into their final presuppositions and implications. Broudy chooses the second method, with judicious recourse to the first for his practical conclusions. He describes his type of procedure as

> the systematic discussion of educational problems on a philosophical level—i.e., the probing into an educational question until it is reduced to an issue in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, or esthetics, or to a combination of these.[12]

When these issues are reached, then rational men must do the best they can to recognize

> those structures in the universe, man and society that are normative for man's striving toward the good life.[13]

Broudy's approach is thus not only ontologically, but methodologically, diametrically opposed to Brameld's. Whereas Brameld not only begins with, but moves constantly toward, an anthropological-sociological view of education, Broudy begins with a classical rationalistic-realistic interest in the structure of

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[12]Harry S. Broudy, *Building A Philosophy of Education*, (Prentice-Hall, 1954), pp. 19–20.
[13]*Ibid.*, p. viii.

being, and moves toward an analysis of educational situations in terms of their ultimate place in a rational world-view.

Broudy's concern with education is with its role in promoting human good. In the beginning of his chapter, "Education and Values," he points out that establishing the aim of education entails judgment as to the features of the good life. The form of the good life, he describes as entailing self-determination, self-realization and self-integration. The cultural theory of value proposed by naturalistic anthropologists, Broudy observes, leads to the familiar dilemma of the relativity of all values. The school, he says, must face the problem of the divergence of moral (and other) standards in the community. Deep lying differences, he says, are not negotiable by appeal to fact or to scientific theory; for facts mean nothing until they are interpreted, and interpretation is the business of philosophy:

> When disagreements and controversy reach this level . . . it is a matter of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics to find a common evaluation that is more significant than a cultural accident.
>
> The school has only a limited number of alternatives about value standards:
>
> (1) It can follow the elections and promote the norms of the group that wins;
>
> (2) It can try to represent in its teachings the norms of all important segments of the community, at one time or at different times;
>
> (3) It can try to avoid those materials and studies on which there are any serious disagreements in the community; or
>
> (4) It can try to set up and adhere to a standpoint that cuts across group perferences by taking its norms from some conception of the nature and destiny of man himself.[14]

Broudy implicitly endorses the fourth alternative when he says:

> If all we have said about knowledge has any truth at all, and if what we have said about the school as an agency devoted to the transformation of life through knowledge is not complete nonsense, then it follows that the norms and standards of the school should be as universal as knowledge can help to make them.[15]

Broudy then examines theories of value and proposes a realistic theory of value as

> the relation between structures of things and the structure of human nature.[16]

This concept of value locates the objectivity of value in the real structure of being, and its subjectivity in consciousness.

Having established his theory of value, Broudy turns to a specific list of values: bodily, economic, recreational, associational, character, intellectual, aesthetic and religious, and discusses the role of the school in relation to each of these.

Broudy's conservative Realistic philosophy of education shares with Brameld's progressive Reconstructionist philosophy the philosophic virtue of beginning with a general attitude toward life and then analyzing educational concerns in the light of this basic world-view. Since Broudy attempts to see life as a whole, and since he sees the educational process as the guidance of life toward all its potentialities, he avoids over-emphasis on the purely intellectual aspects of education,

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–2.
[15] *Idem.*
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

keeping in mind, for example, character and aesthetic qualities in all phases of school work. On the other hand, he does stress the unique intellectual function of the school in contrast to the home, the church and other institutions of society.

Broudy's educational Realism depends, he says, upon a realistic epistemology—viz., that there is truth to be discovered and that learning consists in discovering truth. Hence,

> The discovery of the nature of the world, the social order and of ourselves is the material upon which the pupil is to perfect the habits or tendencies of acquiring, using and enjoying truth. . . . All learning (is) a means for purifying the aesthetic, ethical, political, and social experience of the pupil by subjecting it to intellectual discipline.[17]

Broudy's Realistic philosophy of education runs directly counter to Brameld's Reconstructionism in its ontology and its theory of knowledge, and therefore in many of its pedagogical applications.

VI

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: CONCLUSION

The split between general philosophy and the philosophy of education, amounting to a practical divorce in most colleges and universities, has not been planned by anyone. It has occurred largely because of the haphazard growth of higher education in America and the more theoretical concerns of academic philosophers as compared with the immediately practical demands made upon the philosophers of education. There are now signs that mutual concern for the well-being of American education is prompting a lessening of the gap between them. The Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association devoted a session to the philosophy of education at its annual meeting at Boston University in December, 1955.[18] The Spring issue of *The Harvard Educational Review*, 1956, is given over to a symposium on "The Aims and Content of the Philosophy of Education," largely stimulated by the Boston University meeting.

Perhaps the long war is ending and academic philosophers will recognize the perspicuity with which the philosophers of education have applied their general principles to the baffling problems of educational content and method. Philosophers of education may find it obvious that the basic issues of education are simply the basic issues of life in an educational context, and agree with the academic philosophers that if these issues are not treated with deep seriousness, then

> "all the voyage of their life
> is bound in shallows and in miseries."

[17] Idem p. 144.
[18] The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII, No. 22: October 27, 1955, pp. 612–633.

FREEDOM IN STUDENT ACTIVITIES

BY HERBERT STROUP

FROM EVERY SIDE, EVEN FROM THE VERY EXTREMES, THERE IS COMMON DISAGREEMENT ON THE HEALTH OF FREEDOM ON THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. The claim from the "conservatives" is that nearly everywhere freedom is on the run before the avalanche-like movements of "collectivism." Collectivism means to the conservatives a freedom-denying condition in general society which in these latter days has infected the American campus. Take the views of E. Merrill Root, Professor of English at Earlham College, as an example. He speaks openly of "collectivism on the campus." By this he means that the "collectivist Left" has seized control of the university, intimidating those who believe in traditional values (especially of free enterprise), and indoctrinating a whole generation into the supposed benefits of societal collectivism. Professor Root apparently believes that only the student wishes for true freedom of expression. Faculties are cowed into collectivistic conformity insofar as they do not willingly favor it. Even boards of trustees lean over backwards to protect the leftists, including communists and fellow-travelers.

To such an extent does he wish the university to believe in his brand of freedom that he is willing to go to authoritarian lengths to guarantee it. This he does by asserting that parents, alumni, and educators should demand that "50 per cent of the faculty passionately and articulately uphold free enterprise."[1]

Of course, it is easy to point out that Professor Root thoroughly misunderstands the nature of the university. The university does not exist to insure a percentage of advocacy of anything, unless it be such values as personal integrity and acknowledgment of truth. The task of the university is free inquiry, that is, to enable faculty and students to teach and learn according to the principles of the uncontrolled although informed mind. Moreover, by lumping liberals with communists and fellow-travelers he is doing his own cause a disservice, since so many liberals are fiercely anti-communist. Also, by attaching his doctrine to the primacy of economic determinancy he himself misreads history and even economics and falls rather deeply into the Marxian fallacy. But, nevertheless, he is sure that the university does not have true freedom and he sincerely wants it to change its ways and attain it.

On the other extreme stands Robert M. MacIver, Professor Emeritus of Political Philosophy and Sociology at Columbia University. His views are most clearly revealed in a book which is the product of the American Academic Freedom Project, sponsored by the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation.[2] The book, however,

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[1]E. Merrill Root, *Collectivism on the Campus: A Battle For The Mind in American Colleges* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955).

[2]Robert M. MacIver, *Academic Freedom in Our Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955). A companion volume in the same project, although of quite a different turn of mind, is Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

does not represent the views either of the Foundation or Columbia University, but rather the results of study by its author and his own convictions.

Professor MacIver believes that the social climate in American today is at least the conservatism that Professor Root advocates. In fact, according to the "liberal" MacIver, it is decidedly reactionary. Thus, he spends considerable energy in exposing the "pseudo-educational" associations of Allen Zoll and Merwin Hart as though these were truly dominant groups with significant influence on the American campus. Of them he states: "These are the forces that in our time most seriously threaten not only academic freedom but the whole broad freedom of thought." In addition to such associations, Professor MacIver outlines threats from individual writers, such as William F. Buckley, Jr., special interest organizations, fanatically patriotic groups, and congressional committees. In all, the picture that Professor MacIver paints is black, almost pitch black. True freedom, he tells us, is almost non-existent on the university campus.

Of course, Professor MacIver also misreads the current community and university scene. He magnifies the thought and actions of small, generally unrecognized groups until they take the place of the large, well accepted educational associations (such as the National Educational Association and the American Association of University Professors). In an unscientific manner, he employs isolated instances in which academic freedom has been violated to make a case for its almost total absence in the university. He apparently is able to overlook the fact that, with the exception of some denominational colleges, universities everywhere have placed responsibility as to what shall be taught and how it shall be taught upon faculties. In the main it is the faculty of the university which not only believes in but practices academic freedom.

Thus, both from the right and the left the fate of freedom on the university campus has been sharply questioned. Although the health of freedom has been consistently diagnosed as poor, there is disagreement on the pathology.

BELIEF IN FREEDOM IN THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY

It can hardly be maintained, however, that most students have a sophistocated understanding of the theoretical implications of the present disagreement concerning freedom in the university. Many students, nevertheless, firmly believe in freedom—their freedom in the university community. Their belief may be attributed to a variety of factors:

1. Political involvement.

Some students, probably a small minority on any campus, hold membership in social and political groups (either on or off the campus or both) which possess a relatively well developed doctrine on freedom. Young Republicans and Young Democrats may disagree as to what freedom means on the campus, but commonly they have a view on it and eagerly discuss it. Such opinions are usually doctrinaire rather than objective.

2. Self-interest.

Many students and their groups assert a belief in freedom largely because such a belief is related to certain goals they wish to achieve. Student governments traditionally have wanted to be "self-governments" in the conviction that

they thereby would withstand encroachments from faculty or administration. It is to their interests that they assert their need for a nearly absolute freedom. Again, fraternities and sororities have regularly claimed an independence from the controls of the university in the name of freedom—the freedom of the student to associate with whom he pleases and to organize his life according to principles which he recognizes.

The demand for freedom as a strategem for the attainment of personal and group power is not described here in moralistic terms. Rather it is accepted as a basic principle of human existence even as the unpopular Thomas Hobbes recognized it:

> I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.[8]

It is basically the same desire for absolute and absolutely self-corrupting power that marked the life of Caius Marius, according to Plutarch, who although he was the first man to be made Consul of Rome seven times ended his life in a feverish madness because his thirst for adulation had not been fully quenched.

3. Educational growth.

It is claimed by students that they should have the freedom to make mistakes because by so doing they are able to undergo genuine growth. Faculty and administrators in many instances agree with the students and in a few instances seem to glory in the ability of students to make mistakes in student activities. Those who hold this viewpoint sometimes fail to assert the inevitability of all to make mistakes ("to err is human"); they turn fallacy into a "right" as though the ability would become dwarfed if not practiced constantly. Yet, it is mainly on the grounds of high educational theory that the claim to freedom is made in many cases.

4. Adolescent rebelliousness.

Students rarely like to hold that the freedom they demand is related to their need to rebel against the traditional standards and activities of their homes and community. More commonly, it is the faculty and administration which elaborate this notion, excusing students who misuse their freedom or who cry for more as simply creatures who are bound by unconsciously directed urges given to a particular period of their development.

5. Institutional permissiveness.

In some universities freedom (meaning permissiveness as a doctrine) for students is written into the institutional framework as a basic conviction of those responsible for the university over the years: faculty, administration, and trustees. The philosophy of permissiveness in some universities, despite the changes which have occurred in the direction of "general education," is featured both in the curricular as well as the co-curricular aspects of the corporate life of the university.

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[8]Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, 1940), pp. 49–50. Madison had a similar explanation for "factionalism". See, *The Federalist* (New York: Modern Library, 1941), pp. 54–62.

So, for example, Mary McCarthy pictures the founder of mythical Jocelyn College as being permissive. Says the author:

> Under his permissive system, the students were free to study or not as they chose; he believed that the healthy organism would elect, like an animal, what was best for it. If the students failed to go in the direction indicated by the results of his testing, or in any direction at all, this was noted down and in time communicated to his parents, merely as a matter of interest, to push him in any way would be a violation of the experiment.[4]

Such universities remind one of the Verdurin household in Marcel Proust's *Swann's Way:*

> The Verdurins never invited you to dinner; you had your "place laid" there. There was never any programme for the evening's entertainment. The young pianist would play, but only if he felt inclined, for no one was forced to do anything, and, as M. Verdurin used to say: "We're all friends here. Liberty Hall, you know!"[5]

FREEDOM AS ABSENCE OF RESTRAINT

The idea that freedom means the absence of all restraint is apparent in much of the discussion of freedom in our time. It is a veiled postulate of much of the commentary by students in their relations to the university. To be free, they say, is not to be hampered in their choice of courses and in the exercise of their interests in the use of the co-curricular life of the university. Such a conception of freedom, however, is absolutely unhistorical and impossible in the experience of men. Franz Boas, the noted anthropologist, for example, made this point upon reflecting on the place of freedom in primitive societies (where one might suspect there is perfect freedom); he says:

> Interference with the freedom of action or the personal comfort of an individual by fellow-tribesmen may occur even in the simplest societies. Such interference is generally based on personal conflicts. Two individuals may strive for possession of the same object. If the customs of the community permit, the conflict may be decided by combat between the antagonists and may also involve their friends. Unfriendly gossip may create a condition against which the individual cannot successfully contend and which limits his freedom of action within the social group. . . . Such conflicts between individuals, or between individuals and society as a whole, or between groups unfriendly to each other, may encroach seriously upon the freedom of the individual.[6]

Moreover, absolute freedom from restraint would make of freedom a demonic force in human relations. For example, some of Lincoln's adversaries prior to the Civil War based their slavery arguments upon this absolute doctrine of freedom. Freedom, they said, permitted a man to buy and sell slaves. But, Lincoln in his notable debate with Douglas summarized this conception for his opposition in the following words: "It is, as a principle, no other than that if one man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object."[7]

In limited degree, however, freedom from restraint is partly possible, in that every person possesses spheres within his experience in which he acknowledges greater and lesser external restraint. One is more free to choose a movie than to

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[4]Mary McCarthy, *The Groves of Academe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), p. 62.

[5]Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way* (New York: Modern Library, 1928), p. 270.

[6]Franz Boaz, "Liberty Among Primitive People," Ruth Nanda Ashen, *Freedom: Its Meaning* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 378.

[7]*Letters and Speeches of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Dutton), p. 136.

self-determine the basis on which admission to a university can be secured. One is less free to drive on the highway than to garden on one's own property. So, it goes. Even within the university the variety of situations in which freedom from restraint exists is striking. A student may not be entirely free within the freshman and sophomore years to elect courses, but he may have greater freedom in his junior and senior years. In general the student will have less freedom within the classroom than in student activities. Again, one may have more freedom within a hiking club than within a debate team.

The situations in which freedom as the relative absence of external restraint exist within the university call for a developed awareness of the reality of situational limitations to the pure expression of freedom. The student who fails to acknowledge and act upon the requirements of freedom appropriate to each situation within the university (and in this connection especially in student activities) is not a heroic reformer, but a maladjusted person who has not developed a mature understanding of himself, the intellectual basis for his actions, and the requirements of social living.[8]

Moreover, there is an all-important assumption behind the practice of situational freedom in the university. It is to the effect that the student may be granted increased freedom from restraint to the degree that he is able to match the situation with personal maturity. The university does not in our day permit the student to choose any course program from his freshman to his senior year on the theory that the student is sufficiently mature to take such decisions. But the university may well believe that as a student progresses in maturity he may be maturely able to make intelligent decisions regarding his academic choices. Some such philosophy of personal maturity, if consistently held, should be apparent also in student activities, although it must be quickly admitted that in many instances it is not.

A further difficulty in connection with freedom as the absence of restraint lies in the fact that oftentimes it takes the form (in the university as well as in the community generally) of a mechanistic, power-driven need system. That is to say that students who look upon freedom in these terms may conclude that the only freedom which they are able to possess and exercise is that which they have been able to win from reluctant and even opposed faculties and administrations. In this spirit, a tally sheet may be mentally created by students of the present "stock" of freedom and campaigns waged by which increased freedoms may be attained. Such an attitude toward freedom may turn out unintentionally to be an education in the lowest forms of cheap political activity. If this result takes place, the very meaning of freedom in the university suffers.

It is apparently this sort of belief in freedom which molds some of the efforts of students to secure "student rights." Obviously the mere assertion of rights does not validate them. Commonly the listing of rights by students mirrors the claim of rights in the political community. Students thus sometimes claim (even national associations of student groups make this claim) that there are certain "inalienable" rights accorded them in their status as students. These

[8]Mahatma Gandhi saw this truth and expressed it to UNESCO in the following manner: "I learned from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. . .From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is enough to define the duties of Man and Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed." See, "The Rights of Man," *United Nations Weekly Bulletin*, Volume 3, 1947, p. 521.

rights, students say, are supported by "natural law." Their rights to self-government, to freedom of the press and to equal representation in the determination of certain university policies, they say, is based upon the achievements of rational democracy and that anyone who denies these rights is actually not an educator but an outdated tyrant.

Students who make such assertions, however, fail to understand their academic instruction adequately. For example, they would be hard put in the light of present scholarship to defend their views successfully on the grounds of natural law, for as Leo Strauss has pointed out, the distinction between *physis* and *nomos* in the history of the idea of natural law has consistently involved a transnatural basis for the belief in man's rights.[9]

Moreover, there is little reason to assume that the rights which are accorded to men in the political community are automatically those granted by nature to students in the university. The fact seems to be that students are nowhere more weak and illogical in arguing for rights than when they claim an extension of their rights in society into the university. Also, they show a distinct disservice to the university in conceiving the essential character of the university as a special political community within the larger community. This conclusion is affirmed in the recent report of the United States Student Association which was financially supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. In speaking of the view previously described the report says that it "overlooks the fact that the student is not in the same position as the adult citizen. In the political community, anyone who is twenty-one has the right to participate in determining the way the community is run, but the college is a bureaucratic organization, an institution rather than a political community, and in the college the student is not only in the sociological position of a client, but as well is in the legal position of a child."[10]

FREEDOM AS A CONDITION OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

If freedom, then, cannot fully be understood in terms of the absence of restraint, what is it intrinsically and how does it relate to the field of student activities in particular? Freedom is not a right of man, but an essential condition of human existence. Freedom is not an attribute of any other reality, but a unique reality in itself. All other realities are confined and defined by their own natures. They are what they are. But freedom, although its course is harmonious with its nature, must of necessity determine itself. As Paul Tillich puts it: "Freedom is the possibility of transcending its nature."[11]

It is difficult to know just why freedom is its own special reality, separate from others and distinguished by potentiality and actualization beyond human prediction and comprehension. On this score some insights have been offered historically, although they lack a convincingness which is satisfying. Perhaps the best that can be said about this aspect of freedom has been stated by Alfred North Whitehead:

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[9]Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), especially Chapter III, pp. 81–119.

[10]Eliot Freidson, editor, *Student Government, Student Leaders and the American College* (Philadelphia: United States Student Association, 1955), p. 48.

[11]Paul Tillich, "Freedom in the Period of Transformation," Ruth Nanda Ashen, *Freedom: Its Meaning* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 123. I am indebted to Professor Tillich, my teacher, for several basic categories of thought.

> The peculiarity of the course of history illustrates the joint relevance of the "ontological principle" and of this categoreal obligation. The evolution of history can be rationalized by the consideration of the determination of successors by antecedents. But, on the other hand, the evolution of history is incapable of rationalization because it exhibits a selected flux of participating forms.
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> No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated. It is true that any flux must exhibit the character of internal determination. So much follows from the ontological principle. But every instance of internal determination assumes *that* flux up to *that* point. There is no reason why there could be no alternative flux exhibiting that principle of internal determination. The actual flux presents itself with the character of being merely "given." It does not disclose any peculiar character of "perfection". . . . Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience is most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision of the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification of subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be put aside merely as misconstruction.[12]

One might have wished that Whitehead had amplified his remarks concerning the fundamental fact of freedom in human experience, yet what he has said constitutes as apt a description of it as any.[13] Possibly only a theological metaphysics can ultimately provide a satisfying understanding of the constitution of human freedom. Yet, nonhistorical explanations of freedom tend to deny man his true freedom, for his true freedom is dependent in part upon his ability in history to determine his own nature and history and indeed to become something new in the processes of history. So, history and freedom are dialectically related complementaries whose dependence upon each other gives each its distinctive meaning.

The character of freedom is existential rather than merely political. From the political standpoint, the slave, as illustrated in Greek and Roman societies, was not a free being because he lacked significantly the possibility of self-fulfillment in society. According to the Greeks, moreover, the "barbarians" similarly were not fully free men because they lacked the humanizing opportunities given to the Greeks. Yet, when the Greeks' capacity for political self-determination was shattered by Pompey, Caesar and Augustus, the Epicureans and Stoics realized other aspects of freedom. The Epicureans in the main asserted that freedom in its totality constituted what Michael Polanyi in this latter day has termed "private freedom." Says Polanyi: "There are many things an individual can do . . . the social effects of which are considered negligible by the authorities as well as by the consensus of opinion throughout society."[14] That is private freedom and the Epicureans took refuge in it as the whole substance of freedom.

The Stoics, on the other hand, influenced as they were by the almost universal extension of Roman citizenship, were inclined to find their definition of freedom in Roman citizenship. Through Roman citizenship men could find their opportunity to participate thoroughly in history and therefore find their full freedom.

The Christian view of freedom was less political than the Stoic. The

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[12]Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 74.

[13]Aristotle commented upon the difficulty to define precisely the "moral actions." His ideas are relevant here. See, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1104a.

[14]Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 157–159.

Christian, the claim ran, through the grace of God was liberated from the hold of sin, guilt and the evil powers. This freedom is not dependent upon the political community, but rather upon the church, that is, an assembly of those called out of society in their new freedom. The Christian, as Paul noted, gains a new citizenship, one which is universal in scope, historical in implication and transcendent in its ground. Especially in the Protestant view of Christian freedom were freedom and equality conjoined, since all believers are equal in their status before God and in the responsibilities of their new citizenship.

Thus, freedom in the various historical views has been conceived from a variety of points of view, yet with the general agreement that freedom pertains intrinsically to man as man and to man as historical actor.

For student activities this conception of freedom has many implications. Surely, this idea of freedom is more comprehensive, profound and basic to behavior individually and in groups than has been maintained under the idea of freedom as the absence of restraint. Freedom in student activities is not freedom *from*; it is freedom *for*. Freedom also in student activities is an inevitable consequence of selfhood and institutional participation; it is not a petty gain requiring petty means of attainment. Freedom is not an aspect of the human self, such as the mind, nor is it a socially compartmentalized function, such as political freedom. Freedom involves the total person. It exists for the person throughout his participation in life, although its dynamic quality requires that it be fulfilled or it is apt to lose its meaning.

Freedom in this sense in student activities bespeaks the creative utilization of the student's potentialities. These potentialities are able to fulfill themselves because of freedom, but freedom in itself is not the essential goal. In fact, the student is faced constantly in his whole university experience with the task of self-fulfillment in freedom and in devotion to the social context in which his freedom historically must be expressed.

CREATIVE EXPRESSION OF STUDENTS' FREEDOM

In fact, the student, like all others, exercises his freedom through three kinds of creative expression:

1. Meaningful creativity.

The expression of freedom must be meaningful for the student. He must have a share in deciding in which ways his commitment to action is meaningful; the meaning cannot be given to him by the faculty or by administrators. Of course, it is not necessary for the student always to initiate his own meaningfulness, but whatever purposes to which he gives himself must have a meaning which he cannot deny for himself. If the student acts upon the purposes given to him without his own conviction being present he is in effect being enslaved and denied the meaningful use of his freedom. Thus the student and the student group must possess intrinsically a belief in the worthwhileness or meaningfulness of the activities which the university makes possible for them to accept.

The student group must permit the development of sincere and meaningful acceptance by the individual member of the purposes of the group. It must allow

him a share in the changes which are necessary for the full exercise of his individual freedom and the fulfillment of the group's purposes.

Freedom, then, must be rooted in meaningfulness rather than in sheer opportunity for self-expression. This fact has been made clear recently for college instructors by Professor Sidney Hook.[15] He quotes critically the statement of Robert Hutchins that "everywhere in the U. S. university professors, whether or not they have tenure, are silenced by the general atmosphere of repression." Professor Hook says that professors are not silent and that there is no conspiracy against talk in the university. Then he goes on to say:

> It may be that we educators do not talk as much as we should, but we have talked more than we ever have in the past. The question is: What do we have to say? My point is that we do not talk enough about problems, and the little we do talk is ineffectual. As a kind of compensation for this ineffectuality, there is often heard in educational quarters a new slogan—the importance of nonconformism. It requires only a moment's reflection to see that the terms "conformity" and "nonconformity" are relational and that, unless one knows the what, why, and how of conformity or nonconformity, the terms are meaningless, more accurately emotive symbols communicating at best a mood. In a sense, the greatest nonconformist in modern times was Adolf Hitler. He even refused to conform to the traditionally despotic ways of degrading man but strove to carve out new worlds of infamy for himself.[16]

Students likewise need not glory in conformity and nonconformity. They do not have a quarrel with any person or group within the university or the community over their need for self-expression. They first need meaningfulness in their creative use of freedom and that meaningfulness is not an automatic concomitant or product of their freedom.

2. Autonomous creativity.

Autonomous creativity is the freedom to act within the laws inherent in the situation in which the individual or the group finds itself without the employment of influences extrinsic to the situation. (This view makes use of the traditional meaning of autonomous.) Such freedom recognizes the obligation of the student to express his freedom within the objective structure of the group or situation in which he participates. For the student to act in a manner which denies the intrinsic importance of the social form granted to him for his expression is for him to pervert his freedom. He may have his own "style" in meeting situations. He may be more or less adept in various group situations, but he must follow the basic requirements of the given situation if he expects to find self-fulfillment and to contribute to the progress of the group. Thus, in a paralleling sense, the judge must perform his function in relation to the law. The teacher must find his freedom within the areas of knowledge in which he possesses competency. The racer has the possibility of excelling only by staying on the course. So, too, the student must find his freedom in creative involvement in the social forms at hand. He cannot expect to press his parliamentary skill upon a social dance nor should he seek to dance his way through a session of the student government council. The student who fails to act within the objective structure of the given social

[15]David Riesman also upbraids "intellectuals" who "try to cope with their anxiety by telling each other atrocity stories about America." See, *Individualism Reconsidered* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), pp. 124ff.

[16]Sidney Hook, "Education and Creative Intelligence," *School and Society*, Volume 84, 1956, p. 6.

situation denies his historical freedom. He misuses himself and denies himself his true fulfillment.[17]

In this connection it is significant to note that the so-called pranks of students must be viewed as inappropriate and immoral not simply because they cause the university embarrassment. They should not merely be viewed in moralistic terms as violations of community standards. They are violations of man's nature as a freedom possessing creature who creatively must find his true expression not in self-negating destructive activities but in those which are meaningful and appropriate within the social medium in which he is given the opportunity of acting.

Recently a number of illustrations of a changed attitude on the part of universities and educators toward so-called pranks has occurred. For example, Burton P. Fowler, Principal of the Germantown Friends School in Philadelphia, wrote a letter to the *New York Times* in which, with language different from that employed in the present formulation, he questioned the autonomic propriety of the prank action of some university students. Part of his statement follows:

> Following the recent riots staged at several of our leading colleges, the one characteristic comment of the college authorities as well as that of the press seems to be that "boys will be boys." It is true that boys will be boys until they are expected to be men.
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> Is it not possible that too many bright boys who have not grown up are being admitted to college, and after they get there are having their intellects cultivated at the expense of their behavior. . . .
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> Hazing, fraternity rushing, excessive drinking, commercialized athletics and other campus mores that long ago should have been outmoded are not reassuring to the citizen who looks at the high cost of a college education. When college boys engage in battles with the police, destroy property, and behave insultingly toward girls, or vice versa, it is dismissed as "a combination of youth and spring," while in the slums of our great cities we call similar behavior delinquency, or in prison riots we call it insurrection. . . .
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> There is a real danger, I believe, that this careless freedom from the responsibility of college life, a kind of perpetual Halloween atmosphere, will persist until, like the athletic scandals of last year, it may threaten public respect for the whole of higher education.[18]

Dr. Fowler's tone may seem too moralistic to have his thoughts related to the idea that freedom imposes its own restraints appropriate to the situation in which it is being expressed, yet close attention will indicate that he speaks mainly from the standpoint of the objective conditions in which university students should act.

On May 21, 1956, between 80 and 100 students of the University of Kansas paid a visit to the campus of Baker University (12 miles away) and conducted a "panty raid" at Alpha Chi Omega sorority. On May 31, 1956, the administration of the University of Kansas dismissed 58 of the participants in the riot. Discussion for some time was held among educators as to whether the University of Kansas acted wisely. Of course, many diverse views were expressed. The editor of

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[17]Maybe "integrity" is the best word to describe the ability to use freedom constructively. At least it is that quality which General Robert E. Lee evinced when he had determined upon surrender at Appomattox. One of his officers remonstrated with him saying: "Oh, General, what will history say of the surrender of the army in the field?" "Yes," replied the sobered Lee, "I know they will say hard things of us! They will not understand how we were overwhelmed by numbers. But that is not the question, Colonel: The question is, is it right to surrender the army? If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility." Carl Sandburg, *Storm Over the Land* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 227.

[18]*New York Times*, May 25, 1956, p. 8E.

School and Society, however, pointed out the improper use of freedom by the students in the following manner:

> News of "panty raids" and similar incidents do much to lower the prestige of high education at home and abroad. By putting a strong foot down on such nonsense, the colleges can convince young men—and young women, for that matter, too—that the higher jinks do not mix with higher education. With enrollment expected to mount skyward and with faculties and facilities increasing at more modest rates, there should be no room in the college and university for the so-called student who is whiling away his time amid indifferent academic and behavioral standards. What is needed is the *real* student whose main interest is learning.[19]

As previously stated, the student cannot divorce himself in his use of freedom from the situation in which he finds himself. He is bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the social group or institution in which he acts.[20] It is proper, then, that he be asked to possess and express personal maturity (internalized control) in autonomously relating his use of freedom to the objective structure of the social situation.

3. Self-fulfilling creativity.

If freedom should be meaningful in its expression and appropriate to its surroundings, it also should lead to the self-fulfillment of the individual. Self-fulfillment is the personal aim of the possession of freedom. It entails belief in the fundamental ability of persons to change, develop or mature. Man is a self-fulfilling creature. It is this feature of his nature which in degree marks him from nature. Man, in other words, is able to transcend himself. He can become that which he is not. But, his self-fulfillment is rooted in his freedom, for without freedom man would be forced to remain at a given stage of maturity for an indefinite period of time. Because man is free he is able to change.

Self-fulfillment has its sterner, contentful aspects in which the principal concern is not the feeling of the person but his objective attainment.[21] The student who claims that he is fulfilling himself through a given activity needs to be reminded that there are a variety of criteria by which such fulfillment may be evaluated. In the sphere of freedom not all roads lead to Rome. For example, the student group which asserts an independence regardless of its university relationship is violating the autonomous requirements of freedom and thus also perverting the proper sort of fulfillment which is open to it—a fulfillment which stresses community and cooperation rather than factionalism and disorder. It can be assumed that students as individuals and in groups do not necessarily have the maturity by which they may judge the entire content of their self-fulfillment. Like every person, the student finds his criteria by which self-fulfillment may be evaluated through his association with others. The university, somewhat like the churches, is in part a community of grace in which the members help each other to the fullest maturity. The student editor, for example, who resists the suggestions or instruction of the faculty adviser is failing to maintain that open-

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[19]William W. Brickman, "Higher Jinks and Higher Education," *School and Society*, Volume 84, 1956, pp. 11–12.

[20]William Temple has expressed this sentiment as follows:"Membership of family and nation is not an accidental appendage of my individuality, but a constitutive element in it. . . Membership, such as carried with it a share in a common weal and woe, is an essential element in our nature." *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 186–187.

[21]Elton Trueblood has written an appealing chapter on "The Achievement of Freedom." See, *The Life We Prize* (New York: Harper, 1951), pp. 78–97.

ness toward the objective evaluation of his self-fulfillment which is proper to the possession of freedom. The student government which seeks to maintain a severe independence from faculty and administrators and views every suggestion with pained and troubled reaction is operating under a false philosophy of freedom and in the process shutting itself off from the community of suggestion and criticism by which students are able to judge their own progress in self-fulfillment. Thus, freedom is not a right to do as one pleases; it is the condition of creative self-fulfillment in which the self and others participate within the confines of autonomy and meaningfulness.

Yet, the sterner, contentful aspects of self-fulfilling creativity must find a balance with the sense of joy and happiness which is a result of partial self-fulfillment. So much of student activities exists to provide forms of happiness to students and the sense on their part of mastering new content and skills. It is entirely proper that such enthusiasm be a complement to student activities, both for individuals and groups. But, the happiness to be sought is that of *eudaimonia* rather than *hedone*. *Hedone* expresses the "pleasure principle." In many instances happiness, in the sense of *eudaimonia*, is accompanied by pleasure, but happiness is attainable in which little or no pleasure is present. *Eudaimonia* expresses the actualization of the student's potential self-fulfillment. It is a condition of exultation and joy—the joy of accomplishment, the joy resulting from the true use of freedom.

Individual student achievement should ideally be characterized by *eudaimonia*. This happiness cannot be given to the student, although he can be sympathetically helped to achieve it and its attainment can be noted and shared by others, such as students, family, faculty and administrators.

On the other hand, the possibility of students achieving happiness in student activities should not be too easily conceived. The student is prone to the same need for "the courage to be" that all men experience. The student like all others is threatened by the anxieties of fate and death, of emptiness and loss of meaning, and of guilt and condemnation.[22] All three threats are endemic to human experience and therefore present in the activities of the student in all phases of his life. A student activities philosophy which presents nothing but a breezy optimism regarding students' possibilities for achievement is basically unrealistic. In the long run such a philosophy may well be harmful to the welfare of the students.

The achievement of a philosophy of student activities which fully recognizes the total dimensions of man as a historically founded creature capable of freedom is one of the pressing and current needs of the university. The comments of David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* concerning the desirability of "inner direction" make a popular beginning, although Riesman hardly is aware of the profound problem of the sources of inner directedness in an industrial society.[23] Thus, persons usually are not argued into the acceptance of a new stance of life and if they could be the question still would remain of the sources of the dynamism or power necessary for the fulfillment of the rational ideal. Such an existential question seems ultimately to require a religious answer. (*Continued on page 248*)

[22]Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952); especially pp. 40–57. See, also, David Riesman's description of the problem. *Individualism Reconsidered* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), p. 118, and elsewhere.

[23]David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

BY FOREST K. DAVIS

FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT THE PHILOSOPHIC CENTER OF GRAVITY SHIFTS, perhaps only by a little when all is said and done, but still it shifts, and there are consequences for education and for ideas. The purpose of this review will be to move back and forth among the implications of such a shift at the present time to see what meaning it may have for reflective thought and for the direction of education in the contemplative fields.

By way of premise it is suggested that the fundamental element in human motivation is the urge to know. The will to knowledge can be broadly defined as antecedent to all the organic hungers. A case can undoubtedly be made for the moral dimension as fundamental on higher levels and this possibility should be left open for future consideration. For the time being, however, one may settle on what appears universal for life in general. Major fields of knowledge, as philosophy, religion and the sciences, then become developments in the main theme and may be seen in varied perspective. In the 20th century, moreover, intentional judgment has been increasingly applied to common problems in an effort to improve the conditions of life. It will be wise to apply judgment in the reaches of reflective thought as well, rather than to regard the contemplative interests merely as diversions of the idle mind. Who is to say that an effective world-view is not a vital condition of personal and social well-being?

On the Nature of Knowing

American thought is marked, perhaps even more than European, by periodic fracture of established conceptions of objective reality. It is as if the mood of individualism could not endure confinement for long within a shell of ideas representing an external world to which one does not contribute but only responds. The construction of objective patterns seems to deny freedom to the originality which devised them. Yet human nature constantly demands just such patterns, and so the merry round goes on.

Among the many philosophic currents which flow in a given age there is now a movement away from a view of the world as objective toward emphasis on the role of the individual in perceiving that world. If the universe outside the self is hard and fast, irreducible, ultimate, waiting only to be discovered, man can do little except learn to live more cleverly within its iron frame. If on the other hand life contributes through its perceptions to the substance and selection of the universe, the situation of subject and object becomes suddenly fluid; the conceptions of human nature and of the world-external stand open to revision. This is the present case.

Restriction of this trend to consideration of internal states and feelings will result in a series of truncated subjectivisms of "existential" types as have been common in recent years. If working relationships are recognized between subject and object, however, knowledge may be of several effective kinds—photographic, filtered, or sliced thin. The individual may even be left alone in the

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dark with only the signs of things for company, where the very daylight is a species of deceit having no value except that of constancy in its deception. This, too, is knowledge of a kind, for the individual can operate reliably in his remote condition, albeit not unlike the expert in rare elements whose bloodless fingers, fixed to the ends of poles, pour liquid fire fresh from the vitals of the universe.

The subjective emphasis is open to many types of error, and several of these have been put forward in the century since Kierkegaard and Hegel. Yet surely it is desirable for the role of the perceiver to be worked through in this stage, with reference to the composition of human nature and available facets of the natural world. A new formulation of the process of knowing may be in order, to balance a new fusion of conceptions of reality regrettably separated some centuries ago.

Recognition of the conceptual nature of knowing as common to science, philosophy and religion raises implications significant for reflective studies at the college level. Disconcerting ideas crowd in upon the mind. The philosophic centre of gravity abruptly shifts, temporarily perhaps, from the external world to the world within. No longer is attention directed primarily outward among the neutrons and the nebulae, and only secondarily inward on man's own nature—his nature, incidentally, as child of the hairy ape. Rather the focus falls first on the nature of man in all its unconfinable complexity, and through it becomes free to center upon phases of the outside world selected by interests of the mind.

Mind becomes of pivotal importance. Far from being merely the echo of chemical traffic roaring among the nerves, or the by-product of biological events reflected in evanescent media, mind becomes the signalman of the human system, independent centre of judgment and communication, the unit of individual life which at once provides access to the metaphysical depths of existence and direction for the earnest outreach of the soul.

Empiricism is seen to be at best a momentary phenomenon, erroneous in its findings and existing if at all only for minute fractions of time when transitions from pattern to pattern and age to age may permit brief consideration of unselected fact. Knowing in general is not of this order. It requires organization; organization requires principle; and principle follows upon activity of mind. Intelligible knowledge is ultimately constructional in nature, and only incidentally or methodologically analytic. Physical analysis remains a useful tool; it ought not to be considered in its reductionist aspect fundamental in the construction of comprehensive theories of environment and life. Understanding follows upon assertive activity of mind; intellective assertion enables discovery and selection of identifiable facets of reality. Knowledge cannot be confined to the results of analytic minutism, but requires recognition that human life, existing presumably in a middle range of perceptual possibility, functions on the basis of conceptions which have subjective and objective standing on their given levels. Consequences for the validity of universals may follow, though the issue at the moment is not germane.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE AS FORMS OF KNOWING

Knowing is one thing in all the major fields of concern. Connections are established of some import for religion and science, and bearing upon their consideration in systematic studies.

When all is said and done, that which religion has striven to do since earliest times has been to place mankind in an effective operating relationship with the powers of the universe. Physical and spiritual well-being are end functions of cognitive activity. Man's ceaseless striving to know his world is his pre-eminent characteristic. Theories and patterns have taken many forms but their common purpose has not changed. A worldview places the individual in a recognizable context, that he may live with assurance amid the mysteries of his time. There are other concerns in religion but they are related to this—the will to know where one stands and to stand were one knows.

And when all is similarly said and done, the concern to know the universe and to cast mankind in proper role within it is also the primary problem of the sciences. It is perhaps fair to say that the enormous scientific activity of this age derives in part from convenient discoveries of practices and techniques the working out of which produce desirable conditions of life and varied conceptions of certain of its aspects. The underlying faith of the sciences, as Burtt and Whitehead and others have remarked, is the faith of the Middle Ages that the world is reliable and can be known and that man is capable of knowing it. The direction of attention toward the phenomena of this world perceived through the senses, surely a characteristic of a "scientific" age and greatly cherished by the modern mood, is seen to be akin to the mediaeval realism of St. Thomas Aquinas and ultimately to the Aristotelian shift from the idea to the thing. Science as a general human activity must be concerned in a philosophic way with questions of significance, unless it is to be meaningless motion or a dead thrashing, and so it is, like many other cultural phases, related to the religious root, tied to it by the nature of its work and its methods of procedure.

In these two fields the procedures of knowing are strictly held in common; there is no marked difference between the knowing of science and the knowing of religion. Each type involves construction or grasp of conceptual patterns against which perceived materials are checked. More than this, constructional concepts enable far-reaching advances in understanding. While from time to time systems of ideas have become old and restrictive and therefore subject to assault, by their nature they have enabled in the first instance the splendid achievements of the mind which have changed the face of nature and greatly deepened man's understanding of his habitation. There is the memorable passage in Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* where he describes

> . . . the meeting of the Royal Society in London when the Astronomer Royal for England announced that the photographic plates of the famous eclipse, as measured by his colleagues in Greenwich Observatory, had verified the prediction of Einstein that rays of light are bent as they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the Greek drama: we were the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as disclosed in the development of a supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the very staging:—the traditional ceremonial, and in the background the picture of Newton to remind us that the greatest of scientific generalisations was now, after more than two centuries, to receive its first modification. Nor was the personal interest wanting: a great adventure in thought had at length come safe to shore.[1]

Where apparent conflicts of religion and science have occurred, as in the century of Copernicus and Galileo and later in the times of Darwin and Thomas

[1]Whitehead, *Science and The Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 15. Reprint by permission of the publishers.

Huxley, they have been disagreements of a conceptual order, of interpretation, rather than conflicts of "dogma" and "fact" as often supposed. At the time of its inception Copernican theory was less an appeal to sensory fact than a theoretical construction divised to account for larger numbers of facts than were subsumed under earlier theories. To its contemporaries it was a contradiction of evidences from the senses (obviously the sun went around the earth), and the conflicts it engendered were conflicts of habits of mind. So it was with theories of evolution and of divine creation in the later period.

The warfare of religion and the sciences, pursued with such good will in the recent century, has therefore had an illusory character. It has not entailed much actual disagreement over what is real, though it may have seemed to do so. Alleged conflicts of science and religion have been disputes of phases of thought under conditions in which the respective time-stages have been ignored. The perspective on intellectual change has been too short for the nature of the disagreements to be clear. A more accurate relationship can be discovered in the common purposes of religious and scientific thought—determination of the nature of life and its setting, and in the apparent identity of their procedures of knowing. The coinage remains the same for all parts of the realm.

To be sure, the shouting of Huxley against the bishops had its uses in the long view. Periodically the accustomed patterns of thought must be broken up, and this Huxley did on behalf of Darwin who rested at home with his headaches, rejoicing in the sound of arms from afar. The curious thing is that conceptual change of this kind commonly appears to be greater than it really is. A minor shift of emphasis from one variety of conceptual assumption to another is seen as a movement of far-reaching scope and significance, as altering ways of thinking and as changing the character of the total universe. That the actual change in outlook is very slight and the shift in the perceivable aspect of nature is largely illusory, or at most a movement among aspects, suggests that the implications of intellectual history tend to be misunderstood. Similarly, the general climate of opinion obtaining at a given time is seen as differing remarkably from the climates of other times, and the transitions between them are examined with a closeness which tends to overrate their metaphysical importance. The major changes between one age of thought and another most often derive from removal of general interest from one set of philosophic questions to another, with the consequence that different aspects of reality become prominent at different times. It does not follow that the nature of objective reality is altered decisively merely because the focus of investigative attention is moved, or that some earlier set of questions will not be restated in some new form, perhaps periodically, when the problems which they represent again become immediate.

Educational patterns in the contemplative fields have been shaped in part by classifications developed as agents of convenience under conditions no longer familiar. Traditional divisions in philosophy, science and religion continue to yield useful results, but they must make place for values deriving from general ideas and from perspectives unusually long.

The traditional fields have in common the original concern of human life, the urge to know, a concern which underlies even the will to live since it must precede the satisfaction of hungers as well as the lacework of less demanding interests. Each of the three fields relies on that form of conceptual thought which marks every endeavor of intellectual man. The same conceiving power selects

aspects of nature for perception and study and so reveals the gifts of comprehension and control which inhere in the mind.

For educational purposes many studies are useful and few can be condemned. To concentrate, however, on general questions thrown up by existence, insofar as that is desirable, attention may center on conceptual world-views of the largest compass, those remarkable schemas by which men have pictured to themselves the worlds in which they lived, and in so doing have at once discovered and created them.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

As distinguished, then, from analytic epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge will be concerned with conceptual prehensions of reality in all ages and cultures, and in whatever disciplines they may be found. Cosmology alone is too limited a field to comprise a philosophy of knowledge, but it would be a vital ingredient and perhaps a first approach. The content of a college study in this region of the mind would vary with individual interests, drawing on assertive systems from classical, mediaeval and modern times. Reading could be drawn from Biblical and Greek sources, the Church Fathers, mediaeval reflections through Aquinas and Dante, and from standard early modern and contemporary figures. Scientific thought in recent centuries, selections from the several fields through the 19th century, religious philosophy and the supposedly secular systems—all would offer exciting possibilities. Reviews and research in the history of thought would provide helpful over-views, while a variant approach by way of the philosophers of history also suggests itself. Views of Eastern cultures should stand with those of the West. These fields and their principal figures are familiar ground in many disciplines and are not unusual as they appear in this connection. It is perhaps the focus and the point of view, the kind of question asked and the answers sought, which will serve to organize a philosophy of knowledge.

Experience in history would have its values, but studies in conceptual schemas would in addition respond to the needs of contemporary thought. Comprehensive conceptions of reality, of nature and human life, are of immense significance in the present age. The determinative role of metaphysical assumption cannot wisely be ignored, though in recent times it has been almost replaced by a childlike and carefree running up and down of philosophic alleys. Sharply curtailed perspectives of metaphysical kinds have in turn restricted conceptions of the self and its capacities. Its powers of reflective construction have been limited by limitations of conviction, its destructive powers relatively strengthened by fascination with its animal inheritance. However, contemplative asseveration, lately considered a light-weight game of the mind, resumes its old insistence and overflows into ethical and social realms. The consequences for self-confidence and self-direction and for social behavior on a wide scale need no elaboration. Surely at this point the relation between the popular metaphysics and the ethico-social conduct of large groups of people comes into the clear. Eventually one must encounter that silent metaphysics-of-the-people to which so much of individual and group behavior is a response, and of which the precise versions of the scholars are merely developed variations.

Students of college age, coming to reflective studies when ultimate questions are especially poignant, should become accustomed to thinking in large terms and should be familiar with the classical efforts by which ancient and modern figures have described their several worlds. Conceptual studies will serve these purposes,

among others. The entrance of new minds into the fields of reflection and assertion may help to answer the conceptual needs of the world's populations. New data will constantly be discovered; new relationships of data must constantly be clarified. Frames of reference must be built and built again to set off accumulating information. Widening perspectives are in strong demand.

Implied here is a deliberate shift of the weight of contemplation in some parts of college study, adding to the analytic and comparative emphases the concern for synthesis and constructional thought. Specific programs of study in the philosophy of knowledge will be traditional and perhaps commonplace for teachers in many fields. What may be different is the focus and direction, the determination to expend deliberate effort in the construction of worldviews, in assertion of general ideas to account for the characteristics and setting of life. Individual mind creates its counterpoise from facets of the endless universe. The conduct of life depends for its wisdom on the arch of meaning between the self and its aspects of reality. Mind adventures, and the world, if it will, responds. When the leap is made and the balance met, there is fulfillment; when part is lost, there is confusion or the fall.

The contemplative fields of thought have traditionally dealt with this problem. The sciences have preferred to engage in happy voyages of discovery, supposing that were simpler. Yet clearly, no one of the investigative fields can do without the organizing principles of reflection. Even the sciences have taken up their philosophic implications, albeit too often confined to picking at inconsequential matters well out in the suburbs of significance. Actually, the sciences have always stood closely with philosophy in the implications—drawn or not—of positions they have wished to take, as Burtt has shown in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*. Few recognitions can be more helpful than that ultimate questions pervade every phase of man's existence, tower over every field of thought, demand in eloquent silence answers which every field of study finally wills to give.

The philosophy of knowledge then comes over on several levels. It provides for historical studies of conceptual schemas, in part for the methods and materials of other days and in part for the breadth of awareness involved in the discipline. At the same time it lives acutely in the present, reconstructing comprehensions of nature and life as required by an age buried beneath mounting piles of factual shards and rubble. By implication the philosophy of knowledge throws open for re-study the nature of subject and object and the problem of communication between the two.

The concern of education for these reaches of philosophy is a function of its inescapable relation to metaphysics—that is, to its total view of the world as conceived to be real. When method predominates in education it does so usually on the basis of metaphysical assumptions which require careful examination, or, more commonly, for convenience in resolving community needs in situations where general ideas are not at issue.

A single process of knowing underlies religion, philosophy, the sciences, and education. Their respective appearances are not greatly changed; their vectors face in various directions; they continue to function in different ways. Still, the shadows of these great fields of endeavor are cast toward a common concern. Forthwith the present age is seen to dwell on the edge of a conceptual volcano.

FREEDOM AND CHOICE IN THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

BY VAN CLEVE MORRIS

I

IF THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IS TO PRODUCE ANYTHING NOVEL AND DEFINITIVE IN THE WAY OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY, in all probability it will find it growing, perhaps in a wild state, in the fertile soil of Experimentalism. This is suggested partly because the predominant position this educational outlook enjoys today, at least in theoretical circles, almost requires us to consider it our point of departure. But there is the added factor that this educational view provides the greatest incentive to novelty and change.

Furthermore, Experimentalism, for all its epistemological and axiological grandeur, is just a theory and, qua theory, it is as corrigible as any other. And theorists are under some continuing obligation to ascertain the points where correction is needed. This paper suggests one such point for theoretical consideration.

The point to which I refer is the *doctrine of sociality*, a doctrine which constitutes one of the central members of the Experimentalist edifice. The doctrine of sociality holds that whatever human nature is, above and beyond the physiological, it is the product of human experience; and that human experience as we know it—in fact the only kind we know anything about or can sensibly conceive of—is social experience in corporate, group life. Hence all that arises in a human life has its ultimate origin in what is generically referred to with the adjective "social." In epistemological terms, the doctrine of sociality refers to the public and shareable quality of experience, a quality which makes possible not only the enrichment of individual lives through participating in the experiences of others but, more important, the checking of one experience against another so as to arrive more nearly at what experiences mean. It is this public, social environment in which man exercises his unique facility for symbological communication, and it is through this symbological reporting, this comparing of notes amongst his fellows, that man arrives at what the Experimentalist calls "warrantable assertions" about experience. As educators, of course, we also know that this social environment of experience and sharing and symbolism is the arena where human learning takes place.

Now the doctrine of sociality, as I call it, is without doubt one of the most profound insights of the human intellect. And we can justly honor it and give it special status as a philosophic idea because of the remarkable leverage it provides in understanding how men think, how they learn, how they grow. But the trouble with this recognition of grandeur in a philosophic idea, as with the recognition of grandeur in anything, is the temptation it provides for "hero worship." And as soon as we have identified any of our ideas as "heroic," as soon as we have elevated them to a position of prominence in a system of thought, we are within the magnetic field of orthodoxy.

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I call myself an Experimentalist, but I am inclined to think that the cloak of orthodoxy has begun to settle over the Experimentalist community, especially with respect to the doctrine of sociality. To get right to the point, my thesis is this: the doctrine of sociality as a central concept in Experimentalism is becoming increasingly vulnerable, vulnerable not so much with respect to its basic validity but rather with respect to its totality.

I do not see how any right-minded person could challenge its validity. There is too much evidence, both subjective and objective, to support the view that a great deal of what we call man's humanity is social in origin. But the *totality* of this doctrine is another matter. To be specific, does the doctrine of sociality comprehend the sum of all that is known under the category "human?" Does sociality suffice to explain every human activity? Does it exhaust the measures necessary to ascertain what man really is?

I think not. And the burden of this paper is to focus attention on that portion of the human person which no amount of science, no amount of "social calculus," no amount of culturology has yet been able to touch, i.e., his subjectivity.

I have developed elsewhere[1] the philosophic base for my present criticism of Experimentalism, namely, the philosophy of Existentialism. This new outlook, at once troubling and exciting, may be thought of as a correction or an extension of Experimentalism. It shares many views with Experimentalism: it is secular (in the sense of being wary of substantive supernaturalism), it is open-ended, it is man-oriented. But it differs from Experimentalism in one important respect, i.e., it is primarily subjective while Experimentalism is primarily objective.

Experimentalism is a system of inquiry in which man uses the instrument of science to find his way through life. Although man is no longer the mere passive spectator of reality, as the Realists would say, he is nevertheless the interactive agent in a dynamic reality and a purposeful manipulator of that reality. He is now not just spectator but participant. As participant he tries to make sense out of his participation, i.e., out of his transactional experience, and as he does he surveys as objectively and as scientifically as he can all the phenomena that come within his purview. He may no longer study things in the search for essences, but he studies processes in the search for meanings. The method of his search is the objective and disinterested method of science.

He starts out by studying stars and rocks, and trees, and frogs, and matter, and motion and energy. But sooner or later he discovers himself and, when he does, he proceeds to apply the same objective method of science to the study of himself, namely, his behavior. Thus, beside astronomy, geology, botany, biology, chemistry, and physics, we now have the sciences of sociology, political science, anthropology, and psychology, the so-called behavioral sciences.

All of these are, or pretend to be, objective sciences. They look at the behavior of man in a dispassionate, removed, and scientific way, hoping to catalogue an ever greater proportion of the conduct of man under rubrics of prediction and control. As sciences, their primary opponent is the arbitrary, the spontaneous, the unpredictable in human conduct, and their task is to describe, inventory, and rationalize human behavior in such a way as to circumscribe into as tight a corner

[1] V. C. Morris, "Existentialism and Education." *Educational Theory*, Oct. 1954.

as they can push it the arbitrary and subjective components of human motivation. To the behavioral sciences there is no legitimate concern with the subjective; man is to be studied as object. The biologist studies him objectively as a physical organism; the anthropologist and sociologist study him objectively as a behaving organism; the psychologist studies him objectively as a perceiving and responding organism. Even psychiatry, which began with a search for the subjective, has turned out to be a search for the causation of neurotic behavior. Once the patient understands that his neurosis is caused, he ceases to feel any personal responsibility for his unusual conduct. In a very literal sense, psychiatry has rendered him, behaviorally speaking, merely the product of his past experience, the human effect of experiential causes.

It is not right to consider the tremendous work these sciences have done on "man-as-an-object" as fraudulent or misdirected. On the contrary, they have all shown us remarkable things about ourselves. But try as they will, as sciences in the sociality of man, they are incapable of comprehending the whole of what it is to be a man. What they have to leave out, almost by definition, is that segment of human thought and action that cannot be catalogued, cannot be calculated, cannot be predicted, cannot be controlled.

We may say with Karl Jaspers, a leading Existentialist, that:

> Science, it is true, shows us remarkable and highly surprising things about man, but as it attains greater clarity, the more evident it becomes that man as a whole can never become the object of scientific investigation. Man is always more than he knows about himself.[2]

It is this strange frustration that man experiences when he studies himself that Jean Paul Sartre has so well characterized in his writings. Man has two states of consciousness: (1) he is conscious of things, objects, and processes in his experience, and (2) he is conscious of his consciousnesss. Owing to this split in consciousness, man is divided. He strives to extend his consciousness over the fullness of objective reality by studying all reality, including himself, through the objective instrument of science. But through it all he never wishes to exhaust himself so completely as to render himself nothing but object. He wishes to retain his consciousness of consciousness, his subjective base. He wishes to remain a subject. Since these two strivings are contradictory, man is therefore what Sartre calls "une passion inutile," a futile passion.

In theological terms, it may be expressed by saying that man strives to be like God, to perceive all, to know all, to comprehend all, to be all. It is in this process of *becoming* like God that he finds his greatest human satisfaction. But if he were to succeed in this adventure, he would no longer be capable of becoming; he would pass into the state of being, no longer free, no longer capable of choice, but determined. Man thus pursues a phantom. He is a futile passion.

It is for these reasons that the Existentialist, both the atheistic and the Christian, views the question of God with so much indifference.

> Existentialism isn't so atheistic that it wears itself out showing that God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that even if God did exist, that would change nothing. . . . Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that the problem of His existence is not the issue.[3]

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[2] *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949, p. 60.

[3] Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism*, (tr. by B. Frechtman). N. Y., Philosophical Library, 1947, p. 61.

III

What the issue genuinely is we shall see presently. But before we pass on to this point, we must make clear that man's recognition of himself as a futile passion is nothing particularly new. Modern Existentialism is not the first case of awakening to this agonizing condition. The Greeks recognized it and sought to relieve the futility of their passion by erecting the magnificant card-houses of Rational Humanism; the Medieval Schoolmen sought to explain the paradox by enclosing it in the mysteries of the transcendental; and modern man may one day be spoken of in our 30th century textbooks on philosophy as having tried to solve the riddle with science.

What is so painfully evident however is that science has enjoyed no more success in untying this knot than any other device fashioned by the mind of man. The science of sociality has certainly shown us some remarkable things about this beast, but these things are, we must all admit, only partial answers to the question, "What is man?", the question which overrides all others in the realm of philosophy.

And it is this question—"What is man?"—and the attitude one takes toward it, that most definitely *is* the issue in philosophy, so far as the Existentialist is concerned. It is the way this question has been and is being handled that particularly exercises the Existentialist. And so, with a look into this question, we can begin to peer into Existentialist educational theory.

What is man? The Greeks said he was a rational animal. Their case was built upon both objective evidence, i.e., that he was an animal, and introspective, subjective evidence, i.e., that he possessed reason.

The Medieval Schoolmen called him a spiritual being. In arriving at this definition, the Schoolmen and their modern descendents have been fond of likening man to an artifact. The definition of any object can be identified by asking its maker. Just as a carpenter has the idea of a table before he makes the table, so likewise did God have the the idea of man before he made man. And if you wish to find out what this idea was, you seek out God. Theology is the effort to determine what God had in mind in the creation of man.

And now we have the Experimentalist. He says that man is a behaving, problem-solving, socially originated organism. In working toward this definition of man, the Experimentalist, with the aid of the behavioral sciences—the sciences of sociality—studies human behavior. If all human behavior can be inventoried, if its causes can be identified and its consequences noted, and if the whole thing can be plotted in some statistical kind of way, then we have an operational, or working, definition of man. It is true, of course, in Experimentalism that behaviors lead to unforeseen consequences which in turn pose new problems which subsequently lead to new ideas and new behaviors. But what does *not* change, what is constant in the human career, is the activity of problem-solving and more importantly the *social base* of this problem-solving. There can be no solutions to problems nor can there even be any problems which are not ultimately traceable to social origins. Hence, the definition of man as a social organism.

Now what does the Existentialist say? The Existentialist says this is all wrong. The whole enterprise of defining man is fundamentally wrong-headed,

and for a very simple reason: the moment you define man you destroy his freedom to become something else. And when you destroy this freedom to *become*, you destroy man himself. It matters not whether you try to define him through objective and introspective evidence, or define him by looking into the heavenly reaches of the supernatural, or define him by observing his social behavior. In each and every case, you set out on the search for something—a definition—which can have no other effect than to destroy the very thing you wish to understand. For once a definition is in place, then you have circumscribed the region in which man is to be known and understood.

Man cannot be known for the simple reason that, if he were, he would have obliterated himself. He cannot be known because, if he were, he would no longer be capable of becoming. And it is his becoming-ness which makes him a man. Using the language of the Aristotelians, the Existentialist insists that man has no essence. If he has an essence, it is his freedom from essence and his consequent freedom to choose and become what he will. He cannot be located once and for all in nature; he cannot be located once and for all in the supernatural; he cannot be plotted, catalogued, inventoried in the social. He is free.

It is in this sense that we can say that every philosophy of man up to and including Experimentalism has finally yielded to the temptation of determinism. Every philosophy has found it necessary, sooner or later, to provide a context in which man and his experience can be understood: The Aristotelians had their context of form and matter, actuality and potentiality; the Thomists have had their context of the hierarchy of Being; and now the scientific and empirical philosophies have their context of social experience. But the tragic error of contextualism, of all varieties, is that it ultimately determines the limits of man; indeed this is the purpose of contexts, i.e., to provide the limits of the region in which he can be understood. Thus, the enterprise of defining man, the enterprise of providing him a context within which he can become intelligible, finally devolves into determining what he must be. In the case of Experimentalism, man must be a social product. He cannot be anything else.

But to say that man must be this and cannot be something else ultimately is to say that he is not free. And this is the paradox. Every philosophy has endeavored to assert the freedom of man, but has ended up by either overlooking it or actively trying to destroy it.

The Greeks tried to destroy it with their rational determinism; the theologians have tried to destroy it with a God, ruling and ordaining all that occurs in the cosmos; and now science is trying to destroy it with the social calculus. The remarkable thing, of course, is that it cannot be destroyed. Even in our modern, scientific age, in the age of culturology, in the age of social conditioning, the dogged freedom of man—to choose, to select, to decide—continues to assert itself.

Of course, such programs for the destruction of human freedom have historically always had a rather easy time of it. Men are agonized at the discovery of their radical freedom. Their agony is well illustrated, I think, by the feeling every child experiences around the age of ten or twelve. At some time or other around this age, after a specially severe remonstrance from his parents, a youngster may be heard to say, "I did not ask to be born." He hopes by this gambit to relieve himself of responsibility for what he has done, and by implication for

anything he may ever do. But the stark and blinding fact is that he is now existent in the world, whether he has chosen it or not, and therefore a responsible being in a difficult existence.

This is what is meant by the emphasis on existence in the philosophy of Existentialism. Man, in the aggregate, just like children individually, has awakened to his existence, and when he has done so he is immediately struck by agony and despair because he comes to realize that this existence is the existence of responsibility.

Individuals have thought they could escape this agony and despair by escaping the freedom that brings it on. They have tried a variety of escapes from this freedom; they have tried religion, they have tried totalitarianism, and most recently they have tried the social calculus. In its more benign form this is referred to as the appeal to the "uncoerced community of persuasion." In its more pernicious aspects we call it "group conformism." Fundamentally, they are the same thing, i.e., the appeal to social experience to verify our truths and validate our beliefs.

Ours is a century of "uncoerced persuasion," the century of fads, fashions, group controls, and cultural mores. We live within the dominion of these social mechanisms because we live in what the Existentalist considers basically a century of "homelessness."

> . . . men have lost the old points of recognition and seek, consciously or neurotically, new kinds of recognition. The several forms of totalitarianism of our time are intended to be ways out of this spiritual homelessness for many millions. The middle-class conventionality, which is just as strong now as one hundred years ago, is another way."[4]

Professor Riesman in his *The Lonely Crowd* has made a masterful documentation of our predicament. And more recent books such as Sloan Wilson's *The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit*, Spectorsky's *The Exurbanites*, and most notably the recent book, *The Organization Man* by William Whyte, have all made it painfully plain that we are about to be smothered by the heavy overlay of social conformity.

> But even in the crowd, the individual cannot now escape loneliness and disquietude. It is all too plain that no crowd, no group, has the overall and permanent sanction that can allay all anxiety. And yet, such is the prevailing fear in the twentieth century of non-recognition, that he who is not known under some category knows himself to be lost. . . ."[5]

Thus, it is "middle-class conventionality"—or any brand of "uncoerced community"—that now stands between us and the realization of the true human spirit, just as dogmatic religion and totalitarian politics have before. But the puzzle is that as we fight against conventionality and community we are forced into advocacy of the wrong thing—eccentricity.

> There is no room for eccentricity in middle-class America, 'unless one can afford it,'. . . . And eccentricity, which in itself is not the noblest of virtues, is forced into a position of empty prominence by the fact that conventionality requires everything and gives nothing.[6]

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[4]Ralph Harper, "Significance of Existence and Recognition in Education," National Society for the Study of Education, 54th Yearbook, *Modern Philosophies and Education*, 1955, p. 225.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 221.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 226.

"Not the noblest of virtues," indeed. And so, it is not eccentricity, per se, that is the mark of the Existentialist man. It is the *opportunity* for eccentricity and the full recognition of this opportunity which characterizes the Existentialist man. A man does not have to revolt against society to be an Existentialist. All that is required is that, whether he revolt or conform, he realize that it is he who is making the decision and not some deterministic agency outside himself—ideational, ecclesiastical, or social. All that we should ask of anyone, the adult in the world or the child in the school, is that he awaken to a full and total sense of his freedom to choose what way he will take in life. If this way be society's way, we cannot quarrel with it so long as the individual knows that what he has chosen he has chosen himself and takes responsibility for it. What is so paralytic about our century is not that we conform but that we have talked ourselves into thinking it could be no other way and that therefore we are not ultimately responsible for our choices. The task ahead is not to protest against conformity or conventionality but to demonstrate to men that they must take charge of their own lives.

Now quite plainly this is an educational task. But, by and large, we do not teach this way today. We in the tradition of Experimentalism (and many others besides) have fallen in love with the doctrine of sociality, and in our passion have allowed the school to become the arena where we demonstrate the great superiority of the group mind over the individual mind. All the darling children of the doctrine of sociality—group process, social promotion, the "whole-child" concept, the project method, psycho-dynamics—all these have been put into educational operation because of our great and abiding belief that the *group* thinking, the *group* considering, the *group* choosing is a more authentic and reliable avenue to true humanity than the *individual* thinking, considering, and choosing.

It is not fair to characterize Experimentalism as being opposed to individual freedom in the educative process, but I think it quite evident that it tends to blunt the sharp edge of freedom with its romantic passion for sociality. As theory, Experimentalism produces educational programs which do not focus the attention of the child on his freedom but instead upon inquiry, consensus, and agreement. As I say, these are not opposites; a child can be free and agree with the group; but he is not sensitized to the nature of this freedom in the typical school in American today.

IV

What then may we expect to see in an Existentialist educational theory? I think the answer can be given in three words: freedom, choice, and responsibility. The bending of every educational effort should be made in the direction of awakening the child, first of all, to the special place he occupies in the total reach of the cosmos. This special place is the place of *freedom*. No other being shares this with him; all others are determined in one way or another. The human being's transcendent claim to fame in the universe is the fact that he is free.

When he awakens to this fact about himself, he then awakens to the possibility of choice. He can choose, he can decide, he can make up his mind. The possibility of choice is the special, blessed gift of freedom. When the dawning of this idea arrives, the child begins to see that he is in charge of his life and that he can become more than what he is through the agency of choosing what he wants to make of his life.

And when he awakens to the prospect of being in charge of his life, he awakens also to the heavy burden of responsibility that will be his for as long as he shall live. It is this burden of responsibility in our freedom which, as we have said, has led the Existentialist to the notions of anguish, suffering, nausea, and despair. But this responsibility is the price we pay for freedom. It cannot be bought at a lower one, and if we mean to be men we shall have to show that we can pay that price and glory in the freedom we thereby purchase.

Our glory in this freedom may still very appropriately be exercised in the Experimentalist pedagogical dynamic of problem solving, but with the subjective element elevated to a higher status. The central difficulty with Experimentalist methodology is that it tends to emasculate the subjective at the very point where it is most active. For instance, the Experimentalist asks the youngster to solve problems through testing various possible alternative solutions. His judgment is to be contingent upon the consequences which flow from acting upon each alternative. "Observe the consequences which result from each possible choice, and you may then determine which choice is true or good, in an operational, relative, and functional sense."

This is good advice; and it is good methodology except that it never gets around to the matter of how one is to decide what consequences to consider preferable to others. If the consequences to which Choice A lead are held by the "uncoerced community" to be preferred over the consequences of Choice B, and if as a result, Choice A is selected as the "true" or "good" choice, we really haven't added much to our social thinking. We have merely removed the locus of "majority-vote morality" one stage.

Sooner or later, the subjective, the personal, the individual judgment must enter the picture. I must affirm that this set of consequences, to me, is to be preferred over that set and that set. I must make this affirmation on a subjective base before I can objectify it and announce my vote. When my vote on consequences is tabulated, the community can then go into axiological and/or epistemological action, but not until. At the root of all community action is subjective choice.

If we are to make anything of the human person in the educational enterprise, I do not see how we can avoid attending to his complete, total, and unequivocal freedom. It may be difficult to give up the determinism represented by the social context or the uncoerced community, just as it has been difficult to give up in former ages the determinism of pure reason, supernature, or nature. But give it up we must if we are to awaken to the full and complete possibilities in human development. We may sensibly utilize a great deal that the doctrine of sociality and community has taught us. But there is more to man than this.

The nature of man "cannot be defined because it is not something given, it is in question. A man is possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him, and since this choice is never final, once for all, his existence is indeterminate because not terminated."[7] It is the grounding of pedagogy in this commitment to the transcendent possibilities of man, accessible through his freedom and choice, which characterizes the educational program of Existentialism.

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[7]H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952, p. 88.

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND JOHN DEWEY'S EXPERIMENTALISM

BY FRANK C. WEGENER

SINCE THE ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION HAS BEEN RECENTLY FORMULATED AS A NEW EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, there have been questions raised as to the similarities and differences between it and the experimental philosophy of education of the late John Dewey.[1] At the outset it should be noted that there are important overlappings and concurrences of the organic with the experimental philosophy of education. However, it is the express purpose of this paper to set forth quite briefly a number of the most striking differences.

It is assumed that it is unnecessary to restate Dewey's position on these questions, except in the briefest form. The organic viewpoint needs more exposition.

For the purposes of this paper and organic and experimental philosophies of education can be described in terms of their differences as follows: I. Organic bipolarity in contrast to experimental unity; II. Organic spheres of the educational process in contrast with the experimental sphere of learning experiences; III. Education as a total organic process in contrast with "education as a social process." IV. The organic conception of the two-fold function of reason in contrast with instrumental or behavioral intelligence; V. The organic bipolar reconciliation of the logical-psychological continuity of the educational process in contrast to the experiential continuity of the learning process; and, VII. A résumé of other important differences which can be mentioned but not developed in this context.

I. Organic Bipolarity in Contrast to Experimental Unity.

Both organic and experimental philosophies have rejected "dualistic" explanations of reality or human experience. Dewey is well known for his consistent criticisms of "gaps in experience" and metaphysical dualism. Organicists and experimentalists have expounded on the continuities of man and nature. Whitehead, as the philosopher of organism, wrote his philosophy largely in protest against the bifurcations of some traditional philosophies and dualistic conceptions. The organic educational philosophy likewise has rejected metaphysical dualism.

Dewey's educational philosophy achieves its experimental unity and the

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[1]We are aware of the fact that Dewey's educational philosophy has been termed "pragmatic," "experimental," "instrumental," "naturalistic," and the like. The term "experimentalism" is used here somewhat arbitrarily and intends to carry with it the necessary qualifications expressed in his writings.

overcoming of dualism by means of a genetic-functional explanation of experience. The organic philosophy overlaps with this genetic-functional explanation of experience, but it goes beyond the limits of this single explanation into metaphysical and ontological dimensions of explanation. One of the metaphysical principles utilized in the philosophy of organism and the organic educational philosophy to overcome the problems of dualism, opposites, bifurcations, and the like, is that of bipolarity. Bipolarity is only one of a nucleus of organic principles and propositions; however, in this brief paper it is the only one given direct attention. Elsewhere we have set forth organic conceptions of creativity, relatedness, etc.[2]

Dewey's reaction against traditional dualisms succeeded only in part in his philosophical reconstruction. Using a pragmatic adaptation of the Hegelian triadic pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in his mode of analyzing the problems of philosophy and educational theory, Dewey habitually selected familiar dichotomies and bifurcations and showed how they might be reduced to a unity or synthesis. His treatments of such bifurcations as mind and body, theory and practice, formal and functional, knowing and doing, logical and psychological, interest and effort, subject matter and method, and the like are well known. These diversities were consistently reduced to a unity by their reformulation in the context of the pragmatic means-ends relations of purposeful behavior in life experiences.

The former dulaism was thus dissolved in the pragmatic formula of instrumental intelligence in action. Furthermore, in most cases one of the diverse elements of the dichotomy was subordinated to the other. Theory and practice, for example were to be unified by the subordination of theory to practice; knowing *per se* was to be eliminated for knowing emerges in the act of intelligent action or behavior. Systematic inquiry into organized fields of knowledge and the study of given logics of subject matters were to be set aside as academic pursuits of the experts; systematic knowledge, logically organized subject matters, and logical expositions were discarded for the pragmatic mode of 'the reconstruction of experience.'

It is contended here that Dewey did violence to the principle of diversity while achieving the advantages of the principle of unity at too high a cost. In his strong reaction against dualisms and gaps in experience he neglected the partial validity existing in the dualistic viewpoint—namely that there is an inherent and immanent double aspect to all reality and experience. The pragmatic overemphasis on the relative interdependence of these diversities in terms of genetic-functional relations both blurred and obscured the equally important factors of relative dependence and independence. Not only were the analytical and logical distinctions blurred, but one member of the pair was usually subordinated to the other. Thus theory and practice were not only fused, but theory was subordinated to practice, under the pragmatic genetic-functional theory of experience. The far reaching educational repercussions of this overemphasis upon the principle of unity will be seen in later contexts of this paper.

This organic critique of the experimental position may be summarized as follows: (a) The experimental resolution of the dualistic problem is not via the

[2]See Frank C. Wegener, *The Organic Philosophy of Education* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1957).

principle of bipolarity; (b) The experimentalist educational theory overemphasizes unity at the expense of diversity; and (c) The experimental position results in educational one-sidedness and confusion because it does not hold and therefore apply the organic principle of bipolarity to the educational process.

In contrast to the experimental educational philosophy, the organic educational philosophy emphasizes the metaphysical principle of bipolarity and its many manifestations in reality and experience. This bipolar principle then embraces the notion that an organic reality or an organic process is constituted by diverse forces in a unified relation, that such a unity contains the relations of two poles or spheres, which exhibit a diversity within a unity; this relationship of diverse poles then contains relations of togetherness (unity) and separableness (diversity). The poles or spheres in their reciprocal relations are co-ordinate and not subordinate.

Hence organically, bipolarity refers to a unity of opposite poles, which are related by the characteristics of (a) relative separableness, or independence, (b) incompleteness *in se*, or relative dependence, and (c) togetherness, or relative interdependence. Thus the bipolar unity of opposites exemplifies both unity and diversity, both conjunctiveness and disjunctiveness. They are not "dualistic," for the spheres are only relatively and not absolutely independent. Thus the validity of the principle of diversity as well as the principle of unity is maintained within the bipolarity of the unity of opposites.

The implications for educational theory are vital. The Organic Philosophy of Education seeks a co-ordination of the bipolar elements of the educational process as opposed to the experimental one-sidedness or monopolarity, which is derived from their subordination of one aspect of polarity to the other, and their failure to give adequate recognition of the principle of diversity.

The practical consequences of this philosophical error, that is monopolarity instead of bipolarity, have been enormous. The jumble of the "experience curriculum" with its polemic against the logic of subject matter has been one unfortunate consequence of this conception. The overemphasis upon factors termed functional, psychological, practical, informal, and lifelike, and the underemphasis upon the theoretical, logical, structural, abstract, formal, and academic, have been the results of this *subordination* of one pole to the other.

II. ORGANIC SPHERES OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS IN CONSTRAST WITH THE EXPERIMENTAL SPHERE OF LEARNING EXPERIENCE.[3]

The organic conception of bipolarity as applied to the educational process can be graphically illustrated by the figure of three overlapping circles. Spheres 1 and 2 represent the bipolar unity of opposites; they also represent the physical and mental poles of human prehension and experience. Educational experiences take place in both of these spheres and in a third sphere. The experiences of sphere 1 are typically empirical, functional, observational, exploratory, and inductive. They primarily involve physical prehensions. Sphere 2 is marked by experiences that are conceptual, formal, structural, analytical, abstract, and deductive. They are primarily mental prehensions. The third sphere is constituted by the interactions and reciprocal actions in these spheres through reversi-

[3]Excerpt from Wegener, *op. cit.*

FIGURE 6. THE ORGANIC FIELD OF EXPERIENCE[3]

(1) *Characteristics:*

a. Empirical of "life experiences"
b. "Physical prehensions"
c. Feelings of "causal efficacy"
d. Perceptions of "presentational immediacy"
e. "Responsive phase of concrescence"
f. "Functional intelligibility"
g. "Observational order"
h. "Exploratory stage"
i. "Inductive learning"


(1)
Empirical experiences "in the cave" The Physical Pole.
(2)
Rational Experiences "out of the cave" The Mental Pole.
Interaction and Reciprocity
(3)
Integral experiences both "in and out of the cave" through reversibility and interweaving; interactions of physical and mental poles.

(2) *Characteristics:*

a. Rational and conceptual experiences
b. "Mental prehensions"
c. "Conceptual reactions"
d. "Intutions of form"
e. "Supplemental phase"
f. "Structural intelligibility"
g. "Conceptual order"
h. "Analysis of precision stage"
i. "Deductive learning"

BIPOLARITY OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE, union of opposites through creative interweaving, organic relations of separableness, dependence, and interdependence, or conjunctiveness.

(3) *Characteristics:*

a. Unity of empirical-rational experiences
b. Unity of physical-mental prehensions
c. "Symbolic reference"
d. Unity of aesthetic-theoretic components of experience
e. Phase of "satisfaction"
f. "Organic intelligibility"
g. Unity of observational-conceptual orders
h. "Generalization and synthesis stage"
i. Interweaving of inductive-deductive learning through reversibility

bility. They represent integral experiences in both spheres achieved by interweaving of the experiences. Thus there is achieved a unity of empirical-rational experiences, physical-mental prehensions, aesthetic-theoretic components, observational and conceptual orders, and inductive-deductive procedures. The point is that these learning experiences are bipolar involving relative separableness of theory and practice, and the like, as well as their interweaving. Most important, in distinction from the experimental theory, they are co-ordinate experiences, rather than subordinating one side to the other.

By contrast it is presumed that the experimental theory, both philosophically and educationally, requires the elimination of the separate spheres, in fear of "dualistic implications," and the amalgamation of these components in one sphere of "experience" which subordinates logical components to the demands of the continutity of life experience. Hence, for example, the "core curriculum" or "experience curriculum" as one amalgam of experience follows from the experimental theory. It is one huge sphere of life experience.

Because of the overt and explicit acceptance of bipolarity and co-ordination, the organic theory by contrast clearly recognizes the necessity of the structure-function curriculum, the logical-psychological continutiy, and the deductive-inductive character of learning.

III. EDUCATION AS A TOTAL ORGANIC PROCESS IN CONTRAST WITH 'EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS.'

It is well known that Dewey and the experimentalists have conceived of education as a social process. His many conceptions of "social interaction," "democratic sharing," "social values," "reconstruction of experience," and the like, are rooted in this basic notion of education as a social process. These conceptions in turn were grounded in his psychology, ethics, logic, and social philosophy. Dewey's shift from metaphysical foundations to those of the emerging physical and social sciences in the 1890's marked his social philosophy of education.[4]

Although there can be no doubt that Dewey did so conceive the social nature of the educational process, here is a succinct confirmation of this fact by Professor Baker:

> *The context of any meaningful experience is ultimately a social situation.* Teachers guiding the having of experiences, then, must see to it that this *social quality pervades* the process of development of impulse through the interchange of expressions of each individual engaged in the process of living in the school. Included is the teacher as representative of the wider social experiences with which the immature being interacts in the social process.[5]

The Organic Philosophy of Education agrees that education is in part a social process, but it is only a part of the whole organic process. Again we find that the experimentalist theory has *subordinated* one part of a whole to another part; here, the whole of man's development has been subordinated to social process. Again this pragmatic subordination of all other functions to the social process

[4]See Melvin S. Baker, *Foundations of John Dewey's Educational Theory* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1955).

[5]See Baker, *Ibid.*, pp. 132–33. (Italics mine) This is Baker's characterization of Dewey's theory of schooling.

amounts to a severe reductionism in educational philosophy. When education is fundamentally construed as a social process then the various aspects of educational theory are biased in this direction. The experimental curriculum then becomes the socialized curriculum; the instrumental methodology becomes one of socialized processes; the educational psychology becomes functional as it is based on criteria of socialization. The educational aims, values, functions, and even the role of the teacher become conditioned completely by the social matrix. The resulting educational theories and practices become reduced to social criteria; in short, the educational process becomes distorted.

By way of contrast the organic educational philosophy conceives of education as an organic process. It is a process of human development in the context of all reality, metaphysical as well as social dimensions. Education is not simply in the context of man and society; it is that and more. It involves the relation of man to all reality, which includes aspects termed individual, social, natural, metaphysical, ontological, and religious.

Elsewhere we have described the generic functions of man as "the ten basic functions." These functions are intellectual, moral, spiritual, social, economic, political, physical, domestic, aesthetic and re-creational. Man is a concrescence of these ten functions; they are organically and intrinsically related. Hence, it is the task of education to guide the systematic development of these organically related functions. This we may call total, organic education.

It constitutes a reductionism to describe the educational process in terms of any one or two of these basic functions. Hence it is an error to reduce the totality of the educational process to the social function. Such a procedure superordinates the social function of man far out of its proper relation to the other functions, and in fact subordinates all of the other functions to the social.

By the same token it is an equal error to reduce education to the intellectual function, or the moral function, or the aesthetic function. Some classical philosophies of education tend to err in a reductionism of education to the intellectual process alone. Some religious philosophies of education err by reductionism to the moral and spirtual functions; and some aesthetic theorists err by reductionism to the aesthetic process.

The organic educational philosophy seeks to correct these tendencies toward reductionism by conceiving of the total educational process as organic. This conception requires an organic notion of concrescence of the human being in the context of the creative advance of the world.

IV. The Organic Conception of the Two-Fold Function of Reason in Contrast with Instrumental or Behavioral Intelligence.

Dewey stressed the educational process singularly in terms of "intelligent behavior" while the organic educational philosophy conceives of the two-fold functions of intelligence: (a) pursuit of truth and understanding, and (b) intelligent behavior. That is to say that the experimental philosophy focuses upon the operational character of "knowledge" as it pertains to the ongoing life activities of the learner; there is no "truth" to be sought for itself ontologically or otherwise; "knowledge" is strictly a function of purposeful behavior. Therefore, education

has for its aim the nurture of "intelligent behavior." The Organic doctrine, on the other hand, believes that the educational process should have a broader scope than the pragmatic function. As Aristotle suggested, "man is born in wonder," and therefore seeks to know and understand in a way which transcends the prudential function of intelligence.[6]

The organic educational philosophy is more in agreement with A. N. Whitehead in his interpretation of the functions of reason, as well as Peirce in this particular respect, in contrast to Dewey. Whitehead in his book, *The Function of Reason*, reminds us of the figure bequeathed to us by the Greeks: the rational function of intelligence was called the "Reason of Plato," while the pragmatic or prudential function was characterized as 'the reason of Ulysses.' Amplified in terms of educational philosophy, we accept this figure which in turn implies that the functions of education shall embrace the nurture of the rational function of intelligence and the achievement of understanding, as well as the prudential function of practical problem-solving. In other words the nurture of ratiocination in Mill's deductive sense is equally important as the nurture of inductive problem-solving.

In terms of the figure of the three overlapping spheres that we have suggested earlier this means that the educational process, organically conceived, moves from the first sphere, which is characterized by immediate, empirical, and subjective experience, to the second sphere, which is characterized by the abstract, conceptual, and objective experiences. Thus in terms of the psychology of the learner we begin with subjectively nurtured pragmatic interest and in sustained fashion move to the other sphere of learning which is largely objective 'disinterest' in mode. As Peirce suggested scientific inquiry and its necessary objectivity are destroyed if it is subordinated to personal, subjective interests, or practicality itself. Our organic theory then seeks to utilize direct interest in the empirical sphere, but to nurture the spirit of disinteredness in the objective inquiry and seeking for truth and understanding in the second sphere.

Utilizing what we have termed the organic principle of reversibility there is need for the learning achieved in terms of the third sphere, or the integration of the subjective experiences and objective experiences of the other two spheres through sustained movement between them, thus accomplishing an interweaving of the experiences. The immediate learnings of the sphere of ordinary experience are complemented and reinforced by the conceptual experiences of the sphere of reason, and these then are integrated or fused in the concrescence of the learner in the third phase or sphere of learning. That which was subjective becomes objectified; that which was objective becomes subjectified. The development of the person is accomplished by the fusion of these bipolar elements and interweavings.

Again the distinguishing feature of the organic educational philosophy, as contrasted with experimental theory, lies in our emphatic delineation of the bipolarity of the educational process, the clarity of the various spheres of learning both in terms of diversity and unity, or their necessary disjunctiveness as well as

[6]To corroborate my interpretation here I might remind you of George Maccia's research in which he compared the epistemologies of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey with respect to educational consequences. He too found that whereas Dewey's educational aim centered upon "intelligent behavior" that Peirce's realistic pragmaticism explicitly asserted the two-fold character of educational purposes as expressed in inquiry toward truth as well as well as the behavioral aspect of education.

conjunctiveness. In this delineation the organic doctrine insists upon the sustained co-ordination of these bipolar spheres of educational spheres of educational experience as opposed to the experimental subordination of one pole to the other and the theoretical and conceptual inquiries to the realm of practical behavior.

Dewey's educational philosophy results in a focusing on one sphere of the educational process—experience. Although he did emphasize the relations of theory and practice, the emphasis is experimental and pragmatic through and through. His very conception of knowledge and experience as limited to the genetic-functional continuity necessitates the subordination of theory to practice, and the same with their corollaries. The "core curriculum" and "the emergent curriculum" of recent decades followed logically from Dewey's theory. Curriculum theorists picking up the premises of experimentalism are led to believe that a "life curriculum" which "cuts across" various subject matters is desirable over logically ordered subject matters.[7]

It is the organic contention that "structural intelligibilities" and "functional intelligibilities" are both to be co-ordinated in achieving an integration termed "organic intelligibility." Confusion results in experimental theories of curriculum and the educational process because of the subordination of theory to practice, knowledge to action, knowing to doing, and the "logical" to the "psychological."

V. The Organic Bipolar Reconciliation of the Logical-Psychological Continuity of the Educational Process in Contrast to the Experiential Continuity of the Learning Process.

Another important difference between organic and experimental educational theories is with reference to the problem of the continuity of the educational process. More specifically there are subtle but vital differences with respect to the respective interpretations of the terms "logical" and "psychological" and the order of the educational process. Let us examine these differences very briefly.

Dewey conceived of the educational process largely in terms of the continuity of life experiences, their problems and related inquiries in means-ends relations. Even as early as 1910 he made a sharp critique of the "logic of subject matter" as we have noted. Even earlier in his laboratory school at Chicago, he demonstrated his theory of schooling and his departure from the "logic of subject matters" in his emphasis upon an educational program which centered in life experiences and activities, and thereby subordinated the contents of the respective subject matters to this experiential continuity.[8]

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[7]Parenthetically we have witnessed an eclectic retreat on the part of many experimental-progressivists in curriculum theory in recent years. With the continuing barrage of criticisms toward the "emergent curriculum" they have tended to take a less militant and sharply delineated view toward organized subject matters than was originally the case in Dewey's critique of "the logic of subject matters" in his *How We Think*. Apparently this retreat has not been made by such experimentalists as William Kilpatrick and his followers according to his book, *Philosophy of Education*, 1950.

[8]So frequently is this denied by experimentalists that one or two quotations from a sympathetic interpretor are in order. Speaking of Dewey and his theory of the laboratory school Prof. Melvin Baker says: "This 'systematized and defined experience,' Dewey believed, had accured to the basic pattern of the typical occupations of man which, therefore, were used as the fundamental framework of school life. Cooking, weaving, and sewing, woodwork and metalwork, represenattive of the typical needs for food, clothing, and shelter, constituted this structure in actual practice." (Baker, *Ibid.*,

Experimental and organic theories can be distinguished as follows: whereas Dewey conceived of "psychological order" as that order identified with natural processes of problem-solving, reflective thinking, order of instrumental inquiry, or order of experimentation, the organic viewpoint in contrast defines "psychological order" as: that order of teaching-learning processes dictated by psychological considerations; that order determined from the psychology of the learner; that order "subjectively" determined, as opposed to objective ordering.[9] Thus we see a distinct contrast in our respective definitions of the term "psychological order" in reference to the educational process.

Dewey conceived of "logical order" as that order which is expressed in the "product" of "acutal thinking," or that logic used by experts in the organization of thought or subject matter. In his distinction between "process and product," process was identified with actual reflective thinking in the business of problem-solving, while "product" refers to the organized result of such reflective thinking.

In contrast the organic theory conceives of "logical order" as that order which is systematically derived from the sequence inherent in a given subject matter, or that order which is implicit in given premises or posutlates; in short, an "objective" order of continuity in contrast with "subjective" ordering.[10]

What is the practical upshot of these different conceptions? Dewey was led to the "progressive organization of subject matters" as a product of a curriculum based upon experiential continuity; subject matters are completely instrumental to the ongoing activities and ends of life experience; hence they are subordinate to these problems and pursuits. The experience curriculum is the upshot. The continuity of the educational process is that of problems leading to problems, cutting across subject matter lines, as opposed to the idea of concern with structural intelligibilities of subject matter fields *per se*. The order of learning in terms of experiential continuity is largely subjectively oriented in terms of the needs, problems, and purposes of the diverse and different learners.

In contrast the organic doctrine sees the objectively determined structural or conceptual intelligibilities (or logics of given fields of subject matters) as analogous to a strand of rope. There are objective and intelligible continuities *in se* to be learned; they represent whole-part patterns of organic intelligibility. Yet they are only part of the totality of the learning process. The other strand of the rope, figuratively speaking, is that of the organic psychological continuity, or the subjectively determined order of needs, interests, motivations, experiences, maturational levels, and the like. These two strands are interwoven in the bipolar educational process; they are mutually reinforcing; thus the educational process organically conceived is based upon a "logical-psychological continuity" in the definitions of the terms advanced here. They are co-ordinates rather than one pole being subordinated to the other.

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p. 142) Another enlightening observation along this line is as follows: "Similar interpretations were made of the individual child's interests and capacities. When in the midst of the joy of popping corn he asked what caused the corn to pop, he indicated readiness for simple work in science. When in drawing he became dissatisfied with his product, he was ready for guidance in technique, form, and criticism. When in making a box his curiosity extended to the wood and where it came from, he was, perhaps, ready for reading to supply his interest. . ." (Baker, *Ibid.*, p. 143).

[9]Wegener, *op. cit.*

[10]Wegener, *op. cit.*

VI. A RÉSUMÉ OF OTHER IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES.

Other differences can be mentioned and not developed here: (1) The organic educational philosophy emphasizes the multiple ways of knowing in contrast to Dewey's devotion to the scientific method. (2) The organic viewpoint stresses both the generic functions of man qua man as well as the individuality of man in human development; Dewey reacted against the notion of universal education of man *qua* man and emphasized individuality. (3) The organic orientation is ontological and metaphysical as well as social; Dewey's educational process was oriented in terms of society. (4) Dewey stressed the genetic-functional aspects of the creative process while the organic philosophy emphasizes both the genetic-functional and the morphological aspects—both philosophically and educationally. (5) Dewey's philosophy of education like his general philosophy is characterized by emphasis upon the biological, sociological, psychological, and experimental aspects of human experience; the organic philosophy is characterized by a deep concern for the religious, metaphysical, and cosmological dimensions of experience—not only the social relations of man with man, but man's relations with all of reality including God and the eternal objects. In the philosophy of organism and the organic educational philosophy the speculative realm complements the experimental; the conceptual order complements the observational order; and the philosophical complements the scientific, and the theoretical the practical. These then are some of the differences between the two educational philosophies. We are left with the problem of inquiry into the underlying philosophical distinctions between experimental-naturalism and the philosophy of organism.

FREEDOM IN STUDENT ACTIVITIES

(*Continued from page 224*)

Walter Lippmann also has tackled much the same problem in the area of public action and thought. He has contended that mass public opinion and legislatures have come to exercise a dominant and dangerous influence over the executive functions of government. The result, he states, is that modern democracies have grown increasingly more incapable of ruling wisely in peace and war. The root of the problem, says Lippmann, lies in the failure to defend and maintain the political faith of "public philosophy" which formed the basis of the convictions of the founding fathers. He calls for restraints upon the popularly accepted philosophy and appeals to intellectual and social leaders to find a deeper basis for social responsibility than is current.[24] Lippmann's views, however, also have their shortcomings.

In addition to Riesman and Lippmann there are many others, including Erich Fromm, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Nisbet, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Russell Kirk, Martin Buber, Richard Weaver and Paul Tillich, who are at work in seeking answers to some of the perplexities which confront man in this period. Their efforts may not be easily translatable into the language and practice of student activities workers and such workers well may have important contributions to make in turn in the current dialogue concerning man, his nature and destiny, but in the final analysis the dialogue must be faced by student activities workers and its implications must be accepted if the workers themselves will enjoy that freedom for growth which is their condition by reason of human existence.

[24]Walter Lippman, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1955).

EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY IN FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM, AND ENGLAND

BY JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE ROOTS OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY CAN BE FOUND IN THE THEORIES OF SUCH CONTINENTAL SOCIOLOGISTS as Comte, Spencer, and especially Durkheim. But, interestingly enough, in more recent decades, this field has received most attention and recognition in the United States, although, as we shall show, growing attention has been paid to this area of knowledge in recent decades by various European and Asiatic countries.

Since Durkehim has been recognized as one of the "founding fathers" of educational sociology, we might just as well start our survey with France.

FRANCE

The concepts of Durkheim have genuine significance in modern sociology and in education today.[1] For example, Durkheim emphasized the internalization of cultural norms and pointed out that conflicts are aroused within the individual as a result of the inconsistency of the cultural norms of the groups with which he identifies himself.[2] He stressed the fact, now increasingly accepted, that education directly reflects the culture of the community; it is the product of the interaction of the school and the various cultural groups which comprise the environment which the school serves. Specifically, he states: "Education is the influence exercised by the adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual, and moral states as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined."

Durkheim was no educational reformer. The great reforming theorists of education had been misled by their conception of it as an instrument with which to alter the structure of authority in society. Durkheim had the sense to see that the school cannot dictate to society; rather, society always dictates to the school. He understood education not in terms of content but of function—as the main institution communicating the modes of authority from one generation to another. This is what Durkheim meant when he wrote that "education is a socialization . . . of the younger generation." Thus, in contrast with most of his predecessors, Durkheim emphasized education as the conservative functioning of society. Treating education as "essentially a matter of authority," Durkheim was free from the characteristic utopianism that renders so much otherwise first-

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[1]Emile Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, trans. by Sherwood D. Fox with foreword by Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956).

[2]But it can be pointed out that conflicts within the individual are dependent upon two factors: the degree of inconsistency of cultural norms and the extent to which the individual identifies himself with groups with differing value-norms.

rate educational literature obsolete. Durkheim acknowledged that there can be no "ideal" system of education. "With Durkheim, and granted the further development of a sociology of education, the philosophy of education, as a more or less disguised form of utopia-building, finds a logica terminus."[3] In addition, Durkheim offers points of further scholarly research. His brief references to the teacher as the necessary, examplary, social type in a secular civilization opened one avenue of discussion (developed further by W. Waller and Florian Znaniecki); his reference to humanist, or literary, culture as merely another area of specialization pointed down another important avenue. And then, Durkheim definitely wedded his sociology of education to a viable social psychology.

We have discussed elsewhere the contributions made by such original sociologists as de Roberty, Tarde, Lévy-Bruhl, Blondel, Halbwachs, Piaget and others to our field. To them could be added the theory of Alfred Fouillée (1838–1912) who disagreed with Le Bon's notion that education counts for little in the face of heredity and believed that there is a progressive adaptation of individuals to the intellectual milieu.[4]

Whether educational sociology, as a discipline, has been developing rapidly in France recently is hard to say, especially since the French sociologist does not understand the concept as the Americans do. Furthermore, French sociology is intimately tied up with psychology, as well as with anthropology and ethnology, and it is not easy to separate these disciplines. Likewise, many aspects of human geography, law, economics and linguistics have been considered frequently as ancillary sciences to sociology.[5]

At any rate, it appears that, although French sociology is a highly cultivated discipline, especially in its theoretical aspects, little has been done in the field of educational sociology recently. "Popular education is a field in which practical administrative work is considerably more important than theoretical speculation, and not infrequently the results of successful administration . . . formulated into practical manuals of procedure."[6]

Thus educational theory in France has been almost exclusively on the administrative level. Among the more specific works in the field has been that of Roman,[7] really a study in comparative education, showing how various sociological and educational theories had modified each other in the United States (Ward, Giddings, Coole and others). Actually, the work is only a restatement of Ward, Dewey,

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[3]Philip Rieff of Brandeis University, reviewing Durkheim's *Education and Sociology* in *The American Sociological Review*, XXII, April, 1957, pp. 233–34. See also: Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "The Sociologism of Emile Durkheim and His School," Chapter XXVII, pp. 499–538, in Harry Elmer Barnes, Ed., *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

[4]Augustin Guyau, Chapter XXIV, "The Sociological Theories of Alfred Fouillée," in Harry Elmer Barnes, Ed., *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 461–470. Also, Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Psychosociological Theories of Gustave Le Bon," *Ibid.*, XXVI, pp. 481–489.

[5]For a survey of the recent trends in French sociology, see: Jean Stoetzel, "Sociology in France: An Empiricist View," Chapter 22, in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: Dryden Press, 1957).

[6]L. S. Thompson, "France," Chapter II in Max Salvadori and others, *Contemporary Social Science*, II: *Eastern Hemisphere* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpoel Co., 1954).

[7]Frederick W. Roman, *La place de la sociologie dans l'éducation aux États-Unixs* (Paris, 1923).

King, Ellwood and Giddings. Two French textbooks in educational sociology by A. Hesse, A. Gleyze and I. Souriau[6] are simple introductions to this subject, obviously written in a hurry in order for use the year following the introduction of sociology as a subject into the teacher-training institutions in France (1920).

More recently, objective educational research has been conducted mainly by laboratories or experimental schools attached to institutes of higher education. But it appears that the authorities are beginning to appreciate the scientific concept of education; after World War II, the French Ministry of National Education set up a Service de la recherché pédagogique. An experimental study of the evolution of the social sense in child activities has been authored by Nielsen.[9] The children were set tasks whose satisfactory accomplishment either necessitated or was faciliated by cooperation. Four stages in behavior were noted: up to three or four years of age, a nonsocial stage (in which the child is indifferent to what others are doing); from three-four to seven-eight years, a presocial stage (in which the child is attracted by what others are doing but is debarred from cooperation by its ego-centricity); from seven-eight to thirteen-fourteen, a stage where partial but increasing efforts toward mutual adaptation are observed; finally, a stage involving the conscious organization of social activities. The results of group or individual learning of nonsense words have also been compared by Montmollin.[10] As a general rule, group work is more effective although certain individuals may upset or weaken collective activity. On the other hand, the attainments of highly intelligent individuals are lessened by cooperative work. Burstin studied certain aspects of socio-moral evolution by analyzing children's expressed wishes.[11] Socio-moral concepts are at first schematic, rudimentary, and aroused by immediate needs unrelated to the social structure; during adolescence, desires are more closely in touch with reality, and material, social and moral factors are seen to be interdependent. Recent years have seen the growing use of sociometric methods.[12]

GERMANY

The history of Sociology in Germany can be divided into the pre-1918 period, and three periods after 1918: (1) 1918–1933; (2) 1933–1945; and (3) after 1945.[13]

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[6]A. Hesse and A. Gleyze, *Notions de sociologie appliquée à la morale et à l'éducation* (Paris, 1921); I. Souriau, *Notions de sociologie appliquée à la morale et à l'éducation* (Paris, 1921).

[9]R. F. Nielsen, *Le développement de la sociabilité chez l'enfant* (Neuchatel: Delachaux and Niestlé, 1951).

[10]G. Montmollin and H. V. Perlmutter, "Apprendre en groupe: Une expérience de sociale," *Enfrance* (Paris, 1951), pp. 359–376.

[11]J. Burstin, "Aspects de l'evolution socio-morale de l'enfant," *Enfrance* (Paris, 1953), 97–146.

[12]G. Bastin, "Les observations des professuers et le test sociometrigue," *Cahiers de pédadogie et d'Orientation professionnette* (Liège, 1957), pp. 15–19; G. Mialaret, "Sociométrie et pédagogie," *Enfrance*, 1953, 4; A. Husquinet, *L'adaption scolaire et familiale des jeunes garcons de 12 a 14 ans d'aprés le test sociométrique d'aperception thématique* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1954). See also: Harry Alpert, "France's First University Course in Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, II (June, 1937), pp. 311–317.

[13]Wilhelm E. Mühlmann (University of Mainz), unpublished lecture on "History of Sociology in Germany," the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, 1955. For the definite survey, see: Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Washington, D. C.: Harren Press, 1952) II, "Germany and Austria," pp. 879–931; Mühlmann, "Sociology in Germany: Shift in Alignment," Chapter 23, in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1957).

In the pre-World War I period, the theories which came nearest to what we conceive of being educational sociology, were propounded by Friedrich Paulsen, a prominent and influential figure in the early 20th century, who influenced Prussian schools.[14] He believed that the element of will was more important than intelligence in shaping the personality of a pupil, and that the value of ancient culture was over-emphasized and should be reduced in the modern curriculum; he would not give up the teaching of Latin and Greek, but would elevate modern studies to the same high level enjoyed by the classics of antiquity.

Then Germany had several outspoken champions of universal education and of socially conscious schools (E. Meumann, Otto Willman, K. Koffka, etc.).[15]

During the period preceding the following World War I, there arose in Germany, especially, a school of "Soziologische Pädagogik" (social, sociological pedagogy), which is often identified with educational sociology. In general, this field is most closely related to the concept of social education in America, and based on the idea that the individual is essentially a social being, and that his powers can be developed by participating in social activities. Accordingly, it demands that the school and the class be miniature societies and that cooperation be applied to all the activities of the social life; it implies a tendency to organize the school as an embryonic state, community, society, home, church, playground (the ancient Greeks called playground a school, scholae). Since Comte's introduction of sociology and comparative education, the typical methods in social pedagogy have centralized around Paul Natorp, Paul Bergemann, Paul Barth and Otto Willmann.[16] They all agreed that purely individual instruction is inadequate for solving complex problems of education and that a broad social attitude is essential for a complete understanding of the true nature of the function of education. They regard education as derived not only from the relation between pupil and teacher, but as resulting from the relation between the pupil and the whole social environment, as well as the relation between the younger and the older generations. For them, education is not identical with schoolmastering; it is an organic science, the science of social progress. Individual education erroneously accords to the teacher preeminence among the many educational forces, for the teacher, though an important factor, is by no means always the determining one, in disregard of the other forces. Each of these apostles, then, has a different philosophy of life, and each one has made his particular system of philosophy the theoretical foundation of his social education.

Natorp's social education is inseparable from a New-Kantian *Kritik*; "pantheism" is the spirit of Barth's philosophy of history (that is, what he thinks is "sociology"), and Willmann, a great Roman Catholic educator, derives the basic

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[14]M. Johannes Speck, *Friedrich Paulsen: Sein Leben und sien Werk* (Langenselza: F. G. L. Gressler, 1926); Paulsen, *Gesammelte pädagogische Abhändlungen* (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1912).

[15]For their survey, see: Herbert Wender, "Germany," Chapter V, in Max Salvadori and others, *Contemporary Social Science, II: Eastern Hemisphere.*

[16]Paul Natorp, *Sozialpaedagogik: Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft* (Stuttgart, 1921); Paul Bergemann, *Soziale Pädagogik auf erf ahrungswissenschaftlicher Grundlage and mit Hilfe der induktive Methode* (Gera, 1900); Paul Barth, *Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer und geistergeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (Leipzig, 10th ed., 1925); P. R. Radosavljevitch, "A Spirit of a Modern Educator: Dr. O. Willmann," *New Haven Teacher's Journal*, April, 1933 and June, 1933. The closest representation of this thinking can be found in America in: Leslie D. Zeleny, "Sociology Applied to Education," Chapter IX, pp. 382–422, in Philip L. Harriman, Joseph S. Roucek and George B. de Huszar, Eds., *Contemporary Social Science*, Vol. I: *Western Hemisphere* (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1953).

principles of his social education from the semi-rationalistic Thomistic philosophy. As to the method of investigation, the general truths of social education have been demonstrated deductively by Natorp, and inductively by Bergemann. The aim of education is the perfection of the individual not for his own sake, but as a means to an end, for all agree that education serves the conservation and perfection of society. Social education demands essentially equal educational opportunities for all. To Natorp, father of the "social-pädagogik" concept, social education seems equivalent to education of the community. Barth uncovers the true social character of education in relation to the educational phenomena and to the forces that lie beyond the immediate education field—the social organization, the degree of intellectual development and the character of a people's philosophy of life. His sociological approach is shown by his insistence that the educational theories and practices change with the modifications of the social organization and the social activities. The motive force behind the educational movement and the movements towards a higher cultural life is in the character of the prevailing ideas and in the character of the prevailing philosophy of life; he seeks to make persons of not only a small fraction of the people, but of all the people. Willmann conceives society as a social body or social organism analogous to the biological organism.

Weiss's *Pedagogical Sociology* is quite original in many respects.[17] He considered it an auxiliary pedagogical science, and discussed the relations between society, the social life of children and education. Of particular interest is his thesis that youth can be understood only in terms of its group. (But Weiss failed to deal with non-school agencies.)

The 1918–1933 Period. According to Mühlmann, this was the period of outstanding personalities in research and lore, trying to formulate "big sociological systems" and producing voluminous writings (Max Weber, Sombart, E. Troeltsch, Max Scheler, F. Oppenheimer, A. Vierkandt, F. Tönnies, R. Thurnwal, Leopold von Wiese, etc.). In addition to this more theoretical and systematic approach, there were many reliable and important investigations of social mobility, class structure of Germany society, industrial and political sociology, problems of masses, etc. There were also promising beginnings in the field of social psychology and of educational sociology—a good example being Karl Weiss's work.

The 1933–1945 Period. During the "Hitler period," sociology as a body of coordinated scientific efforts ceased to exist. Many eminent scholars emigrated; others became interested in less harmful topics (ethnology, folklore, human geography); some flourishing discussions (as on the Sociology of Knowledge and the problems of class structure) were obliterated.

But, paradoxically enough, it was also this period which has led, eventually, to several valuable and brilliant analyses analyzing the educational aspects of the Nazi movement.[18]

The Period after 1945. The present period has been that of reconstruction (but this applies only to Western Germany). Although the influence of the

[17]Karl Weiss, *Pädagogische Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1919).

[18]See the survey of the respective literature in: Arthur Henry Moehlman, "Education in Germany," Chapter 9, in Arthur Henry Moehlman and Joseph S. Roucek, *Comparative Education* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), and such works as: G. F. Kneller, *The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); Gregor Zimmer, *Education for Death* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941).

"great old men" (especially that of Leopold v. Wiese) remains, but the time of "big systems" is now coming to an end and the emerging trends may favor research along the empirical lines. According to a Swiss authority, "The study of sociology of education received new impetus during the past few years through the influence of American research on the German language literature in the field," although "few publications of importance have as yet appeared."[19] The appearance of A. Fisher's complete works produced the appearance of his basic remarks on the science of educational sociology and its distinction from social philosophy and social theory of education.[20] Engelmayer and Weiss have contributed to the sociology of school classes and work groups;[21] Weiss especially has made a scholarly contribution describing the atmosphere of the class, its sociological background, and its influence on the student's attitude; also instructive is his analysis of the method of sociometric tests, sociometric computation, and sociograms. Beck has conducted interesting experimental investigation on the understanding of social problems in family and school.[22]

Yet, in spite of these valuable contributions, a visiting American sociologist felt, on the basis of his two-years' visit of German Universities, that nearly all the work has been limited to theoretical aspects.[23]

BELGIUM

Although a claim has been made that, "when compared with many larger and wealthier countries, Belgium is a far from somber spot on the sociological map."[24] little progress in contributions to sociology have been available to the American specialists, either in the field of sociology or educational sociology. Recently, De Coster and Van der Elst have made a special study of the phenomenon of the individuals rising in the social scale by means of education, noting the desire to rise in the social scale by means of education as being one of the most potent factors making for social mobility and often met with in small families.[25] It is, however, very difficult to achieve. The main obstacles are the lack of selectivity in primary education which offers false hopes to parents (especially as the Belgian secondary system is highly selective); family finance; lack of suitable guidance; absence of a cultural background in the home where education is primarily considered as a means to future economic advantages; the student's psychological isolation due to the low mental background of the family, environment and the higher social circles which he is trying to enter; and, resistance from the upper classes.

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[19]Marcel Muller-Wieland, "German Speaking Countries: Austria, The German Federal Republic, and German-Speaking Switzerland," Chapter IV, pp. 57–74, in *Review of Educational Research*, XXVII (February, 1957), "Educational Research in Countries Other than the U.S.A., "p. 59.

[20]Aloys Fischer, *Leben and Werk* (Life and Work), ed. by Karl Kreitmair (München: Bayerischer Schulbuch Verlag, 1950–54, Band, 1 ¾).

[21]Otto Engelmayer, *Schulkinder unter sich, Das Soziogramm in der Modernen Schule* (School Children Among Themselves. The Sociogram in the Modern School) (München: Christian Kaiser, 1952).

[22]Robert Beck, *Grundformen sozialen Verhaltens. Beitrage zur Experimentellen Sozialpsychologie* (Basic Forms of Social Behavior. Contribution to Experimental Social Psychology) (Stuttgart: Enke, 1954).

[23]W. C. Lehmann, "Some Observations of a Visiting Sociologist on Tendencies and Trends in Sociology in Germany Today," *Sociologus*, VI, 2 (1956), 115–126.

[24]Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Washington, D.C.: Harren Press), II, "Belgium," pp. 867–877.

[25]S. De Coster and G. Van der Elst, *Mobilité sociale et enseignment* (Brussels: Librarie encyclopédique, 1954).

ENGLAND

Consideration of the sociology of education from an English point of view has been neglected until quite recently. The British have relied chiefly on publications of United States authors whose general conclusions seem to have been found acceptable but whose detail has not been entirely applicable to the English social landscape. Moreover, as Ottaway suggests, there is always room for a clear presentation of the problems of society undefiled by the jargon and verbal infelicities with which some schools of thought have cluttered up our vocabulary.[26] Obviously, as in America, there is no consensus in England about the scope and subject-matter of what is loosely called educational sociology, and little clarification of this confusion is provided by the small volume of Ottaway (said to be the first serious British contribution to the field).

The confusion is due to the character of sociology in Great Britian, which has developed there mainly in the service of social problems, such as population, old age, deliquency, class-mobility, and so on. This has been due to the fact that Sociology as a discipline in its own right has never been fully accepted by English universities—with the exception of the University of London. There has been no established set of people interested in social theory. Spencer, who was not a University man, Hobhouse who held the only Chair of Sociology, and Ginsberg, his successor, are the only English sociologists who have made any outstanding contribution to Sociology as a scientific discipline. The emphasis on "applied sociology" is reinforced by the fact that such financial aid that is provided by public funds is spent either on the teaching of the social workers, on research into specific problematic topics (as mentioned above).

This tendency is glaringly evident from a survey of the field, "School and Society" (published by the Institute of Sociology):[27] this collection of addresses given at the Summer Conference organized by the Institute of Sociology. The topics listed here run the gamut of all social problems from "The Challenge: The Present Crisis and the Needed Revolution," by H. C. Dent, to "Local Survey Courses with Army Units," by Mrs. M. Hardiman (lately Senior Commander A.T.S.)—thus resembling the chaotic editorial policy of the recent issues of the American *Journal of Educational Sociology*; sandwiched in between such general subjects are a few topics in the area of educational sociology: "The Vocational Content of the Social Education of Teachers," by Catherine Fletcher, "Art and Handicrafts in School and Society," unsigned; "Music as a Medium for the Sunthesis of School and Society," by R. R. Kimbell; "Religion in School and Society," by W. M. Jones; and a few others. Possibly the best excuse that can be offered for this hash is the fact that these lectures were given just at the end of World War II.

Interestingly enough, the late Karl Mannheim, a Hungarian by birth, is credited with "more than anyone to arouse the interest of the teaching profession here (England), in sociological thinking, and his all too brief spell of service in the University of London already stands out as a landmark in recent history of the training of teachers in (England)."[28] Especially his two well-known contribu-

[26]A. K. C. Ottaway, *Education and Society: An Introduction to the Sociology of Education* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953; New York: Grove Press, 1954).

[27]D. M. E. Dymes, Ed., *School and Society* (Ledbury, Herefordshire: Le Play House Press, the publishing department of the Institute of Sociology, 1945).

[28]Ottaway, *op. cit.*, viii.

tions, *Diagnosis of Our Time* (London: Kegan Paul, 1943) and *Man and Society* (London: Kegan Paul, 1940) have had "a far-reaching influence in England, "creating among teachers a growing demand for literature and lectures on the relationship of social and political thought to school problems." Sir Fred Clarke is also credited with promoting this field as a personality, as a lecturer to teacher audiences and his stimulating little book.[29]

The implications of the Education Act of 1944[30] eventually forced the publication of the first systematic textbook in educational sociology for the English reader by Ottaway;[31] the author, after taking biology and chemistry for some years at Abbotsholome School, took up full-time study and research for the M.A. degree in Education at the University of London Institute of Education, coming under the direct influence of Fred Clarke and later Karl Mannheim; recently he has been lecturing and tutoring at the University of Leeds' Department of Education. His treatment depends heavily on the American sociological contributions in order to interpret the scope of Sociology very broadly; and he uses contributions from any of the relevant social sciences (especially anthropology and social psychology). Noteworthy is his effort to separate Sociology from Social Philosophy. Ottaway defines the sociology of education "as a study of the relations between education and society. It is thus a social study, and in so far as its method is scientific it is a branch of social science . . . concerned with educational aims, methods, institutions, administration, and curricula, in relation to the economic, political, religious, social and cultural forces of the society in which they function. In the education of the individual, it concerns the influence of the social and social relationships on the development of personality."[32] Ottaway then proceeds to examine, sociologically, education in a democratic society, assuming that the democratic values in England are worthwhile; one chapter is devoted to his own interpretation of their possible application to school life in England; then, in order to clarify some of his reasons for accepting "a democratic philosophy" (thus placing himself in the camp of "social pedagogy" or "social education"), Ottaway adds a chapter (IX) on "Beyond Sociology," wherein he propounds "a religious interpretation of life," and that "the essential clue to why we behave in education for a free society is only to be found in a religious appraoch to life."[33]

In his *Education and Society*, Ottaway presents us with a brief introduction to general sociology with considerable emphasis upon its educational implications. In other words, the text is self-contained, and the author assumes that the reader has had little or no previous acquaintance with academic sociology. Relatively little space is given to education itself. One chapter, however, is devoted to "the social determinants of education in England" during the past century, a

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[29]Sir Fred Clarke, *Education and Social Change* (London: Sheldon Press, 1940), is a concise statement of some of the historical determinants of English education; it also offers a series of suggestions for the readaptation of the system to the social changes accelerated by the onset of the war. His *Essays in the Politics of Education* (London: Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1944), suggests a social conception of education in opposition to Nunn's advocacy of the value of individuality, the dominant theory of education in England at the time of the publication. See also; Clark, *Freedom in the Educative Society* (London: University of London Press, 1948).

[30]For more details, see: Herbart Scholer, "Education in the United Kingdom of Great Britain," Chapter 5, 109–155, in A. H. Moehlman and Joseph S. Roucek, Eds., *Comparative Education* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952).

[31]A. K. C. Ottoway, *Education and Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953).

[32]*Ibid.*, p. 2.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 168.

second deals with "the educational needs of our future society," and a third discusses the problems of authority and democracy "in the social climate of the school." A commendable feature is the author's separation of his social philosophy from his sociology in a concluding chapter entitled "Beyond Sociology." Throughout the volume the author emphasizes the two somewhat conflicting functions of education: to hand on the cultural values and behavior patterns of an existing culture, and at the same time to develop critical and creative individuals able and willing to initiate social change. He resolves this conflict by accepting the program of Karl Mannheim for a "Third Way," a democratic society where planning would be not for conformity but for variety and where agreement would exist upon a few basic values while more "complicated" values could be left open to choice and experiment.

More specialized investigations of English education, from the sociological viewpoint, have been growing in recent years. While Dent has continued his sociological interpretations of the changes in English education,[34] Anderson and Schnaper have pin-pointed the social backgrounds of Oxford and Cambridge students,[35] Hamilton has showed the shortcomings of British Universities in education for the modern world.[36] Dangerkery's discourse on the features of British Universities which are most striking to the visiting educator is too subjective, reportorial, and largely uncritical.[37] More valuable, in that respect, are the comparative studies by Henn[38] and Kneller;[39] the latter's inquiry into the progress and change in higher learning in English Universities since World War II, is penetrating, especially as it determines the place the British Universities hold in national life. Against the background of effort and research devoted to the improvement of transition from school to college in the United States, special interest should attach to Dale's discussion of a wide variety of factors bearing upon university admissions in England and Wales.[40] Armytage has linked the tradition of the 11th century, the universities of the Middle Ages, the virtuosos of the 17th century, and literary and scientific societies of the 19th century, with the civic universities of Britian of today.[41] A detailed history of a British University has been presented by Chapman;[42] another historically penetrating contribution has been that of Rex, analyzing contested elections, careers of man, and their parliamentary activities, in regard to university representation of Oxford and Cambridge in the House of Commons.[43]

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[34]H. C. Dent, *Change in English Education* (University of London Press, 1952).

[35]C. Arnold and Mariam Schnaper, *School and Society in England* (Wash. D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1952).

[36]Sir Walter Hamilton, *The Crisis in the University* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950).

[37]S. R. Dangerkery, *Universities in Britian* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935).

[38]T. R. Henn, "Some American Universities as Seen Through British Eyes," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIV, 3 (Summer, 1954), 202–21; especially pertinent are Henn's comments on American graduate schools, the Ph.D. program in particular, and his inquiry concerning the nature and possibilities of "integrating" the entire college program.

[39]G. F. Kneller, *Higher Learning in Britain* (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1955).

[40]R. R. Dale, *From School to University* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).

[41]W. H. G. Armytage, *Civic Unviersities* (New York: John de Graff, 1955).

[42]Arthur Chapman, *The Story of a Modern University: A History of the University of Sheffield* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

[43]M. B. Rex, *University Representation in England, 1604–1690* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1954). Additional studies of this type are listed in: British Information Services, *A Select List of Books and Documents on Education in Britian* (New York: 1949 and subsequent editions.)

Social and racial problems have been receiving increasing attention by the British sociologists. Glass, Professor of Sociology, London School of Economics, is the editor of a book concerned with the processes of social selection and differentiation at work in Britian; it takes up the formation of social classes and discusses the nature, composition and function of these classes in relation to social grading of occupations, education, marriage, income and other indices of social mobility.[44] Social differences have been also analyzed by Oppenheim and Pear.[45] The growing problem of the colored man in Britain has been receiving growing attention lately also,[46] together with that of the effects of military upon draftees.[47]

We might note also here the influence exerted by Bertrand Russell, who has been also interested in education.[48] Russell expanded his essays *On Education and the Good Life* (New York: H. Liveright, 1926) into *Education and the Social Order* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932). According to him, education should produce men and women of courage, vitality, sensitiveness and intelligence; vitality is related to one's power to do things, and it should promote happiness. Courage is the most significant in the absence of irrational fears, and the courageous man is also the man of many interests, with an active intelligence, and the man who feels himself a small though not unimportant speck in an immense universe. Much of the world's unhappiness is rooted in our stunted sympathy—the cruelty of industrialism, the oppression of subject races, the savageness of war; another aspect of sensitiveness is that of our aesthetic emotions. American education, especially, has neglected not only literary but also general aesthetic values and the school should give more consideration to sense training and dancing, to music and singing. The school should allow the child practice self-expression, to discover for itself colors, sounds and rhythms. Each child should contribute, according to its special talents, to cooperative activities. The acquisition of knowledge should be an "intellectual adventure," and should be "related to real life," in such a way that this meaning is understandable to the child. The child should be given sex information naturally and easily in the home. Russell should be also noted by the educational sociologist for his emphasis on the democratic education, his advocacy of universal education, and his demand for the development of internationalism as opposed to nationalism.[49]

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[44]D. V. Glass, Ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

[45]A. N. Oppenheim, "Social Status and Clique Formation Among Grammer School Boys," *The British Journal of Sociology*, VI, (September, 1955), 228–245. T. H. Pear, *English Social Differences* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955), a study of the nuances of which characterize English social divisions in the 20th century.

[46]Anthony Richmond, *Color Prejudice in Britain* (New York: Grove Press, 1955), reports the findings of research into the assimilation and adjustment of over 300 West Indian Negroes who emigrated to Britain recently. See also: Mary Trevelyan, "Coloured Students in Britain," *Geographical Magazine*, XXVII, 12 (April, 1955), 632–640. For additional contributions to the field of educational sociology in England, see: Ottoway, *Education and Society*, 169–178.

[47]T. Ferguson and J. Cunnison, *In Their Early Twenties* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), gives an account of the effects of miliatry service upon the careers of 1,349 Glasgow boys who left school at the age of 14, the earliest permissible age.

[48]John Dewey and H. M. Kallen, *The Bertrand Russell Case* (New York: The Viking Press, 1941).

[49]Obviously, Russell is more of a philosopher than a sociologist. Not many of his ideas appear original; for instance, most of them can be traced to Comenius.

DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR

BY IRA J. GORDON

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE REACHED A PLACE IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES where it has become important to stop and take a look at the progress that has been made in the development of basic concepts, and to see what suggestions might grow out of this for educational practice and research.

This paper will attempt, therefore, to discuss some of the emerging concepts about human behavior that lie behind the descriptive data and that might be somewhat fundamental in any discussion of the directions for education.

I have selected, or rather ordered or organized, seven concepts for such a discussion. These all overlap to some degree; they are not nice discrete entities—at least they are not in my thinking. Why are there seven rather than another number? Perhaps it is because of the strong Hebraic concern with the magic of the number—seven days for a week, every seventh year a sabbatical one, and so forth—perhaps it's because I gave out of ideas at this point. Whatever the case, here they are:

1. The concept of "process."
2. The concept of "the open energy system."
3. The concept of "organization" and "order."
4. The concept of "self."
5. The concept of "growth."
6. The concept of "individual variability."
7. The concept of "multiple causation."

Each of these will be discussed in turn including some definition, some discussion of its meaning, and some guesses as to its use in education.

1. Process.

We have been so used to thinking of "things" and "entities" that it is fairly difficult for us to think or feel in terms of ongoingness. We can visualize something in the process of changing continuously through time, but this is not what I mean. It seems to me that the individual is not something "in the process of" but the individual *is* a process or rather a series of interrelated processes.

I should like to explore this notion in terms of one particular facet that I feel is of tremendous importance in the field of human development. This particular notion is that of the inter-relatedness of structure and function. It used to be that we saw these as two discrete "entities" with the notion that structure determined function. We moved in biology, physiology, and other behavioral sciences to a recognition of the "inter-relatedness" of these two—a recognition that not only could structure determine function, but that function in turn could effect structure. It seems to me that we are now reaching the point of seeing structure

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and function simply as two different approaches to the same thing. It might be said almost that structure *is* the organization of function at a particular moment in space-time.

This is not only in terms of bodily processes where we might say that bone, muscle, etc., are structures, and the behaviors of the person are functions, but this way of seeing structure-function is also to be conceived of in terms of psychological and cultural processes.

For example, in the case of the differentiation of cells so that an animal or a worm differentiates out along a pole from head-to-tail, research has clearly shown that the development of structure is related to location in the field of the animal rather than to a "given" within the cell that is different than the "given" in a cell alongside it or ten cells down the line. As Gerard states: "Clearly there was nothing in the cell itself to determine which of these different paths (i.e. becoming a head or a tail cell) it would follow but only its position relative to the other cells"[1] so that "the head end gets the bumps and the bumps make the head end."[2]

Where does such a notion or principle of circularity lead us? First, let me say that this "principle of circularity" is based not only on biological research but also research in the field of perception[3] and in the field of self-regulating and servomechanisms in engineering[4]. We can, if we wish to extend this, see that the physicist's definition of the atom is also in terms of process. Even though he uses the word "particles" as though they were actually entities, he *operates* with a recognition that they are not.

Let us now look at the meaning of this for us. First of all, by conceiving of the individual as an organization of processes all reciprocally related, it becomes easier to break down any mind-body dichotomy. It provides a background for understanding psychosomatic dynamics. It frees us, to some degree, from dealing with "givens" as though they were insurmountable barriers—for example, "native intelligence" becomes virtually meaningless as a "given." It makes more understandable several other concepts we will discuss, such as the extremely fascinating, implication wise, generally accepted in lip service, notion of individual variability.

It helps us to get away from some limits that are perhaps self-imposed as to the growth potential of the human being. For example, we are finding that, in relation to developmental norms in the United States, "the norms are in the process of changing . . . there is evidence that growth and rate of development in the present generation of North American infants has significantly advanced over the norms established on the Gesell, Cattell and Viennese infant development scales."[5]

In education, it may mean that seeing a child as constantly "becoming" gives a new impetus to seeing the teacher's role as being concerned with the processes of experiencing, particularly as they are perceived by the child, rather than being concerned with an end-product defined in terms of containment of so much

[1] R. W. Gerard, *Unresting Cells* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 359–360.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 357.
[3] F. Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure* (New York: John Wiley, 1955).
[4] N. Weiner, *The Human Use of Human Beings* (New York: Doubleday, 1954).
[5] E. Jackson, "Child Development Patterns in the United States," in K. Soddy (Editor), *Mental Health and Infant Development* (New York: Basic Books, 1956), pp. 87–88.

knowledge, so much skill, thus-and-such an attitude, as though both the culture and the child were static or at best dynamic entities in constant contact with each other.

2. THE OPEN ENERGY SYSTEM.

All living organisms can be defined as open energy systems or at least semi-closed systems. A system is an organized "something" that has a direction to it and some degree of internal unity. An organism as a system is partly continuous with its environment. In an open system such as an organism "there is a continuous input from the environment and a continuous output of products of the system's action."[6]

The system is greatly affected by the environment, and is not to be considered or understood apart from the situation in which it is. We cannot look at the system in isolation; we cannot understand the individual apart from the culture which has influenced and is continuing to influence him.

There are several characteristics of such a system: it maintains a "steady state," that is, it attempts to maintain its own integrity and balance of forces within the system. It does not reach "equilibrium"—this is death. It is constantly and continuously active, indeed this is its most outstanding characteristic.

In addition, the notion of ceaseless activity does not mean uncontrolled activity. The system has "built-in" regulators which we will look at in the next section. In this maintenance of a "steady state," the organism is not merely responding to the external environment but also to the "milieu interieur." Cannon's concept of "homeostasis" fits here.

Activity is ever present—even activity in the conceptual nervous system (CNS) is continuous. This CNS activity is self-sustained and does not rely on input of nervous energy from without. These circuits reverberate and are circular. To some degree, these circuits are sub-systems maintaining their own order and integrity. In terms of motivation, this has many implications, some of which we will look at at the end of the section on "self." These circular causal processes lead us to our third concept, which is perhaps the central concept or keystone of this paper and that is the notion of "organization" or "order" or "control."

3. ORGANIZATION.

We have said that a system by definition has an organization. We said of structure that it is momentary organization. An organism by definition is an organization.

An open energy system has a particular kind of organization or order. It is not like a building—the organization of the individual is organizing, ordering activity. A characteristic of such a system is direction—it can only go forward; it can't reverse itself as a closed system can. This order or organization, then, is a *directional* one—as seen in such activities as growth, learning, goal-setting, etc. It maintains its organization through activity, but it organizes this activity in a systematic way. "... living things do not just blindly explode their energy stores in response to environmental vicissitudes; they also direct them. The

[6]Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

organism must maintain its complex integrity against the hostile forces of confusion, it must fend the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" and so counter or adjust to the surrounding environmental whirl that is remains itself and yields as little as may be necessary. The more it changes the more it remains the same. True, over longer times, covering the evolution of the race or even the development of the individual, progressive change is a vital part of the life picture, and again along regular rather than random lines. But from moment to moment the individual acts to preserve itself in its current state. To environmental changes, or stimuli, living things respond adaptively, they make such changes in their behavior as most effectively preserve the status quo."[7]

How does the organism control its activity? What determines its direction of energy? At this stage, we are able only to theorize and hypothesize about these questions. But there are clues which come to us from biology, from cybernetics, from perceptual psychology.

For example, from cybernetics we have the notion of "negative feedback" and the notion mentioned earlier of "built in regulators." The basic homeostatic processes controlling the physical and chemical properties of the blood stream are examples of the operation of negative feed backs.

This control is accomplished through the sending of information from tissues to the CNS which then sends out impulses to bring the system back to a steady state. While control seems to reside in the CNS, any sub-system or tissue system can be the instigator of new activity. The CNS itself, since it is always active, can instigate organized activity.

The concept of "order" needs to be examined here. We have the idea that the universe is running down, that while we cannot reduce the amount of energy in the universe, the amount of useful energy is constantly being dissipated. The world, in effect, is becoming more disordered and disorganized. This concept of movement toward complete randomness is known as entropy. It seeming contradiction to this, the organism, when viewed as a system, is becoming more ordered, more organized, and is using its energy more efficiently. Organisms are characterized by their ability to wrench order from disorder or by negative entropy. We can look at this in the following fashion. The food we take in is free energy; we convert it into tissue; we store it as fat; we burn it up in behavior. We burn some of it up in the process of converting it into tissue and fat as well, so it is lost. But the remarkable thing is that we *can* convert and store it for future use. There is another kind of "energy" we take in—this is stimulus energy, or information. This can come either from outside the system or from within. In either case information serves to bring order out of chaos, to organize the system. Information is the reciprocal of entropy. Food energy provides the wherewithal; information provides the direction, the order, the organization.

All of this may seem very removed from education at the classroom level. Are there any meanings we can draw from this?

First, we are saying that the individual is always active, is in constant transaction with the environment, is always moving in the direction of increased complexity, and acts to order himself and his environment. We are imputing *direction* to him, and, in addition, we are saying the direction choice is within the system.

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[7]Gerard, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–212.

As Freeman states: "We are justified in taking this egocentric view, which says in effect that man conceives his world; for in the interests of preserving internal constancies, the exterofective system develops and maintains optimal external constancies. By means of overt reaction to specific external stimuli, the human organism stabilizes and betters its surroundings, eliminates potential dangers . . . From our point of view, these self-constituted surroundings ARE the organism, and the behavioral processes by which they are maintained are homeostatic-regulatory. That is to say that a slander is just as much a threat to a man's good name—built up by a series of elaborate exterofective behaviors—as is a change in oxygen supply a threat to essential life processes. The organism will react to both displacements with behavior calculated to restore balance and equilibrium. The only difference in the two examples is that the "good name" constancy is not nearly as stable and universal as is the oxygen requirement."[8]

It must be remembered, however, that the system includes the environment through the internalization of past experiences and the present field of forces.

Furthermore, this concept of organization presents another focus for us. This drive for order pervades the individual organism and the society. Order and predictability are security-giving. The gestalt concept of "closure" is an example of this. We perceive order, we *create* order where the field is such that there is a semblance of completeness. We attempt to see things as closed when they are not, because the closed system is more satisfying.

We are not only trying constantly to organize our world, we then get caught, so to speak, in our organization. It requires too much energy to change an organization. We maintain it even when, like the appendix, it may have outlived its usefulness. The organization becomes an end in itself. It becomes a dynamic. We tend to treat it not as our creation, but as a "given." We surrender to it some of our power. For example, social institutions, clubs, committees, etc., become self-perpetuating. Nobody questions their existence; or, if someone does, he's reminded that "we've done it this way for 87 years. . ."

Our drive for order and organization, then, is what makes us, to some degree, human—it helps to explain our behavior as individuals because we strive to grow and perpetuate our organization. It helps explain individual resistance to change as well as cultural lags and the perceptions of social institutions as sacred and having an existence of their own apart from people.

In classroom operation, it means that pupils' needs for order need to be satisfied. I'm not talking about "discipline," but their need to see that the class or course has some system, some direction to it, whatever the particular organization may be. For example, introduction of newer teaching methods reflecting research in group processes or psychotherapy can be threatening to pupils when they perceive these approaches either as lacking any organization or as violating their already developed concepts of what a classroom situation "should be."

4. THE CONCEPT OF "SELF."

One way of seeing and labelling these organizing processes of the individual by which he attempts to structure his world is by using the concept of "the self." This permits us at one and the same time to talk about the consistency of an

[8]G. L. Freeman, *The Energetics of Human Behavior* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1948), pp. 146–7.

individual's organization and its ongoingness. Self here is defined as the processes by which an individual organizes the organism pole of the constantly fluid organism-evironment field. The self-system might be defined as "what is" organized at a given moment.[9] As a part of one's self-system are those highly differentiated, integral, fairly persistent aspects which are one's concepts of himself. As Snygg and Combs say, "the self-concept includes those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual has differentiated as definite and fairly stable characteristics of himself."[10] This self-system fits the criteria for definition of an open-energy system—it attempts to maintain a "steady state;" it has direction to it; it has some degree of internal consistency; it is in continuous transaction with its environment. While its atomistic ingredients change—cells die and are replaced, behaviors, too, die and are replaced—the system goes on and has a recognizable identity. This recognizable identity, behavior wise, is a function of the self system and to a great degree of its self-concepts. By analogy, today's members of the First Division still wear the fourragère awarded to the Division by the French in World War I. I would guess that nobody in the present division was there at the time, but the identity of the Big Red One is continuous. Stretching a little bit, while we cannot predict the behavior of an individual soldier in the division, we might predict that the unit as a whole would maintain its organization, its traditions, etc., in battle. We might predict the future performance of the organization by knowing its present identity—its present self-system, and its concept of itself as visually displayed on the shoulders of its members.

The self-system, then, is at one and the same time a resultant of all the previous organism-environment transactions and it is one of the transactees. It is acting and being acted upon. We said the self has direction—it is going somewhere. This direction is not only in terms of time's arrow, but also in terms of purposes or goals. We can only understand the behavior of a person when we we have some understanding of what he is striving *toward*.

The whole organism is goal-oriented. Understanding of self, then, means becoming aware of not where a person has been so much as becoming aware of ***where he is going***. For education this has many implications. Education is concerned with present and future; the self-system is concerned with present and future. The past, of course, is embodied in the present and future. Both are goal-directed. The first task of the teacher is the clarification of goals—his own and his pupils'. This requires that he have a knowledge of the goals of man—the nature of the beast, so to speak, and then an understanding, as best he can, of the self-systems of his individual students. What are the goals of Man?

5. THE CONCEPT OF "GROWTH."

Growth may be seen as the ability and activity of the organism to preserve its steady state independent of its original conditions. For our purposes here growth may also be defined as the entire series of anatomic and physiologic changes thus combining growth and maturation. Both increase in size and increase in complexity are growth processes. Growth itself is a "goal" of organims. As a way of maintaining organization in a fluid environment, the organism reaches out into it, incorporates it both physically and psychologically, "feeds" on it (remembering our earlier statement about information being the reciprocal of entropy)

[9]I. J. Gordon, *The Teacher as a Guidance Worker* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 168.
[10]Snygg and Combs, *Individual Behavior* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 112.

and grows. While growth as increase in size stops, growth as increase in organization and complexity continues throughout the life cycle. At the risk of being teleological, the organism has growth as a goal or purpose. Growth is a means for maintaining organization and is also a directional process of organization.

Thus, a basic goal of man is continuous growth. This means a reaching out for experience, a curiosity, a need for coming to grips with his environment, a terrific urge to learn. As one of my undergraduates put it, a "ravishing appetite for knowledge." Cantril states: "the outstanding quality of man's motivation . . . appears to be a desire to bring forth and experience the value aspects latent in every concrete behavior."[11] He further says: "man is constantly making his environment more 'human' by extending his understanding of the significances of events or happenings."[12] Man hunts for significance, for meaning in his world. He orders this world in terms of meaningfulness.

Man grows as he organizes. His goal is the development of a whole person, enhancement of the experiencing organism. As Sinott puts it, "the goal of the organizing process is a single, whole individual."[13]

Individual development can be seen, then, as the processes by which a person, from the moment of birth on, works toward self-actualization, fulfillment, completeness, or, to use the term we have been dealing with throughout, maximum organization and integration. This development can be studied, for example, from the observer's viewpoint by gathering data about those aspects of growth that are measurable or observable physically—height, weight, the appearance of secondary sex characteristics, etc. This development, however, needs to be seen in another way—in terms of how the person himself continuously organizes and re-organizes his world as he goes through progressive stages of development. It becomes necessary to not only observe that this child has reached his pre-adolescent growth spurt, but also to observe and infer from observations the *meaning* this has to the child—to discover as best we can what *he* is experiencing.

Let us now take a look at these last few concepts—organization, self, and growth, and explore some of their implications for education.

First, we have said that information is essential to the system. It takes information to maintain organization. There must be input. While some input is from the internal environment, much or most must come from outside the organism. The meaning of the input, the value of it, is determined by the system, not by the objective cue itself. It becomes information when it adds to the already developed pattern or structure. Nevertheless, growth cannot take place without information on which to feed. This means that the primary function of the school must be as a place where cues are readily available. Subject matter *is important.* It becomes information to the person when he sees it as assisting him in enhancing his self-system. He wants it—he needs it—and he seeks for it. There can be no such thing as process in the abstract—the concrete cues must be there for him to use. While it is true that he will fashion these to suit his particular organization, this does not relieve us of the responsibility for providing

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[11]Hadley Cantril, "The Qualities of Being Human." *American* Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring, 1954, p. 8.

[12]*Ibid.*

[13]Sinnott, Edmund, "The Biology of Purpose," *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Vol. XXII, No. 3, July, 1952, p. 466.

them. While his organization of them will differ from ours, we cannot escape our responsibility for providing a rich variety of resources.

This has many implications for administration and curriculum development. Research is needed in the areas of thought and concept formation to aid us to plan the timing of experiences as well as the nature of the learning situations we wish to provide. Bruner's work[14] in this direction needs to be expanded so that we may understand how these strategies used in concept formation are acquired or developed as the child grows up. We have virtually no data on this crucial problem of how the child utilizes and organizes data to form concepts which become integrating forces in his self-system.

Allied with this is our notion that the individual is striving to learn, to grow, to have experiences and to symbolize or interpret these experiences. The child, or youth in school is active, thirsty, (and not just for the many drinks of water he takes throughout the day) and inquisitive. We don't have to make him want to learn those things he perceives as meaningful. The older notion of motivation—that you could "motivate" another—makes little sense in this framework. Motivation is ever present, continuous, and internal. What the teacher can do is enable the child to see relationships between where he is going and the skills, attitudes, behaviors, the school as an agent of society is attempting to convey. The teacher is an active agent in the process; he can serve as a guide and resource person. His task is not so much to arouse interests and curiosity, but to take those that are already there and extend the youngster's horizon, show him opportunities, offer data that he can then use as information. The task of the teacher is in no way diminished by recognizing that children basically want to learn. In some ways, the teacher's job becomes more complex, because he is dealing with a whole child constantly relating to his environment, whose needs for knowledge and experience may transcend the teacher's resources, or whose needs may differ from those of the teacher.

Third, knowledge of growth processes leads us to the recognition that one's presently developed self-system, including, of course, one's physical organism, sets limits on what will be perceived, experienced, turned into information, and therefore "learned." While we have said that structure-function may be seen as two approaches to process, it also must be recognized that external expectations must be related to the present system, and can only be utilized when the system has arrived at a particular point in space-time. For example, it is a cliché to say you can't teach a child to walk until he is ready. We are saying here you can't present any learning situation with hope of success to the individual until his total self-system is "ready." This means teachers need to know about the process of total development-physically and psychologically since in behavior these two aspects are "all of a piece."

6. INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY.

Perhaps the concept most widely accepted in human development is that of individual differences. If there is one "law" about people, it is that no two are alike. We know this—yet so often we act as though we wish this were not so. Let me give you an example from my undergraduates again—a committee, in

[14] J. S. Brunner, J. J. Goodnow and G. A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956).

discussing the needs of children said, "the parent should realize that there are individual differences and that this is not necessarily bad."

We are constantly attempting to use both a nomothetic and an ideographic approach. We have this need for "order" ourselves, and it disturbs us when the concept of individual variability looks to us like choas. If we could re-organize our thinking to see that the concept is lawful rather than chaotic, we may learn how to see it as the most promising idea for the future rather than one we'd like to do without.

In this search for order we've done another peculiar thing to the notion of individual differences. We say, "yes, they exist, but they exist in an ordered fashion—the normal curve." It would be so comforting if this were so—but unfortunately, it isn't. We have a nice normal curve on intelligence tests, but this is the result of the way we constructed the tests and is not necessarily the result of what exists in nature.

It seems to me at a time in education where we are talking so much about enhancing the individual, developing potentialities and all our other pet phrases, that we must come to grips with the meanings of individual variability in our efforts to construct curricula, to develop sequences of experiences, to administer a program still designed—as for example, grade levels—much as the Procrustean bed. In practice, individual differences has often meant lopping off the feet or stretching the body to fit the pre-determined size of the bed. We are faced with the task of re-designing the bed.

Perhaps the first place where a new design must emerge is in our philosophic approach. Do we see differences as a problem to be overcome, or as a challenge to create?

Research is needed here to increase our understanding of individual learning in the group setting. Certainly research is needed about what happens to the *total* development of the child who is at either of the ends of the "normal" curve and who is grouped accordingly. We need further to examine the kind of teacher education which is necessary to provide teachers with skills to enhance the individual development of individuals who must be met in a large group setting.

7. MULTIPLE CAUSATION.

Historically, this concept has meant the recognition that behavior not only is caused but also that the causes are some sort of amalgamation of external and internal factors. For example, to explain why a boy might prefer to go the the library rather than go on the playground with his junior high school peers, we might hypothesize that this is due to: (a) he is a late maturer, and (b) he lacks skills in games, and (c) he has low energy output, and (d) his parents encourage him to read, and (e) his teacher has found some special books for him, etc. While this all may be so, the number of variables and the combination of variables are so many that one who wishes to explain behavior is faced with the virtually insurmountable task of gathering historical as well as contemporary data.

It is certainly important to recognize the many experiences that have been organized by the person into his self-system and his Weltanschauung— his view of the world. It reduces our task of understanding and predicting behavior if we attempt to gather and order our data in terms of his self-system. If we do this, it no longer is important to know that his baby sister was born when he

was two. It is only important to know what place his sister holds in his present view of life.

What does this do to the concept of multiple causation? It moves the multiplicity *within* the individual. While his present behavior is certainly a resultant of all he has experienced, we may now say that his present behavior is a function of his self-system, which is his unique organization of his past experiences including physiological processes as experiences.

Another way we can look at this is to recognize that man is integrating rather than integrated. This means that the self-system, while it attempts to maintain a steady state, is always to some degree in disequilibrium. Tensions may arise from any part of the system, or from the interplay among the various sub-systems. Multiple causation may then be perceived of as the behavior resulting from the disharmony existing among the sub-systems of the self-system. "Motives are not abstracts out in space that one dangles or creates to inspire learning; they are forever in operation in terms of tension distribution and development."[15] Any part of the system thus may be an instigator of behavior. The direction of the behavior is determined by the *total* system.

Behavior is always a function of the total system operating in a situational field. To understand behavior we need to understand the self-system and the complex interactions of its sub-systems in the present situation.

This means that research needs to be done in helping teachers to find ways to analyze the situations in which they place children, and to infer from behavior the meanings these situations hold for children.

In summary we need to: (1) increase our knowledge of the conceptual and perceptual development of children, (2) develop skills which can be taught to teachers so that they may infer about the self-system of children with a high degree of accuracy, (3) build up our understandings of the role of situation in behavior, since we have repeatedly stated that this is a transactional process, (4) increase our knowledge of how and what individuals learn in group settings, (5) examine more fully the processes of concept formation and the various ways in which concepts are developed, (6) explore the role of "order" in the learning situation. How ambiguous can or should a situation be to be effective? What is the range of individual variation in the need for "order?" (7) raise our sights in terms of goals and free ourselves from setting what may be too low ceilings on the potentials for individual development, (8) clarify and increase our understandings of the process of changing goals and changing the self-system. Since organization seems to be an important force, and changes in organization are resisted, just how is change accomplished? How open to change is the self-system? Are there epochs (i.e. the adolescent period) where the system is more open to change? What kinds of environments produce change? And, for social scientists charged with responsibility, we cannot avoid exploring the question of what direction we set up as the one along which the developing child should move. We cannot avoid the choice-making process, but we may be able to make wiser choices as we increase our understandings of the development of human behavior in the cultural milieu.

(*Continued on page 274*)

[15]Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

AN ANSWER TO THE MISCONCEPTIONS OF JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY JOHN PAUL STRAIN

MUCH OF THE DILEMMA IN MODERN EDUCATION RESULTS FROM A CONFUSION THROUGH THE MISINTERPRETATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION in relation to his theory of ethics. One basic reason for this misinterpretation is that Dewey's writings are difficult to read and to comprehend. Especially is this true concerning Dewey's world view and philosophy of science. And yet, it is absolutely necessary to understand Dewey's world view in order to get a complete picture of his ideas on education. Hence, the reason for many of these misinterpretations of Dewey's philosophy of education is due to a lack of insight by the interpreters into his total philosophy. Dewey was always enthusiastic about the consistency of his whole program, and in his thinking, the theory of education was always an integral part. For Dewey, education and the world were importantly related—in fact, Dewey considered the world as a large classroom whose subject matter was experience. Thus, to understand the meaning of Dewey's educational theory, one must first understand his conception of the world.

This procedure, however, does not imply a dialectical scheme built on deductive principles. Rather, Dewey's method in coming to educational ideas was pragmatic and inductive. Instead of beginning with the world and ending with education or other arts, Dewey thinks of them as reciprocal. The importance of this fact is that Dewey's world view and his theory of ethics are as much dependent on educational philosophy as the reverse is true. An understanding of Dewey's philosophy of education gives an insight into his total philosophy, especially into the metaphysical status of ethics. Educational theory can be a key to the difficulties found in Dewey's philosophical thought, and it can solve some of the misinterpretations about Dewey's philosophy.

A most important perspective along these lines is the one by Robert Ulich of Harvard who believes that "it is necessary to divide Dewey's development as an independent thinker into two phases."[1] This, according to Mr. Ulich, is the clue to Dewey's thought. The year of transition is presented as 1930 and becomes the dividing line between Dewey as a pragmatist and Dewey as the great exponent of the scientific method.

The earlier phase from 1894 to 1930, according to Mr. Ulich, is the period when "Dewey developed his pragmatic system without compromise and exercised his greatest influence."[2] This period emphasized the philosophy of freedom, change, and the "natural cooperation of men in society."[3] It was a period of

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[1]Uhlich, *History of Educational Thought*, p. 322.
[2]*Ibid.*, p. 322.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 322.

reaction and criticism against the other-worldly standards of behavior and metaphysical systems of ethical conduct. It was a philosophy that placed a premium on the naturalness of man's total experience.

But, says Mr. Ulich, "a definite change occurs around 1930. In this second period of his thought, Dewey's whole conception of values receives a character of definiteness which lifts it out of the realm of mere experimentation into a sphere of persistent validity."[4] The result, says Ulich, is an intrinsic moral teleology in which Dewey attaches his faith to "the reality of ideal ends and values in their authority over us. . . ."[5]

Hence, in Dewey's philosophy, life is no longer free and experimental; rather, it is restricted to the authorities of science over men. Change no longer is spoken of as something indeterminate and nominal, rather, it becomes an objective principle to control, use, and manipulate. In this latter phase the whole world becomes ordered by science and the method of test and verification. The final result is an ethical system that is built on tested experience and verification.

Mr. Ulich is an educational philosopher. This is quite relevant because the acutenesss of the dichotomy of Dewey's philosophy is more clearly seen in educational philosophy than in any other area. The fundamental problem of education for morality and social intercourse is whether one has individual freedom and natural goodness on the one hand, or whether he needs control and discipline on the other. This is also predominantly the fundamental issue of Dewey's ethical theory. Did Dewey oppose metaphysical and external control in order to replace it with a new kind of control, or did he oppose control in general in favor of freedom and a natural goodness which blossoms forth in every child who is provided with the right environment? In the first suggestion he is endangering the beliefs in the naturalism of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel; in the latter he is implying a metaphysical status and order which is above human experience. This it seems is the fundamental problem of Dewey. And, as Robert Ulich points out, Dewey seems to have taken both sides.

THE PROBLEM STATED IN DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS

In the field of Education the problem is explicit and stated in a variety of ways. In more recent discussions it is thought that Dewey's later writings were an attempt to "slap the hands" of his followers who had falsely misconstrued his philosophy of education. The most outstanding of these later writings was the Kappa Delta Pi lecture which was published under the title *Experience and Education* in 1938. In this compact book Dewey begins with the familiar symbols of words that made his philosophy outstanding, but in reading the various chapters one cannot mistake the new meanings that Dewey now gives to these words. Especially significant is the new emphasis placed on freedom. Freedom is no longer something spontaneous and natural, but an object grasped when it proceeds from the correct method used and proven by science.

> It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against. For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own under-lying principles.[6]

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 332, 333.
[5] Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 44.
[6] Dewey, *Experience and Education*, p. 10.

> The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while.[7]

Dewey goes on to say that there must be a distinction between the freedom of intelligence with the physical and external side of activity, but he qualifies this seemingly clear dualism with the statement that "this external and physical side of activity cannot be separated from the internal side of activity: from the freedom of thought, desire, and purpose."[8] But it appears that this does not answer the paradox.

What Dewey is attempting to say is that there is need of a new kind of control, a kind that does not involve restriction. Dewey uses the example of a good citizen who is subject to social control without a restriction on his personal freedom.[9] The solution, says Dewey, must come through "factors of control that are inherent within experience."[10] Hence, Dewey proposes that controlling of experience by eliminating any mis-educative experience, any experience which engenders callousness, produces lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness, and any experience that promotes a slack and careless attitude.[11] The basic criteria is (1) whether there is an immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness, and (2) whether there is its productive influence upon later experience.[12]

Thus, Dewey affirms that one can have control without restrictions and it can be gained through the control of experience in education. Perhaps Dewey's most outstanding statement is:

> But the existence of some form of convention is not itself a convention. It is a uniform attendant of all social relationships. At the very least it is the oil which prevents or reduces friction.[13]

Hence, Dewey proposes a more organized structure of education that brings order into the classroom and consistency in method.

> But the fact that the empirical sciences now offer the best type of intellectual organization which can be found in any field shows that there is no reason why we, who call ourselves empiricists, should be 'push overs' in the matter of order and organization.[14]

It is evident that the organized control of experience is the theme of Dewey's book *Experience and Education*. The fundamental question is whether this idea is basic in all of Dewey's writings.

The earlier works of Dewey appear to give a different meaning to the word control. Control is related to experience but through an environmental factor rather than the factor of intellectual organization and methodology. Instead of speaking in terms of rules and convention, Dewey uses such terms as natural activity and development. Dewey states in *My Pedagogic Creed*, article four,

> The question of method is ultimately reducible to the question of the order of development of the child's powers and interests. The law for presenting and treating material is the law implicit within the child's own nature.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[8] Dewey, *Experience and Education*, p. 69.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[13] Dewey, *Experience and Education*, p. 67.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

In the first years of the twentieth century Educators were debating the question of subject centered versus child centered schools. At the University of Chicago Dewey produced the little book *The Child and the Curriculum*. After viewing both sides of the argument Dewey states his own position which is significant to this discussion.

> Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as something hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process.[15]

The most outstanding treatise on the philosophy of education by John Dewey is *Democracy and Education* which was written in 1915. In this work John Dewey explains very precisely that education is a process of living and activity—the natural way of development in a natural and directed environment. One of the main themes of the book is that education is guidance. He states that there is an element of control in this kind of education, but it is a different kind than is customarily given. Says Dewey concerning direction, control and guidance,

> Of these three words, direction, control and guidance, the last best conveys the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided; control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought to bear from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled; direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continouus course, instead of dispersing aimlessly. Direction expresses the basic function, which tends at one extreme to become a guiding assistance and at another, a regulation of ruling. But in any case, we must carefully avoid a meaning sometimes read into the term 'control'.[16]

Dewey states that true control of the immature must come through an understanding of and working with environment. The environment is a stimulus on the whole personality of the child. Any education which cooperates with the environment is one that is both useful and real. What Dewey is saying is that education is as broad as life itself, "and that the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel."[17] Thus education is something that results from experience and the material, character, and morality gained is as much subconscious as conscious. Dewey states that: "We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment."[18] He proposes that the task of the educator is to produce the right environment.

The one true environment in Dewey's philosophy is the environment of naturalism. In *Schools of Tomorrow* Dewey accepts the premise of Rousseau that nature is the primary conditioner for development. Dewey adds, on the other hand, the belief that ends are also determined by this naturalism.

STAGES IN DEWEY'S THOUGHT SUGGEST AN ANSWER

We see now the fundamental issue in Dewey's educational philosophy. But as we have seen, there are a variety of interpretations concerning this philosophy. These interpretations become the most pronounced in the hands of the those prac-

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[15]Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*, p. 11.
[16]Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 28.
[17]Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 22.
[18]*Ibid.*, p. 22.

titioners who attempt to put theory into practice. First, there are those who emphasize the child as the naturally good creature in a world of naturalism. Second, there are those who emphasize the compatibility of the child's interest with the curriculum. Third, there are those who stress guidance and direction in education. And fourth, there are the philosophers for progressive education who claim that the correct interpretation of Dewey is to be found in his later works which stress organization and control. The central problem in our discussion is: which interpretation is the true one.

The answer to the problem must exist in the metaphysical status of the ideal of education. For Dewey, this ideal is the ethical and moral behavior of mankind. Hence, Dewey's philosophy of education is not so much learning facts, disciplines, or vocations as it is an education that sets its goal for a full, meaningful and well-adjusted life. Dewey's philosophy of education is a moral philosophy whose fundamental stress is social adjustment and satisfaction. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to understand the metaphysical status of Dewey's moral theory.

It is at this fundamental point that our previous discussion has shown a difference in Dewey's ethical thought. In Dewey's earlier works his approach was pragmatic and anti-metaphysical. He approached the problem of ethics through the unsystematized door of immediate ends and consequences. The world he knew was one of change and nominalism. Hence, ethics, science and education were not something fixed and rigid, but changeable and flexible with the criterion being the satisfaction of needs.

In Dewey's later writings the world receives a new kind of order. The naturalism of human dignity and mutable circumstances becomes a naturalism of scientific investigation and verification. From an open world of practical consequences it becomes a closed world built on the ideals of man's ability to project his imagination into the future which is predominately the theme of his book *A Common Faith.* Man's function, hence, becomes that of a manipulator, and life is the struggling for the control of the world through the method of science and intelligence.

The misconceptions of John Dewey's philosophy of education relate to this fundamental problem. Mr. Ulich states that it all points to a distinction in Dewey's own thought which altered around the year 1930. The evidence seems to point to a distinction in Dewey's philosophy. But instead of making this a leaping transition it seems more plausible to state that there are stages of Dewey's thought which begin with pragmatism and end with the scientific method. As a result there has developed a number of interpretations of Dewey, each identifiable with a certain book or stage in the development of his philosophy. Individually these books and stages can be misconceptions of Dewey's philosophy of education. They become misconceptions when they are absolutized or when they are conceived outside of their framework and purpose.

All this implies: first, the right of the philosopher to develop; second, the possible fallibility of any creative thinker; and third, the incorrectness of disciples to absolutize any person's attempt to think clearly. Hence, the misconceptions are the fault of the philosopher and his problem of knowledge, and the interpreter who fails to understand the philosopher in relation to his problem.

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ATTITUDES TOWARD THE STUDY OF SCHOOL SUBJECTS

BY T. BENTLEY EDWARDS AND ALAN B. WILSON

MUCH ATTENTION IS CURRENTLY BEING DEVOTED TO SCHEMES OF EDUCATION FOR GIFTED CHILDREN. There is a widespread attitude that prevailing practices in American secondary schools are not conducive to the intensive development of these potential leaders, and that something had better be done to modify the situation.

Various proposals have been made for the selection and training of the gifted. In practice, identification is usually on the basis of intelligence quotients as calculated from scores on group tests, together with reading age, mathematics age, and perhaps teacher-assigned grades.[1]

Since the items on group intelligence tests are selected and validated by correlation with school grades, or with other tests similarly validated,[2] the degree to which intelligence quotients will accurately predict successful achievement is evidence of the level of stability and generality of achievement. Selection on this basis emphasizes and perpetuates existing discrepancies in achievement. Actually the most accurate single predictor of achievement has been found to be prior achievement.[3] Channeling students in accord with achievement, whether indicated by prior grades, intelligence tests, or other aptitude tests, has been, and doubtless will continue to be, the prevailing practice. However, when the fact that intelligence and achievement are not independently defined is obscured, and intelligence quotients are taken for an explanatory account of achievement, attention is directed away from the possibilities of controlled change.

At the same time variation in the performance of students is admitted. Terman,[4] among others, has made the point that children with high intelligence

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[1]Robert J. Havighurst, Eugene Stivers, and Robert F. DeHaan, *A Survey of the Education of Gifted Children*, Supplementary Educational Monographs, No. 83 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Arno Jewett and J. Dan Hull, *Teaching Rapid and Slow Learners in High Schools*, U. S. Office of Education Bulletin No. 5 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1954).

[2]Lewis M. Terman, "The Revision Procedures," *The Revision of the Stanford Binet Scale*, ed. by Q. McNemar. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942); David Wechsler, *The Measurement of Adult Intelligence* (Baltimore: the Williams and Wilkins Company, 1944), pp. 128–130; Prescott Lecky, *Self-Consistency: a Theory of Personality*, ed. by Frederick C. Thorne (New York: Island Press, 1951), p. 108; Kenneth Walter Eels, *Intelligence and Cultural Differences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); for a criticism of one of Eel's points see Fred T. Tyler, "Comments on the Correlational Analysis Reported in *Intelligence and Cultural Differences*," *The Journal of Educational Psychology;* XLIV (May, 1953), 288–295.

[3]H. W. Samenfeld, "Predicting College Achievement," *Journal of Higher Education*, XXIV (November, 1953), 432–433; R. E. Jesson, "Predicting Scholastic Achievement of First-year Graduate Students," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, XIII (Summer, 1953), 322–329; Elizabeth C. Baker *et al.*, "Factor Analysis of High School Scholastic Experience and Success in the First Semester at the University of California at Davis," *College and University*, XXX (April, 1955), 351–358.

[4]Lewis M. Terman *et al.*, *Genetic Studies of Genius*, Vol. IV, *The Gifted Child Grows Up* (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1947), pp. 289, 294: "The fact is that a good many of the most highly gifted did not achieve (as achievement is here measured) in proportion to their scholastic abilities. . . The most challenging fact in regard to scholarship is that about 25 per cent of the most gifted subjects have college records that are only fair to poor." These "most gifted" had IQ's over 170.

quotients are not uniformly successful in school work. They do not always get good grades. Successful pupils are willing to work at their studies. They possess favorable attitudes toward the study of school subjects.[5]

What seems to be needed to produce more effective education is not so much another metric of achievement, but an understanding of student motivation. The purpose of the present research study, which this paper is introducing, is to clarify our understanding of the motivation of high school students. We also wish to determine the relation of motivational factors to academic success, and to commitments to specialization in the natural sciences, on the one hand, and social and literary studies, on the other.

I

Although teacher-assigned grades include a measure of attitudes toward the study of school subjects, such measures lack the precision demanded by curriculum workers because they depend on a number of variables: achievement, teacher standards, teacher-pupil relationships, abilities of other students, community mores, and vocational aspirations of pupils, to mention only some of them. Further, teacher grades, when used to measure attitudes toward school subjects, fail to distinguish between those children who are intrinscially motivated and those who study hard to please the teacher or another adult.

The term "motivation" is ambiguous because of the diverse meanings attached to the term by people using different theoretical frameworks to understand behavior. A motive donotes that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way. In naive experience action is accounted for in terms of purpose; when the ends of action are known the act is "understood." When the ends of a group are homogeneous the performance of a traditional act does not require ulterior justification. The anticipation of the responses of others does not confront one as a problem requiring assessment. Why one uses a handkerchief, puts on socks, transfers food from the cooking vessel to serving dishes, do not require "reasons" even in our differentiated society. "The average individual in all societies is unconscious of his group's interests and ratings under ordinary conditions. He merely follows the established behavior patterns of his culture without trying to analyze these or to grasp their deeper significance. Ratings and interests are brought to his attention only in conflict situations to which no regular culture patterns correspond."[6]

In a heterogeneous group the ends of action are obscured. The absence of universal norms toward which action is instrumentally rationalized makes divergent forms of behavior mutually incomprehensible. It requires some sleuthing and hypothecation of ends to make the behavior of others meaningful. The effort to provide universal end-terms for the instrumental formula, ". . . in order to . . .", in the face of parochial behavior, results, on the one hand, with an illusory understanding in terms of abstractions which do not aid in prediction: happiness,

[5]Baker *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 352, indicate that grades, also, are not stable. Many who do well in high school do poorly in college, and vice versa. ". . . These marked discrepancies between prediction and performance are due to something that is not being measured by the high school variables or the University of California differential. They may be explained in terms of emotional reactions, motivations, rates of intellectual and physical growth, and other similar variables. Something is needed in addition to the routine information available to an admissions officer under the present conditions."

[6]Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), pp. 434–435.

pleasure, new experience; and, on the other hand, with normative symbols around which action should be integrated: social equilibrium, class interest, the good life.

The ascription of motives may have a circular effect. ". . . A motive is not some fixed thing, like a table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, and being such it will naturally take its place within the framework of our *Weltanschauung* as a whole . . . a generally accepted account of how the mind works can make it work that way."[7] Thus the "springs of behavior" may be fashioned rather than uncovered. Many teachers will be disturbed by the thought that use of grades and other symbols of social judgment may elevate these values in the hierarchical system of the child. Deliberate use of extrinsic motivation, instead of developing the intellectual curiosity of the child, may replace this intrinsic value with concern for the acquisition of the badges of success.

The impact of the heterogeneity of ends upon man's effort to understand human behavior is that conscious purposes become ". . . a part of behavior rather than mysterious forces lying behind it, motives are not so much explanations of behavior as they are behavioral problems, themselves requiring analysis and explanation."[8] The purpose cannot account for choices when, at the same time, the choice of purposes requires an account. The Liebnitzian intellect, the source of acts, is replaced by the Lockean *tabula rasa*, pushed from without.

Skeptical of conscious purposes as an adequate explanation of behavior, some scientists have conceived of the "hollow man," driven by biological and/or environmental forces, much after the model of classical physics. In the dispute over the proper emphasis to be placed between these forces, the common denominator has been obscured. Under the aegis of Darwin's doctrine of phylogenetic continuity, all human behavior is reduced to complex means for the satisfaction of viscerogenic drives which men share with other animals.

> It is essential for one who wishes to understand the evolution of society to penetrate beneath the play of mere desires to the fundamental natural needs, as these are to be viewed in their rude and naked form among peoples not yet in possession of the societal power to relegate them to the background; . . .[9]

In order to find human nature the contingent aspects of behavior must be stripped away. This focuses attention upon the earliest stages of development, or back to the non-human, to find the motives of behavior. "Both instinct and habit psychologies start with 'primary' motives, which have a fixed and natively given content; they view all later interests and concerns as 'derived,' in the sense that they obtain their energy and significance from their connection with selected biological ends. New interests and concerns become means in the service of old ends."[10]

An examination of Hilgard's *Theories of Learning* [11] will show how pervasive

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[7]Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (Los Angeles: Hermes Press, 1954), pp. 25, 29. The latter portion of the quotation is Burke's summary of the gist of I. A. Richards', *Mencius on the Mind.*

[8]Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, *Social Psychology: the Revised Edition* (New York: the Dryden Press, 1956), p. 302.

[9]W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), I, 27.

[10]Solomon Asch, *Social Psychology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 77.

[11]Ernest R. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (2d ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), *passim*, especially chap. xii, sec. 1: "Current Developments: I. Reinforcement and Drive," pp. 407–433.

the derivation of behavior from biological drives has been in psychological thought. ". . . the *Zeitgeist* favored our seeing incentives not as providing something sought after for what was inherent in the incentive, but something providing relief. The incentive was seen as an avenue of escape from pain, anxiety, tension." There have been critics of "drive-reduction" theories, such as Gordon Allport, all along. However, even in Allport's doctrine of "functional autonomy," a motive finds its genesis in primary drives and continues vestigially in a new context:

> Infinitely varied, and . . . self-sustaining *contemporary* systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them. . . . What was once an instrumental technique becomes a master motive.[12]

The reduction of behavior to a system of wishes, needs, drives, or functions—into a system of natural laws—is an effort to account for diverse forms of behavior by ascribing universal ends toward which all behavior is extrinsically motivated.[13] Theories and experiments in motivation have sought to establish global laws of behavior of *the organism*, ignoring or averaging out individual differences as "contingent" or "accidental," much as laws of motion are abstracted from any particular instances of motion. They may be used for the *a posteriori* interpretation of behavior, but are not useful for the prediction of behavior. They may have the effect, as suggested above, of creating motives by suggestion. The scientist to some extent modifies behavior by the effect of his theories.

In this regard Gunnar Myrdal comments on such explanatory concepts as Summer's "folkways" and "mores":

> The formula will be found to be invoked with some regularity whenever an author expresses his attitude that changes will be slow, or, more particularly, that nothing practical can be done about the matter. . . . By stowing the commonly held valuations into a system of mores, conceived of as a homogeneous, unproblematic, fairly static, social entity, the investigator is likely to underestimate the actual difference between individuals and groups and the actual fluctuations and changes in time. . . .[14]

Edward Sapir goes further to suggest that

> The study of culture as such, which may be called sociology or anthropology, has a deep and unacknowledged root in the desire to lose oneself safely in the historically determined pattern of behavior.[15]

In interpreting the practical consequences of an intellectual position and ascribing these consequences as subconscious motives for adherence to the position, the rationality of the position is implicitly denied. Arguing on the same level one could investigate the discontents motivating Myrdal and Sapir to their judgments of cultural determinists. This absurdity points to a consequence of the diffusion of determinism: attention is directed from the validity to the unconscious causes of propositions.[16]

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[12]Gordon W. Allport, *Personality* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), pp. 194, 196.

[13]Sigmund Koch, "Behavior as 'Intrinsically' Regulated: Work Notes towards a Pre-Theory of Phenomena Called 'Motivational'," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1956*, ed. by Marshall R. Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956), pp. 42–87.

[14]Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 1031.

[15]Edward Sapir, "The Emergence of a Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures," *Culture, Language, and Personality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956), p. 198.

[16]Cf. Reinhard Bendix, "Social Science and the Distrust of Reason," *University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions*, I (1951), 1–42; also n. 26 of this article.

II

A way out of this dilemma is pointed out by cognitive psychologists. ". . . There is in the very functioning of sensori-motor operations a search for coherence and organization."[17] The process of coming to terms with the environment is not a passive one. The individual actively seeks new experience and endeavors to control the physical and social environment. Recognition of this behavior is made by the use of such terms as "curiosity,"[18] "cognitive placing need,"[19] and "exploratory drive."[20] Many professional biologists, too, have emphasized that the behavior of men is based upon the anticipation of future in symbols.[21] Nissen,[22] a physiological psychologist, argues that this "need of mind" is more significant in the determination of choices within the human social fabric than the viscerogenic drives which have occupied central attention in experimental research in motivation. This tendency has had the valuable effect of redirecting attention to cognitive behavior. Posed in the terminology of drives or "hypothetical constructs," it does not do more than this. It posits a term corresponding with this class of behavior, but is an elliptical explanation. The task it poses for a theory of personality is that of abstracting significant dimensions along which cognitive behavior varies, can be measured, and from which predictions of behavior can be made.

The ubiquity of needs cannot be ignored. Yet they are inadequate theoretical tools for the understanding of normal human behavior.[23] "But man may decide against meeting his need—of food, for instance, as Mahatma Gandhi does from time to time. . . . This capacity is not so much intelligence . . . it is the possibility of disengaging oneself temporarily from the vital urgencies and remaining free for activities which in themselves are not satisfactions of needs . . ."[24] A child may resist the pangs of hunger, the desire for sleep, or even simple considerations of his own bodily safety as he explores and manipulates his environment. A man will suffer even more prolonged and intense deprivation to pursue an interest or for the sake of a value.

The recognition of *possibility*, other than actuality, depends upon man's ability to make symbolic abstractions. The flow of unique events which con-

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[17]Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932).

[18]Harry F. Harlow, "Motivational Forces Underlying Learning," *Learning Theory, Personality Theory and Clinical Research: the Kentucky Symposium* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1954), pp. 36–53.

[19]Edward C. Tolman, "A Psychological Model," *Toward a General Theory of Action*, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[20]Leon Festinger, "Motivation Leading to Social Behavior," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954*, ed. by Marshall R. Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954).

[21]E.g., Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Theoretical Models in Biology and Psychology," *Theoretical Models in Personality Theory*, ed. by David Krech and George S. Klein (Durham: Duke University Press, 1952), pp. 24–38.

[22]Henry W. Nissen, "The Nature of the Drive as Innate Determinant of Behavioral Organization," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954*, ed. by Marshall R. Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954), pp. 281–321.

[23]Cf. Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1950), p. 235: ". . . In the case of personality as with other human topics, the first thing that catches the attention is not the normal behavior (which is taken for granted) but the abnormal. We therefore know more about personality *dis*integration than we know about personality integration."

[24]Ortega y Gasset, "Man the Technician," *Toward a Philosophy of History*, trans. Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 90–93.

stitutes experience is structured by the mental imposition of bi-polar categories.[25] The process of abstraction reduces the complexity of the environment: it does not reproduce it. Phenomena of persistence and change are seen in terms of these categories: realationships are inferred. The adequacy of anticipation depends upon the goodness of fit of the categories with recalcitrant experience.

The symbols with which abstractions are made arise in social communication.[26] Gestalt psychologists have made clear three necessary conditions for communication: the structural similarity of the perception of different individuals, the isomorphism or correspondence of experience and action; and the axiom of the objective character of the surroundings. The awareness of differences in perspective emerges in contrast to the underlying unity of psychological experience.

It is our association of categories that are our predictions or anticipations of the future, and form the structure of knowledge. The way in which these associations are formed and validated is a significant variable of cognitive activity, of especial importance for the intellectual function of education.

III

There is variation in the tolerance for deliberation in individual strategies for decision-making. Deliberation is a suspension of decision while a variety of possible associations are mentally or experientially projected. Some individuals use the most proximate clues or associations as a basis for decision-making. There is an impulsion toward action and an intolerance for ambiguity.[27] In general such individuals would be termed "practical" as opposed to "philosophical" or "theoretical." Limited thinking may lead to unanticipated consequences and be viewed in retrospect, or from the outside, as "romantic" or "unrealistic," rather than "practical." Extreme intolerance for deliberation implies following the clues provided in the immediately given context. The individual is a "will-o'-the-wisp," following the fads of the moment, driven by the winds of circum-

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[25] Jerome S. Brunner, Jacqueline G. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 246: ". . . virtually all cognitive activity involves and is dependent on the process of categorizing. More critical still, the act of categorizing derives from man's capacity to infer from sign to significate,. . ."

[26] There is a growing literature in anthropology illustrating the differences in the concepts provided by the languages of different groups, and the congruence of these concepts with the cultural functioning and interests of the societies: e.g., W. H. R. Rivers, "Vision," *Physiology and Psychology*, Vol. II of *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straights*, ed. by A. C. Haddon (6 Vols.; Cambridge: the University Press, 1901–1935), pp. 1–132; B. L. Whorf, *Four Articles on Metalinguistics* (Washington: Foreign Institute, Department of State, 1950); D. D. Lee, "Conceptual Implications of an Indian Language," *Philosophy of Science*, V (January, 1938), 89–102. Generalization from this evidence and from Karl Mannheim's analysis of the "sociology of knowledge", especially *Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Society of Knowledge*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), has given rise to a linguistic extension of cultural relativism. Radicalization of the "ideology" concept denies the possibility of objective knowledge. Since Marx "put Hegel on his feet" the problem of the social determination of knowledge has not ceased to plague social scientists. A discussion of the relation of language to culture is to be found in Dr. Roger W. Brown's "Appendix" to Bruner *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–312, and a critique of cultural relativism in Asch, *op. cit.*, *passim*. We might point out that the propositions of the relativists, themselves, make an implicit claim to be "knowledge"; the meaning of "knowledge," the criteria for the warrantability of propositions, is logically prior to any proposition asserting the conditions or causes of knowledge. Cf. Felix Kaufmann, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

[27] Else Frenkel-Brunswick, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable," *Journal of Personality*, XVIII (September, 1949), 108–143.

stance. Riesman's "other-directed" personality[28] falls toward this end of the continuum.

Deliberation involves the consideration of alternative forms of action, an evaluation of the possible consequences, and the subordination of immediate ends to long-run values. The deliberative actor carefully observes the consequences of his acts in order that future behavior may lead him more easily and directly to his goal. A deliberative orientation, too, can be carried to an uneconomical extreme where "action is sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought," and the individual is incapacitated for decisive action.

At the extreme of immediacy we find action to be impulsively disorganized, each decision compartmentalized in accord with the exigencies of the moment, largely controlled, therefore, by external pressures; at the other extreme consequences occur by default because of the inability to order the claims of incompatible ends.

This dimension of cognitive variability has been analyzed by Kurt Goldstein and Martin Scheerer in terms of concrete and abstract attitudes.[29]

> *The concrete attitude is realistic.* It does not imply conscious activity in the sense of reasoning, awareness or a self-account of one's doing. We surrender to experiences of an unreflective character: we are confined to the immediate apprehension of the given thing or situation in its particular uniqueness. . . .
>
> *The abstract attitude embraces more than merely the "real" stimulus in its scope.* . . . We transcend the immediately given situation, the specific aspect or sense impression: we abstract common from particular properties;. . . . We detach ourselves from the given impression, and the individual thing represents to us an accidental example or representation of a category. The abstract attitude is the basis for the following *conscious* and *volitional* modes of behavior:
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 4. To shift reflectively from one aspect of the situation to another.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 7. . . . to form hierarchic concepts.
> 8. To plan ahead ideationally; to assume an attitude towards the "mere possible" and to think or perform symbolically.

While Goldstein and Scheerer have applied this dimension primarily to a study of organic pathology, and hence tend to dichotomize the description, they indicate that it is a continuous variable.

The normal individual develops an integrated preference system. Incompatible ends (because of the scarcity of time and effort, as well as of mutual exclusiveness) are ordered into a hierarchy of value which makes choice possible.[30] Later decisions are affected by earlier decisions; there is personal continuity and inertia. The matured personality usually has a high degree of autonomy *vis-a-vis* the social situation at any particular moment.

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[28]David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of Changing American Character* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

[29]Kurt Goldstein and Martin Scheerer, "Abstract and Concrete Behavior: an Experimental Study with Special Tests," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. LIII, No. 239 (1941).

[30]Lecky, *op. cit.*; Carl Rogers, "Divergent Trends in Methods of Improving Adjustment," *Harvard Educational Review*, XVIII (Fall, 1948), 209–219: "As I study, as deeply as I am able, the recorded clinical cases which have been so revealing of personal dynamics, I find what seems to be a very significant thing. I find that the urge for a self-determined integration, the tendency to strive, even through much pain, toward a socialized maturity, is as strong as—no, is stronger than—the desire for a comfortable dependence, the need to rely upon external authority for assurance. . . ."

The structure of interests of a personality is not itself a conscious goal of action, but an observational abstraction from the manifest choices or preferences of an individual. This "style" can usefully be referred to as the "latent structure"[31] of personality.

One dimension by which to analyze the latent structure of personality has been provided by directing attention to the variation in deliberative and evaluative activity prior to the making of a decision. This can be conceived as a continuum from an immediate affectivity for proximate ends to an analytical and deliberative mode of strategy of decision-making.

The objects of interest are either social or non-social. Most people are interested in both people and things, and their interrelations, but the emphasis or extent to which their attention is attracted one way or the other places them on a continuum running between the two.

IV

The possible combinations of these two dimensions yield four resulting "vectors" by means of which "orientations" of personality may be conceptualized: the deliberative orientation toward the social environment, characterized by an analytical approach to society; the deliberative approach toward the non-social environment, characterized by interest in natural science; the non-deliberative orientation to the social environment, characterized by dependence upon esteem and sanctions of others; and the non-deliberative orientation toward the non-social environment, characterized by an affective appreciation of things.

Prudence is the quality of deliberative and judicious adaptation of means to ends in social conduct. "Suppose, e.g., that we say a man is 'prudent.' Concretely, that means that he takes out insurance, hedges in betting, looks before he leaps . . . As a constant habit in him, a permanent tone of character, it is convenient to call him prudent in abstraction from any of his acts. . ."[32] The prudent individual reflects upon alternative possibilities of social action, and is concerned with the long-run consequences of acts. He will renounce opportunities for the immediate gratification of proximate ends where this may conflict with more remote or general values. He seeks to rationalize his social environment by widening his scope of cognition, rather than by narrowing or compartmentalizing it, and thus is motivated toward the behavioral sciences.

In Aristotle's division of the "higher virtues," prudence is the use of reason in social conduct, while theoretic activity is the use of reason to apprehend the nature of things.[33] Following this suggestion, the concurrence of the deliberative mode with interest in the non-social environment is here denoted as "theoretic."

The concurrence of the non-deliberative mode with orientation toward the social environment is designated "immediate." The "immediate" individual assumes the proximate goals emerging from the social environment. He is responsive to the sanctions of others and seeks their esteem. His means toward success may be manipulative or vicarious fantasy.

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[31] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954).

[32] William James, *The Meaning of Truth* (New York, etc.: Longmans Green and Co., 1910), p. 148.

[33] Aristotle, *Nichmachean Ethics*, trans. Sir David Ross (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), x, 5–8.

The immediate responsiveness to the non-social environment is designated as "aesthetic." Prior to Baumgarten's application of the word to "criticism of taste," the word referred to the direct sensory perception of the environment.

> To catch the passing phenomenon in all its novelty and idiosyncrasy . . . does violence to intellectual instinct and involves an *aesthetic* power of sinking into a stream of sensation, having thrown overboard all rational ballast and escaped at once the inertia and the momentum of practical life.[34] (Italics provided.)

These four vectors are abstractions from the complexity of factors influencing particular decision. On any given choice considerable idiosyncratic variation is to be expected. Yet the assumption of any scheme of classifying personality is that behavior is not random. When a character trait is assigned to an individual it is assumed that it has predictive relevance in a variety of situations. We do not expect a mild gentleman to display choleric temper at slight provocation. If he should, we would suspect that we had miscategorized him or that our categories were inadequate. If behavior were completely unpredictable along a mildness-irascibility dimension, it would be an inopportune category since it would warrant no expectations. It would rapidly be abandoned as a character category, or, rather, should never have arisen. The usefulness of any scheme of categorization depends upon its efficiency in prediction rather than *a priori* argument.

If an individual who selects proximate social ends over ends reflecting a process of deliberation in a number of situations can be reliably expected to select such ends in a further choice situation, then categorizing him as relatively more "immediate" than "prudent" is of predictive value. The contrast is conceived as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy, however. The most "immediate" individual would prefer proximate ends in all choice situations, while a slightly deliberative individual would choose proximate ends over those requiring a high degree of "prudence," yet would make some relatively "prudent" choices, etc. Thus it is necessary to devise an instrument that will reliably rank order the individuals in terms of the latent structure of their orientations toward the four vectors.

Contrasting each vector with the remaining three yields six scales along which individuals are to be ranked; i.e., prudent vs. theoretic, prudent vs. immediate, prudent vs. aesthetic, theoretic vs. immediate, theoretic vs. aesthetic, and aesthetic vs. immediate. An assumption is made that the six continua represented by the reversal of the six just mentioned—theoretic-prudent, immediate-prudent, and so on—provide us with no new concepts. Theoretic-prudent is assumed to be the obverse of prudent-theoretic.

While any choice of behavior an individual might make could be categorized according to this conceptual scheme, it is not suggested that these dimensions are necessarily the most relevant in accounting for all behavior. Any historical event is far too complex for a single theory to reproduce it. Being "theoretic" or "aesthetic" by no means fully describes an individual, just as being "mild" did not exhaust the attributes of the aforementioned gentleman. These dimensions would, however, seem to be particularly relevant to an understanding of attitudes towards school subjects. The justification for this schematization of behavior must be pragmatic.

(*Continued on page 285*)

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[34]George Santayana, *The Life of Reason* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 23.

ANOTHER NOTE ON "THE METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JOHN DEWEY"

BY MARCUS BROWN

DOROTHY J. NEWBURY'S ANALYSIS OF CLYDE V. MARTIN'S ACCOUNT OF DEWEY'S "METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT" MUST BE CONSIDERED AS SUCCINCT A REPLY as one could demand to the kind of material that she chose to criticize.[1] In connection, incidentally, with the practice of publishing reader reactions here in the form of brief notes (such as Professor Newbury's), it seems to me that this can only serve to increase reader interest and tend to keep contributors on their intellectual and scholarly toes.

I am unable to confirm Professor Newbury's claim that

> It is likely that the bibliography alone of Dewey's writings on metaphysics *before 1900* occupies more lines of type than the entire article under discussion.[2]

Of course, this claim may be said to revolve on the pivotal question of what she meant by "metaphysics." Since *My Pedagogic Creed* would be included in her list of "Dewey's writings on metaphysics," I find it difficult to imagine what would be excluded. If, however, "Dewey's writings on metaphysics" is less ambiguously read as "Dewey's writing *about* metaphysics," I do not find that there would be more than three articles in this category.[3]

This question is important for Professor Martin's paper (as Professor Newbury clearly realized). Even if one sticks to Dewey's 'major' works for study of his metaphysical development, one would avoid much of Dewey's primary writings *about* metaphysics. Surely, it is reasonable to assume that his pronouncements *about* metaphysics are likely to be significant for any adequate account of his metaphysical development. Granted that there is a distinction to be made between what one does and what one says one does; but to ignore what Dewey says *about* metaphysics, in an account of what Dewey's metaphysics is alleged to be, is to avoid one of the major challenges that Dewey had to offer. Yet, as I see it, the most outstanding trait in the history of the accounts of Dewey's

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[1]Newbury, Dorothy J. "A Note on 'The Metaphysical Development of John Dewey'," *Educational Theory*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (July, 1958), pp. 186–7.

Martin, Clyde V. "The Metaphysical Development of John Dewey," *Educational Theory*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 55–8.

Professor Martin did not attribute *My Pedagogic Creed* to the alleged second phase of Dewey's metaphysical development, as Professor Newbury maintains.

[2]Newbury, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[3]Dewey, John. "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Vol. XVI (April, 1882), pp. 208–13.

Dewey, John. "The Philosophic Renascence in America," *The Dial*, Vol. XVIII (1 February, 1895), pp. 80–2.

Dewey, John. "The Metaphysical Method in Ethics," *The Psychological Review*, Vol. III (March, 1896), pp. 181–8.

metaphysics is the constant failure to take into account what Dewey says *about* metaphysics.

Dewey's *first* significant consideration of the relation of metaphysical inquiry to the knowing process takes place in *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). The *most* significant publication by Dewey on the subject of metaphysical inquiry was appropriately entitled "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry."[4] Written in 1915, it represents the sum total of what he had to say on the subject and remains his *only* 'formal' announcement of these views. It is the *only* writing of Dewey's exclusively devoted to the explanation of his position regarding metaphysical inquiry. The *only* possible exceptions to this that one might wish to claim would have to refer to the rejoinders made by Dewey to those to whom he found it necessary to reply on questions of what metaphysics he could be said to employ or espouse.

To allege, incidentally, as Professor Martin does, that "the only sustained exposition of these [metaphysical] foundations [of Dewey's] is found in *Experience and Nature*," seems not to take into account Dewey's response to Santayana's similarly peculiar review of this work. Dewey then stated:

> If there is any novelty in *Experience and Nature*, it is not, I should say, this "metaphysics" which is that of the common man, but lies in the use made of the method to understand a group of special problems which have troubled philosophy.[5]

The question of metaphysics in Dewey's philosophy has long been in need of exhaustive scholarly study.

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[4]Dewey, John. "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XII (24 June, 1915), pp. 337–45.

[5]Dewey, John. "Half-Hearted Naturalism," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIV (3 February, 1927), pp. 57–64 (quote on p. 59).

Santayana, George. "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXII (3 December, 1925), pp. 673–88.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE STUDY OF SCHOOL SUBJECTS

(*Continued from page 283*)

We have endeavored to schematize behavior according to a *sui generis*, rather than a derived, model, in terms which cut across motivational, learning, and perceptual categories. If behavior can be qualitatively differentiated in terms of these categories, and valid predictions of achievement be made, we contemplate a series of investigations into the modification of attitudinal structures by varying curricular practices. Additional testing of the usefulness of the theory will therefore come when it is used consciously to modify attitudes.

BOOK REVIEW

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION by D. J. O'Connor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957.

One should not review a book on the philosophy of education but rather write another book on *the* philosophy of education. For, I suppose that there is the philosophy of *education* as distinguished from the philosophy of something else. But one is treading much more cautiously in this field, if, as in a colleague's recent production, the procedure is that of "building" rather than introducing an audience to *the* philosophy of education. In all events "a" is more apt an adjective than "the". For we become embroiled in irrelevant controversy, when we bluntly fly in the face of contention and claim that the discipline of knowledge called "the philosophy of education" is one with a possible purpose of the discipline: the location of "the" philosophy of education. And we should tread more lightly than does author Professor O'Connor when he concludes his treatise by stating that "... the problems of the philosophy of education, if pressed far enough, become the traditional problems of philosophy." (p. 140) Doesn't this beg the issue of Dewey's threat to *traditional* philosophy when he suggested that "... philosophy may even be defined as *the general theory of education.*"? (p. 383, *Democracy & Education*, Macmillan Co., N. Y. 1916).

This much said, we have gone slightly beyond the title of this little volume and the author has led us directly to a central problem in the philosophy of education but he himself does not drink.

Is the philosophy of education many disciplines or one? Is the purpose of the philosophy of education to rise above controversy among philosophies to "the" philosophy of education? Cr is this merely one problem within the discipline of the philosophy of education?

Is the purpose of the discipline of philosophy of education to begin and end in controversy? Or is the purpose of philosophy of education to resolve controversy? Isn't resolution merely one aspect of controversy? Who has ever heard of a resolution that frees us *from* further controversy? Isn't the purpose of "resolution" to free us *for* further controversy? By the way, have you read "Queries", chapter XII in I. A. Richards "Speculative Instruments" (University of Chicago Press, 1955) where he poses a query concerning a theory of query? And where he suggests that queries and querying is all philosophy has to show for its age-long endeavors? Surely, we wouldn't suggest that the philosophy of education has any more honorable an objective, would we?

This will probably not be called a review at all. But merely a reopening of fresh wounds. In any event, read the volume. It has meat, other than the problems of education.

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EDUCATIONAL THEORY

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